Knowledge that Transforms

I analyze the effect of monetary policy actions on the cross-section of equity returns. Based on earlier theoretical work for the monetary transmission mechanism one can argue that changes in monetary policy should produce differentiated effects on firms and stocks with different characteristics. By using different portfolio sorts the results show that the impact of monthly changes in the Federal funds rate is greater for the returns of more financially constrained stocks (e.g., small and value stocks) than on the returns of stocks with a more favorable financial position (e.g., large and growth stocks). By using a VAR methodology, the results indicate that the negative effect of Fed funds rate shocks on stock returns comes from a corresponding negative effect on future expected cash flows (cash-flow news), which is stronger than the impact on future equity risk premia (discount rate news). Thus, cash-flow news is the main return component affected by changes in the Fed funds rate. These results are reasonably robust to different VAR specifications. Moreover, the dispersion in return responses to monetary shocks across stocks is explained by a similar dispersion in the effects into cash-flow news, which outweighs the dispersion in discount rate news betas. These results represent new evidence on the effect of monetary policy on stock prices and on the monetary transmission mechanism.

We examine whether equity issuances initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) are in part driven by investor sentiment by using equity mutual fund flows to proxy for the rational and/or irrational components of aggregate demand for equity. We find that more firms issue equity when flows are higher and repurchase equity when flows are lower. More firms file with the Securities Exchange Commission when predicted flows in the expected issuance month are greater. Price revisions are positively related to contemporaneous flows and unexpected flows. Initial returns are positively related to contemporaneous flows only for IPO issuances. These results are driven by retail, and not institutional, flows. Our evidence suggests that investor sentiment partially drives equity issuances.

This article studies how the allocation of control rights in bankruptcy influences outcomes. Using Hungarian data, we find that the large majority of bankrupt firms in our sample are maintained as going concerns despite the fact that these firms generate large operating losses and low recovery rates for pre-bankruptcy creditors. We trace the bias to the allocation of control rights between secured and unsecured creditors and the compensation scheme of the agent managing the bankruptcy process. Our findings shed light on a very important bankruptcy design question: how particular provisions of the bankruptcy code affect the costs of bankruptcy and the size of the pie available to pre-bankruptcy creditors.

I propose a new factor—the global downside market factor—to explain high returns to carry trades. I show that carry trades have high downside market risk, i.e. they crash systematically in the worst states of the world when the global stock market plunges or when a disaster occurs. The downside market factor explains the returns to currency portfolios sorted by the forward discount better than other factors previously proposed in the literature. GMM estimates of the downside beta premium are similar in the currency and stock markets, statistically significant and close to their theoretical value. High returns to carry trades are fair compensation for their high downside market risk.

This article studies the interaction between corporate hedging and liquidity policies. We present a theoretical model that shows how corporate hedging facilitates greater reliance on cost-effective, externally provided liquidity in lieu of internal resources. We test the model’s predictions by employing a new empirical approach that separates cash flow hedging from other hedging instruments. Using detailed, hand-collected data, we find that cash flow hedging reduces the firm’s precautionary demand for cash and allows it to rely more on bank lines of credit. Furthermore, we find a significant positive effect of cash flow hedging on firm value, where prior evidence is mixed.

We ask whether public financial aid reduces small businesses’ credit constraints. To answer the question, we analyze a policy of bank loans made from subsidized funds. Extensions of this large program are plausibly exogenous and help identify its effects. Using firm-level data, we find that the program substantially increases debt financing without substitution between subsidized and unsubsidized finance. Returns on subsidized debt are significantly above its market cost, with no subsequent surge in default risk. We interpret this as evidence that targeted firms are credit-constrained and underline the implied welfare differences between upfront financial aid and public guarantees.

Benchmarking, pay for luck, and the large compensation packages given to CEOs in recent years are three major controversial compensation practices. We examine the extent to which variation in the market for CEO talent explains these practices. We find that CEO compensation is benchmarked against other firms only in industries where CEO talent is not firm-specific, and that pay for luck is more prevalent there also. These findings are consistent with theories based on the market for CEO talent. However, CEO compensation levels do not depend on whether CEO talent is firm-specific, which seems inconsistent with the talent competition argument.

Using new monthly data, we investigate open-market repurchase executions of US firms. We find that firms repurchase at prices that are significantly lower than average market prices. This price discount is negatively related to size and positively related to market-to-book ratio. Firms’ repurchase activity is followed by a positive and significant abnormal return. Importantly, the market response occurs when firms disclose their actual repurchase data in earnings announcements, and this positive response is followed by a 1-month drift. Consistent with these results, we find that insider trading is positively related to actual repurchases.

We document a significant and robust connection between firm-level asset changes and return momentum. Momentum profits are large and significant for firms that have experienced large asset expansions or contractions, whereas they otherwise are small and often insignificant. The interaction pattern is not subsumed by previously documented drivers of momentum and shows up in market states where prior literature has documented an absence of momentum profits. Furthermore, we find a positive time series relationship between aggregate asset growth (AG) and return momentum, and the effect of aggregate AG is stronger than that of variables related to business cycles and investor sentiment. While most existing models of firm investment and momentum cannot explain our results, recent real options models appear to hold the most promise.

We investigate the role of sentiment and its implications for real assets. Using shipping sentiment proxies that capture market expectations, valuation, and liquidity, we construct sentiment indices for the dry bulk shipping market. Evidence suggests that sentiment affects the monthly returns of real assets. The empirical findings also show that market sentiment serves as a contrarian indicator for future cycle phases in all sectors. Furthermore, a sentiment-based trading simulation exercise on the sale and purchase of vessels shows that investors can benefit from higher returns compared to the buy-and-hold benchmark, while partially offsetting the highly volatile nature of the shipping industry.