Knowledge that Transforms

Dollar Cost Averaging is a strategy for purchasing equity securities that is widely recommended by professional investment advisors and commentators, but which has been virtually ignored by academic theorists and textbook writers. In this paper we explore whether the strategy is but another instance of irrational behavior by individual investors, or whether it is an investment heuristic that has survival value in an environment in which security prices exhibit mean reversion behavior that has only belatedly been recognized by academic theorists. Our evidence supports the view that the uninformed individual investors who follow this strategy in purchasing individual stocks to add to an existing portfolio are better off than if they followed the ‘rational’ strategies traditionally recommended by academics.

This study uses data that offers the unique opportunity to analyze how an unprecedented crisis suchas the September 11 tragedy influences expected returns and volatility forecasts of individual investors. Via e-mail, we asked a randomly selected group of individual investors with accounts at a German online broker to answer an internet questionnaire at the beginning of August 2001. A second e-mail to the investors who had not yet answered, scheduled five weeks later, was postponed due to the terror attacks until September 20, which was exactly the day with the lowest share prices in Germany in the year 2001. Based on the answers to questions concerning stock market predictions, we find that return forecasts of the investors in our sample are significantly higher after September 11, suggesting a belief in mean reversion. Our results show that investors interpret the largedrop in share prices during the ten day period after September 11 mainly as temporary rather than permanent. After the terror attacks, volatility forecasts are higher than before September 11. In two out of four cases, historical volatilities are overestimated. Therefore, investors are not generally overconfident in the way that they underestimate the variance of stock returns. Differences of opinion with regard to return forecasts are lower after the terror attacks whereas differences of opinion concerning volatility forecasts are mainly unaffected.

A fundamental unresolved issue is whether information asymmetries underlie investors' predisposition to invest close to home (i.e., domestically or locally). We conduct experiments in the United States and Canada to investigate agents' portfolio allocation decisions, controlling for the availability of information. Providing participants with information about a firm's home base, without disclosing its specific identity, is not sufficient to change investment behavior. Rather, participants need to know a firm's name and home base. Additional evidence indicates that participants have a greater perceived familiarity with local and domestic securities and, in turn, invest more in such securities.

The paper documents lack of awareness of financial assets in the 1995 and 1998 Bank of Italy Surveys of Household Income and Wealth. It then explores the determinants of awareness, and finds that the probability that survey respondents are aware of stocks, mutual funds and investment accounts is positively correlated with education, household resources, long-term bank relations and proxies for social interaction. Lack of financial awareness has important implications for understanding the stockholding puzzle and for estimating stock market participation costs.

This paper addresses the question of what determines where in a firm's hierarchy investment decisions are made. We present a simple model of a CEO and a division manager to analyze when the CEO will choose to allocate decision-making authority over an investment decision to a division manager. Both the CEO and thedivision manager have private information regarding the profit maximizing investment level. Because the division manager is assumed to have a preference for “empire”, neither manager will communicate her information fully to the other. We show that the probability of delegation increases with the importance of the division manager's information and decreases with the importance of the CEO's information. A somewhat counterintuitive result is that, in some circumstances, increases in agency problems result in increased willingness of the CEO to delegate the decision. We also characterize situations in which the CEO prefers to commit to an allocation of authority ex ante, instead of deciding based on her private information.Finally, even though the division manager is biased toward larger investments, we show that under certainconditions, the average investment will be smaller when the decision is delegated. These results help explain some findings in the empirical literature. A number of other empirical implications are developed.

This paper investigates the forecasting accuracy of bankruptcy hazard rate models for U.S. companies over the time period 1962–1999 using both yearly and monthly observation intervals. The contribution of this paper is multiple-fold. One, using an expanded bankruptcy database we validate the superior forecasting performance of Shumway's (2001) model as opposed to Altman (1968) and Zmijewski (1984). Two, we demonstrate the importance of including industry effects in hazard rate estimation. Industry groupings are shown to significantly affect both the intercept and slope coefficients in the forecasting equations. Three, we extend the hazard rate model to apply to financial firms and monthly observation intervals. Due to data limitations, most of the existing literature employs only yearly observations. We show that bankruptcy prediction is markedly improved using monthly observation intervals. Fourth, consistent with the notion of market efficiency with respect to publicly available information, we demonstrate that accounting variables add little predictive power when market variables are already included in the bankruptcy model.

Mergers and acquisitions improve market efficiency by capturing synergies between firms. But takeovers also impose externalities (both positive and negative) on the remaining firms in the industry. This paper describes a new equilibrium concept designed to explain and predict takeovers in this setting. We experimentally compare the new equilibrium concept to that of competing con-cepts in situations without and with externalities. Moreover, we examine the predicted dynamics of takeovers and outcome implications of those dynamics. Our experimental results support the predictions of the new equilibrium concept and provide implications for further empirical tests. 1.