This paper presents a model of dynamic competition between two firms that repeatedly engage in an innovative activity. The state of competition—measured by the difference between the number of innovations introduced by the firms—evolves stochastically according to their effort level. The structure of Markov perfect equilibria is identified. It is generally not true that competition is fiercest when firms are closest. Rather, firms invest under two distinct circumstances: while sufficiently ahead, to outstrip their rival and secure a durable leadership; while behind, to regain leadership and prevent the situation from worsening to the point where their rival outstrips them

This paper presents a model of dynamic competition between two firms that repeatedly engage in an innovative activity. The state of competition—measured by the difference between the number of innovations introduced by the firms—evolves stochastically according to their effort level. The structure of Markov perfect equilibria is identified. It is generally not true that competition is fiercest when firms are closest. Rather, firms invest under two distinct circumstances: while sufficiently ahead, to outstrip their rival and secure a durable leadership; while behind, to regain leadership and prevent the situation from worsening to the point where their rival outstrips them

Many believe that a key innovation by the Grameen Bank is to encourage borrowers to help each other in hard times. To analyse this, we study a mechanism design problem where borrowers share information about each other, but their limited side contracting ability prevents them from writing complete insurance contracts. We derive a lending mechanism which efficiently induces mutual insurance. It is necessary for borrowers to submit reports about each other to achieve efficiency. Such cross-reporting increases the bargaining power of unsuccessful borrowers, and is robust to collusion against the bank

This paper analyses the link between the internal organization of the firm and the growth process. We present a Schumpeterian growth model in which monopoly firms face agency costs due to collusion between managers inside the organization. These costs affect incentives to invest and the rate of innovation in the economy. When collusion is self-enforcing, higher growth and more creative destruction shortens in turn the time horizon of colluding agents in the organization and makes internal collusion more difficult to sustain. We analyse this two-way mechanism between growth and agency problems and show how the transaction costs of side-contracting within the firm and the growth rate of the economy are simultaneously derived

This paper analyses the link between the internal organization of the firm and the growth process. We present a Schumpeterian growth model in which monopoly firms face agency costs due to collusion between managers inside the organization. These costs affect incentives to invest and the rate of innovation in the economy. When collusion is self-enforcing, higher growth and more creative destruction shortens in turn the time horizon of colluding agents in the organization and makes internal collusion more difficult to sustain. We analyse this two-way mechanism between growth and agency problems and show how the transaction costs of side-contracting within the firm and the growth rate of the economy are simultaneously derived

We claim that the stock market encourages business creation, innovation, and growth by allowing the recycling of “informed capital”. Due to incentive and information problems, start-ups face larger costs of going public than mature firms. Sustaining a tight relationship with a monitor (bank, venture capitalist) allows them to finance their operations without going public until profitability prospects are clearer or incentive problems are less severe. However, the earlier young firms go public, the quicker monitors' informed capital is redirected towards new start-ups. Hence, when informed capital is in limited supply, factors that lower the costs for start-ups to go public encourage business creation. Technological spill-overs associated with business creation and thick market externalities in the young firms segment of the stock market provide prima facie cases for encouraging young firms to go public

I analyse social interactions that stem from the successive endeavours of new cohorts of heterogeneous decision makers to learn from the experiences of past cohorts. A dynamic process of information accumulation and decision making occurs as the members of each cohort observe the experiences of earlier ones, and then make choices that yield experiences observable by future cohorts. Decision makers face the "selection problem" as they seek to learn from observation of past actions and outcomes, while not observing the counterfactual outcomes that would have occurred had other actions been chosen. Assuming that all cohorts face the same outcome distributions, I show that social learning is a process of sequential reduction in ambiguity. The specific nature of this process, and its terminal state, depend critically on how decision makers make choices under ambiguity. I use the problem of learning about innovations to illustrate. Copyright The Review of Economic Studies Limited, 2004