Knowledge that Transforms

This article investigates collective denial and willful blindness in groups, organizations, and markets. Agents with anticipatory preferences, linked through an interaction structure, choose how to interpret and recall public signals about future prospects. Wishful thinking (denial of bad news) is shown to be contagious when it is harmful to others, and self-limiting when it is beneficial. Similarly, with Kreps–Porteus preferences, willful blindness (information avoidance) spreads when it increases the risks borne by others. This general mechanism can generate multiple social cognitions of reality, and in hierarchies it implies that realism and delusion will trickle down from the leaders. The welfare analysis differentiates group morale from groupthink and identifies a fundamental tension in organizations' attitudes towards dissent. Contagious exuberance can also seize asset markets, generating investment frenzies and crashes.

This paper analyses the effect immigration has on the wages of native workers. Unlike most previous work, we estimate wage effects along the distribution of native wages. We derive a flexible empirical strategy that does not rely on pre-allocating immigrants to particular skill groups. In our empirical analysis, we demonstrate that immigrants downgrade considerably upon arrival. As for the effects on native wages, we find a pattern of effects whereby immigration depresses wages below the 20th percentile of the wage distribution but leads to slight wage increases in the upper part of the wage distribution. This pattern mirrors the evidence on the location of immigrants in the wage distribution. We suggest that possible explanations for the overall slightly positive effect on native wages, besides standard immigration surplus arguments, could involve deviations of immigrant remuneration from contribution to production either because of initial mismatch or immigrant downgrading.

We use variation in the degree of development of local credit markets and matched employer–employee data to assess the role of the firm as an internal credit market. We find that firms operating in less financially developed markets offer lower entry wages but faster wage growth than firms in more financially developed markets. This helps firms finance their operations by implicitly raising funds from workers. We control for local market fixed effects and only exploit time variation in the degree of local financial development induced by an exogenous liberalization, so that the effect we find is unlikely to reflect unobserved local factors that systematically affect wage–tenure profiles. We estimate that the amount of credit generated by implicit lending within the firm is economically important and can be as large as 30 percent of the bank lending. Consistent with credit market imperfections opening up trade opportunities within the firm, we find that the internal rate of return of implicit loans lies between the rate at which workers savings are remunerated in the market and the rate that firms pay on their loans from banks.

International audience

We consider a dynamic Mirrlees economy in a life-cycle context and study the optimal insurance arrangement. Individual productivity evolves as a Markov process and is private information. We use a first-order approach in discrete and continuous time and obtain novel theoretical and numerical results. Our main contribution is a formula describing the dynamics for the labour-income tax rate. When productivity is an AR(1) our formula resembles an AR(1) with a trend where: (i) the auto-regressive coefficient equals that of productivity; (ii) the trend term equals the covariance productivity with consumption growth divided by the Frisch elasticity of labour; and (iii) the innovations in the tax rate are the negative of consumption growth. The last property implies a form of short-run regressivity. Our simulations illustrate these results and deliver some novel insights. The average labour tax rises from 0% to 37% over 40 years, whereas the average tax on savings falls from 12% to 0% at retirement. We compare the second best solution to simple history-independent tax systems, calibrated to mimic these average tax rates. We find that age-dependent taxes capture a sizable fraction of the welfare gains. In this way, our theoretical results provide insights into simple tax systems.

This article analyses contract cancellation and product return policies in markets in which sellers advise customers about the suitability of their offering. When customers are fully rational, it is optimal for sellers to offer the right to cancel or return on favourable terms. A generous return policy makes the seller's “cheap talk” at the point of sale credible. This observation provides a possible explanation for the excess refund puzzle and also has implications for the management of customer reviews. When customers are credulous, instead, sellers have an incentive to set unfavourable terms to exploit the inflated beliefs they induce in their customers. The imposition of a minimum statutory standard improves welfare and consumer surplus when customers are credulous. In contrast, competition policy reduces contractual inefficiencies with rational customers, but it is not effective with credulous customers.

This paper investigates how precisely short-term, job-search oriented training programs as opposed to long-term, human capital intensive training programs work. We evaluate and compare their eects on time until job entry, stability of employment, and earnings. Further, we examine the heterogeneity of treatment eects according to the timing of training during unemployment as well as across dierent subgroups of participants. We nd that participating in short-term training reduces the remaining time in unemployment and moderately increases job stability. Long-term training programs initially prolong the remaining time in unemployment, but once the scheduled program end is reached participants exit to employment at a much faster rate than without training. In addition, they benet from substantially more stable employment spells and higher earnings. Overall, long-term training programs are well eective in supporting the occupational advancement of very heterogeneous groups of participants, including those with generally weak labor market prospects. However, from a scal perspective only the low-cost short-term training schemes are cost ecient in the short run.

In the 2001 U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), 27% of households report simultaneously revolving significant credit card debt and holding sizeable amounts of low-return liquid assets; this is known as the \\credit card debt puzzle". In this paper, I quantitatively evaluate the role of liquidity demand in accounting for this puzzle: households that accumulate credit card debt may not pay it off using their money in the bank, because they anticipate needing that money in situations where credit cards cannot be used. I characterize the puzzle in survey data, and calibrate a dynamic stochastic heterogeneous-agent model of household portfolio choice, where consumer credit and liquidity coexist as means of consumption and saving, where households consume a cash good and a credit good, and where cash consumption is subject to uncertainty. The model accounts for between 44% and 56% of the households in the data who hold consumer debt and liquidity simultaneously, and for 100% of the liquidity held by a median such household. Under reasonable calibration alternatives, the model can capture the entire puzzle group size as well. One-half of money demand in the model is precautionary.

We propose exact simulation-based procedures for: (i) testing mean-variance efficiency when the zero-beta rate is unknown, and (ii) building confidence intervals for the zero-beta rate. On observing that this parameter may be weakly identified, we propose LR-type statistics as well as heteroskedascity and autocorrelation corrected (HAC) Wald-type procedures, which are robust to weak identification and allow for non-Gaussian distributions including parametric GARCH structures. In particular, we propose confidence sets for the zero-beta rate based on "inverting" exact tests for this parameter; these sets provide a multivariate extension of Fieller's technique for inference on ratios. The exact distribution of LR-type statistics for testing efficiency is studied under both the null and the alternative hypotheses. The relevant nuisance parameter structure is established and finite-sample bound procedures are proposed, which extend and improve available Gaussianspecific bounds. Furthermore, we study the invariance to portfolio repacking property for tests and confidence sets proposed. The statistical properties of available and proposed methods are analyzed via aMonte Carlo study. Empirical results on NYSE returns show that exact confidence sets are very different from the asymptotic ones, and allowing for non-Gaussian distributions affects inference results. Simulation and empirical results suggest that LR-type statistics - with p-values corrected using the Maximized Monte Carlo test method - are generally preferable to their Wald-HAC counterparts from the viewpoints of size control and power.

We solve a multi-period model of strategic trading with long-lived information in multiple assets with correlated innovations in fundamental values. Market makers in each asset can only condition their pricing functions on trading in each asset. Using daily non-public data from the New York Stock Exchange, we test the model's predictions on the conditional and unconditional lead–lag relations of institutional order flow and returns within portfolios. We find support for the model prediction of positive autocorrelations in portfolio returns as well as the predictions for how informed order flow positively predicts future returns and future informed order flow. We show that these relations strengthen for portfolios formed from assets within the same industry, which likely have higher correlation of fundamental values. Furthermore, we discuss issues that arise when testing implications of strategic models with imperfect proxies for the underlying strategic behaviour.