Public regulation is increasingly facing competition from “private politics” in the form of activism and corporate self-regulation. However, its effectiveness, welfare consequences, and interaction with public regulation are poorly understood. This article presents a unified dynamic framework for studying the interaction between public regulation, self-regulation, and boycotts. We show that the possibility of self-regulation saves on administrative costs, but also leads to delays. Without an active regulator, firms self-regulate to preempt or end a boycott and private politics is beneficial for activists but harmful for firms. With an active regulator, in contrast, firms self-regulate to preempt public regulation and private politics is harmful for activists but beneficial for firms. Our analysis generates a rich set of testable predictions that are consistent with the rise of private politics over time and the fact that there is more self-regulation and activism in the U.S., while public regulation continues to be more common in Europe

We evaluate the efficiency of dynamic linked environmental regulation. Linked regulation allows inspectors who uncover violations at one plant to increase future enforcement at other plants that share a common owner. When compliance costs are correlated, regulators can then target scarce enforcement resources towards bad actors without inspecting everyone. We develop an empirical framework of dynamic moral hazard under linked regulation that allows for large portfolios of plants and for choices to be interdependent within the portfolio of plants and across time. Using the framework we evaluate a linked regulation scheme in Texas and find that linked regulation performs substantially better than both unlinked regulation and untargeted regulation. We test two alternative theoretical mechanisms that underpin the benefit—a “firm-wide moral hazard mechanism” and a “correlated targeting mechanism”—and find that a large share of the value of linked regulation is due to the former

This paper examines the role of the information contained in stock prices in the regulation of privatized firms. Stock prices contain noisy but unbiased information about firm's future prospects that regulators can use to decide on some regulatory policies. The main argument developed is that the observation of stock price movements reduces the incentives of regulators to develop their own monitoring technologies and can allow them to commit to relatively lighthanded regulations. This protects firm's investments in cost reduction activities and can increase ex ante welfare

Slayton and Treblicock (1978)), the formal analysis of the economics of the self-regulating profession has received little attention from theorists. If a profession is self-regulating, in the sense that its current members, being the sole suppliers of a certain type of service, are free to determine, in one way or another, whether or not to admit a potential recruit, then it might seem prima facie that such a profession could simply be regarded as a monopolistic seller of the service in question, so that the effects of self-regulation would appear to involve an unambiguous welfare loss. The whole rationale for self-regulation, however, rests on the notion that it provides a vehicle through which the quality of the service may be maintained in markets where the consumer cannot readily measure this quality himself. It is the analysis of the interplay of these two elements, the enhanced price of such services associated with the monopolistic power of the profession, and the improved quality of the service which may accompany a reduction in supply, which forms the focus of the present paper. It is tempting to begin the analysis of such a profession by first positing some particular

We study optimal enforcement in credit markets in which the only threat facing a defaulting borrower is restricted access to financial markets. We solve for the optimal level of exclusion, and link it to observed institutional arrangements. Regulation in this environment must accomplish two objectives. First, it must prevent borrowers from defaulting on one bank and transferring their resources to another bank. Second, and less obviously, it must give banks the incentive to make sizeable loans, and to honour their promises of future credit. We establish that the optimal regulation resembles observed laws governing default on debt. Moreover, if debtors have the right to a “fresh start” after bankruptcy then this must be balanced by enforceable provisions against fraudulent conveyance. Our optimal regulation is robust, in that it can be implemented in a way that does not require the regulator to have information about either the borrower or lender. Our results isolate the way in which specific institutions surrounding bankruptcy—namely rules governing asset garnishment and fraudulent conveyances—support loan markets in which borrowers have no collateral

We study collusion among firms against imperfectly monitored environmental regulation. Firms increase variable profits by violating regulation and reduce expected noncompliance penalties by violating jointly. We consider a case of three German automakers colluding to reduce the effectiveness of emissions control technology. By estimating a structural model of the European automobile industry from 2007 to 2018, we find that collusion lowers expected noncompliance penalties substantially and increases buyer and producer surplus. Due to increased pollution, welfare decreases by € 1.57–5.57 billion. We show how environmental policy design and antitrust play complementary roles in preventing noncompliance

In an industry where naturally monopolistic and competitive activities are vertically related, should the natural monopolist be allowed also to operate in the deregulated competitive sector? This paper assumes that monopoly pricing behavior is regulated and, therefore, the effect of vertical integration on the task of regulation is central to the analysis. When vertical integration by the monopolist is allowed, the regulator's task is made harder as the monopolist has anticompetitive incentives to raise rivals' costs. On the other hand, integration may lead to less duplication of fixed costs. The overall welfare comparison between separation and integration is ambiguous

Financial regulation is harmonized across countries even though countries vary in their ability to bail-out their banking sector in the event of a crisis. This article addresses the question of whether countries with different fiscal capacity should optimally have different bank regulation, implemented—among other tools—through capital requirements—a question so far ignored by the theoretical banking literature. I show that countries with larger fiscal capacity should have lower ex ante minimum bank capital requirements, in an environment with endogenously incomplete markets and overinvestment due to “Too-Big-To-Fail” moral hazard and pecuniary externalities. I also show that, in addition to a minimum bank capital requirement, regulators in countries with strong “Too-Big-To-Fail” moral hazard should impose a limit on the liabilities pledged by financial institutions in a crisis state. This implies limits on put options/credit default swap contracts. Finally, I argue that the type of regulatory instrument used is crucial as to whether larger fiscal capacity implies more- or less-stringent bank regulation

How does the shadow banking system respond to changes in capital regulation of commercial banks? We propose a quantitative general equilibrium model with regulated and unregulated banks to study the unintended consequences of regulation. Tighter capital requirements for regulated banks cause higher convenience yield on debt of all banks, leading to higher shadow bank leverage and a larger shadow banking sector. At the same time, tighter regulation eliminates the subsidies to commercial banks from deposit insurance, reducing the competitive pressures on shadow banks to take risks. The net effect is a safer financial system with more shadow banking. Calibrating the model to data on financial institutions in the US, the optimal capital requirement is around 16

For many goods and services such as electricity, health care, cellular phone service, debit-card transactions, or those sold with loyalty discounts, the price of the next unit of service depends on past usage. As a result, consumers who are inattentive to their past usage but are aware of contract terms may remain uncertain about the price of the next unit. I develop a model of inattentive consumption, derive equilibrium pricing when consumers are inattentive, and evaluate bill-shock regulation requiring firms to disclose information that substitutes for attention. When inattentive consumers are sophisticated but heterogeneous in their expected demand, bill-shock regulation reduces social welfare in fairly-competitive markets, which may be the effect of the Federal Communication Commission's recent bill-shock agreement. If some consumers are attentive while others naively fail to anticipate their own inattention, however, then bill-shock regulation increases social welfare and can benefit consumers. Hence, requiring zero-balance alerts in addition to the Federal Reserve's new opt-in rule for debit-card overdraft protection may benefit consumers