Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines how shareholder investment horizons influence payout policy choices. The authors infer institutional shareholders' investment horizons using the churn rate of their overall stock portfolios prior to the payout decision. The authors find that the frequency and amount of repurchases increases with ownership by short-term investors to the detriment of dividends. They also find that the market reacts less positively to repurchase announcements made by firms held by short-term institutions. These findings are consistent with a model in which undervalued firms signal their value through repurchases, but firms held by short-term investors make repurchases more often because those investors care mostly about the short-term price reaction. Hence, the market rationally discounts the signal provided by such repurchases. Our findings suggest that shorter shareholder investment horizons might be one contributing factor to the increasing popularity of buybacks.

The focus of this article is on the predictive role of the stock-bond yield gap—the difference between the stock market earnings (dividend) yield and the 10-year Treasury bond yield—also known as the “Fed model”. The results show that the yield gap forecasts positive excess market returns, both at short and long forecasting horizons, and for both value- and equal-weighted stock indexes, and it also outperforms competing predictors commonly used in the literature. These findings go in line with the predictions from a present-value decomposition. The absence of predictive power for dividend growth, dividend payout ratios, earnings growth, and future one-period interest rates, actually strengthens the return predictability associated with the yield gap at very long horizons. By performing an out-of-sample analysis, the results show that the yield gap has reasonable out-of-sample predictability for the equity premium when the comparison is made against a simple historical average, especially when one imposes a restriction of positive equity premia. Furthermore, the yield gap proxies generally show greater out-of-sample forecasting power than the alternative state variables. An investment strategy based on the forecasting ability of the yield gap produces significant gains in Sharpe ratios.

Traditional theories of capital structure do not explain the puzzling phenomena of zero-leverage firms and negative net debt ratios. We develop a theory where firms adopt a net debt target that acts as a balancing variable between equityholders and managers. Negative (positive) net debt occurs in human (physical) capital intensive industries. Negative net debt arises because tradeable claims cannot be issued against transferable human capital. Heterogeneity in capital structure occurs when firms have debt that is not fully collateralized. Physical capital intensive firms take on high leverage but may underlever to avoid bankruptcy costs. This creates excess rents for managers (even if the supply of human capital is competitive) because wealth constraints prevent managers from coinvesting.

We provide evidence on the causal link between financing constraints and the risk of corporate cash flows and returns. For identification, we compare public US firms in the same industry, location, and size quintile, but whose access to bank credit was differentially affected by WorldCom’s demise in 2002. A credit shortage induces a permanent increase in the volatility and skewness of operating cash flows and an increase in the correlation between firm stock and market returns. We document how firms’ cash, payout, and investment policies respond endogenously to mitigate the impact of constraints on risk.

We document increased stock price comovement for companies added to major indices around the world. Using data on forty developed and emerging markets for 10 years, we find that in most markets, when added to a major index, firms experience an increase in their beta (especially if their pre-inclusion beta is low) and in the extent to which market returns explain firm stock returns (R2). Stock turnover and analyst coverage also typically increase upon inclusion. Various empirical tests suggest that the category/habitat views of Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler explain most of these results, although information-related factors also account for some findings.

We examine whether the trading activities of retail and institutional investors cause comovements in stock returns. Around stock splits, retail trading correlations (RTCs) decrease with stocks in the presplit price range and increase with stocks in the post-split price range. These shifts in RTCs induce changes in return comovements. In the cross section, return comovements among low-priced stocks are amplified when retail trades are more correlated and when aggregate uncertainty amplifies behavioral biases. We find similar patterns among local stocks and when firms change their corporate headquarters. In contrast to retail trading, institutional trading attenuates return comovements.

We provide the first empirical study of the relationship between corporate working capital management and shareholders’ wealth. Examining US corporations from 1990 through 2006, we find evidence that: the incremental dollar invested in net operating working capital is worth less than the incremental dollar held in cash for the average firm; the valuation of the incremental dollar invested in net operating working capital is significantly influenced by a firm’s future sales expectations, its debt load, its financial constraints, and its bankruptcy risk; and the value of the incremental dollar extended in credit to one’s customers has a greater effect on shareholders’ wealth than the incremental dollar invested in inventories for the average firm.

Between September 08 and June 09, a period with significant market events, we surveyed UK online-brokerage customers at 3-month intervals for their willingness to take risk, 3-month expectations of returns and risks for the market and their own portfolio, and self-reported risk attitude. This unique dataset allowed us to analyze how these variables changed over time, and whether changes in risk taking were related to changes in expectations and/or risk attitudes. Risk taking changed substantially during the period, as did return and risk expectations. Numeric assessments of return and risk expectations were only weakly correlated with corresponding subjective judgments. Consistent with the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, changes in risk taking were associated with changes in subjective expectations of market portfolio risk and returns, but less with changes in numeric expectations.

We examine the link between minority shareholders’ rights and corporate governance by studying institutional investors’ voting patterns in a concentrated ownership environment. Institutions rarely vote against insider-sponsored proposals even when the law empowers the minority. Institutions vote against compensation-related proposals more often than against related party transactions even when minority shareholders cannot influence outcomes. Potentially conflicted institutions are more likely to vote for insiders’ proposals than stand-alone investors, regardless of their effect on outcomes. A plausible conclusion is that empowering minority shareholders affects the selection of proposals but not actual voting; another is that empowering minority shareholders is ineffective without addressing conflicts of interest.

Based on a textual analysis of initial public offering (IPO) prospectuses, we obtain a number of important findings regarding the relation between the conservatism in prospectuses, IPO pricing, and subsequent operating and stock return performance. First, prospectus conservatism is positively related to underpricing, with the relation more pronounced for technology than nontechnology firms. Second, for nontechnology IPOs, prospectus conservatism is able to predict the firm’s post-IPO operating performance. Specifically, we find that conservatism is inversely related to the firm’s operating performance for the 3 years following the IPO. However, this predictability is limited to nontechnology IPOs. Finally, we find some evidence that for nontechnology IPOs conservatism is inversely related to the firm’s post-IPO abnormal stock return. We conclude that the conservatism contained in an IPO’s prospectus contains useful information about pricing and subsequent operating and stock return performance. Moreover, prospectus conservatism for nontechnology IPOs deserves more attention from investors.