Knowledge that Transforms

I show that the pricing of a bond liquidity shock depends on the current size of a firm’s bond rollover exposure. Using US corporate bond transactions data, I find that a market liquidity shock induces a larger yield spread increase among firms with nonzero rollover exposures. This effect is more pronounced for credit risky firms and increases in the size of the rollover exposure. Furthermore, I show that tests that do not control for the heterogeneity in firms’ rollover exposure policies provide biased estimates of the pricing impact of the rollover channel.

We show in a theoretical asset pricing model incorporating heterogeneous beliefs that the expected excess return on a risky asset depends on its exposure to the risk arising from innovations in the average belief of investors about the expected return of a representative asset. Using the actual EPS data and the analyst EPS forecast data provided by I/B/E/S, we construct a market-wide average belief measure, which we call “the earnings belief measure.” We find that the average return on stocks with high sensitivity to earnings belief shocks is 7.14% per year higher than that on stocks with low sensitivity. This positive relationship holds after accounting for traditional risk factors, is prominent among large-cap stocks, and is invariant across sentiment levels.

If regulation fails to differentiate between priced and idiosyncratic risk, it incentivizes investors to reach for yield. Studying securitization exposures on the balance sheets of German banks, I show evidence consistent with this prediction. Banks with tight regulatory constraints (low capital adequacy ratios) invest more in higher yielding ABSs conditionally on rating-implied regulatory risk weights. ABS investments of constrained banks tend to perform worse ex post in terms of collateral delinquency and lose value. Differences in bank sophistication, market power, or incentives to retain securitizations are unlikely to explain the riskier ABS investments of constrained banks.

We analyze how firm-level shocks to collateral values influence employment outcomes among US corporations. Using comprehensive employment data from the US Census Bureau, we estimate that employment expenditures increase by $0.10 per $1 increase in firms’ real estate collateral values. These effects are stronger among financially constrained firms, and additional hiring is funded through debt issuance, consistent with a collateral channel. This relation holds among firms in tradable goods sectors, alleviating concerns about local demand shocks. Thus, through a collateral lending channel, fluctuations in the US commercial real estate market are an important driver of corporate labor demand.

Firms affiliated with business groups survive the stress of the global financial and euro crises better than unaffiliated firms. Using granular data from Italy, we show that better performance stems partly from access to an internal capital market, as the survival value of group-affiliated firms increases with group-wide cash flow. Internal cash transfers increase when banks’ health deteriorates, with funds moving from cash-rich to cash-poor firms and, some evidence suggests, to firms with favorable investment opportunities. Internal capital markets’ role thus increases when external markets (banks) are distressed.

Margin capacity, defined as the aggregate excess debt capacity of investors buying securities on margin, strongly predicts (i) lower S&P 500 returns, (ii) lower growth in aggregate earnings, dividends, employment, and overall economic activity, (iii) higher macro, financial, and policy uncertainty, (iv) lower interest rates, (v) tighter lending standards by banks, and (vi) lower intermediary equity capital. High margin capacity is a precursor, not a response, to borrowing and intermediary constraints and higher volatility. It typically arises when levered investors with profitable past positions limit their leverage. We interpret that it reflects informed investors’ conservatism ahead of bad times.

By analyzing the portfolio allocations of target date funds (TDFs), we document that the observed durations of TDF portfolios are inconsistent with the durations predicted by classical portfolio theory. We call this stylized fact the duration puzzle. We investigate to what extent several extensions of classical portfolio theory can explain the duration puzzle. More specifically, we consider the impact of human capital, inflation risk, and portfolio restrictions on the duration of the optimal portfolio. We find that it is difficult to explain the duration puzzle, especially for individuals aged between 35 and 65 years.

We introduce a novel strategy to predict monthly equity premia that is based on extracted news from more than 700,000 newspaper articles, which were published in The New York Times and Washington Post between 1980 and 2018. We propose a flexible data-adaptive switching approach to map a large set of different news-topics into forecasts of aggregate stock returns. The information that is embedded in our extracted news is not captured by established economic predictors. Compared with the prevailing historical mean between 1999 and 2018, we find large out-of-sample (OOS) gains with an ROOS2 of 6.52% and sizeable utility gains for a mean–variance investor. The empirical results indicate that geopolitical news are at times more valuable than economic news to predict the equity premium and we also find that forecasting gains arise in down markets.

We examine how an investor collective action organization (ICAO) enhances activism by institutional investors. The ICAO initiated a new form of engagement—private meetings with independent directors to discuss governance proposals. Compared with a single investor acting alone, the ICAO has stronger incentives to engage in activism. Its dollar holdings and voting power are six times larger and predict direct access to the board and the firms it engages. Firms engaged by the ICAO are at least 58% more likely than non-engaged firms to adopt the ICAO’s governance proposals that include adoption of majority voting, say-on-pay, and specific compensation policies. Engaged firms also increase CEO incentive pay. An event study around the announcement of the ICAO’s formation shows a positive impact on value that increases in both dollar holdings and voting power. We conclude that institutional investors improve governance outcomes through collective action.

I find that aggregate asset growth constructed from bottom-up data negatively predicts future market returns both in and out-of-sample and this result is robust across G7 countries. I further show that aggregate asset growth contains information about future market returns not captured by traditional macroeconomic variables and other measures of investment or growth. The forecasting ability of asset growth is strongly correlated with its propensity to predict more optimistic analyst forecasts and subsequent downward revisions, earnings surprise, and systematic errors in investors’ expectations. The time-varying risk premium also appears key in explaining the documented return predictability.