Knowledge that Transforms

We use the text of financial stability reports (FSRs) published by central banks to analyze the relation between the sentiment they convey and the financial cycle. We construct a dictionary tailored specifically to a financial stability context, which classifies words as positive or negative based on the sentiment they convey in FSRs. With this dictionary, we construct financial stability sentiment (FSS) indexes for thirty countries between 2005 and 2017. We find that central banks’ financial stability communications are mostly driven by developments in the banking sector. Moreover, the sentiment captured by the FSS index explains movements in financial cycle indicators related to credit, asset prices, systemic risk, and monetary policy rates. Finally, our results show that the sentiment in central banks’ communications is a useful predictor of banking crises—a one percentage point increase in FSS is followed by a twenty-nine percentage point increase in the probability of a crisis.

This article shows that postcrisis stress tests have negative effects on entrepreneurship and innovation at young firms. Exploiting unique data on business-related home equity loans in Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, I show that stress-tested banks strongly cut small business loans secured by home equity, an important source of financing for entrepreneurs. Lower credit supply leads to a relative decline in entrepreneurship in counties with higher exposure to stress-tested banks. The decline is stronger in sectors with a higher share of young firms using home equity financing, that is, in which the reduction in credit hits hardest. More-exposed counties also see a decline in young firms’ patent applications as well as labor productivity, reflecting young firms’ disproportionate contribution to growth.

We examine how cross-country differences in capital regulations shape the structure of global lending syndicates. Using globally syndicated loans extended by banks from forty-four countries, we find that strictly regulated banks participate more in syndicates originated by lead lenders facing less stringent capital regulations. The resulting lending syndicates extend loans to riskier borrowers, charge higher spreads, forego covenants more frequently, and incur higher default rates. Such syndication activity also facilitates the access to credit by riskier corporations and exposes both participants and lead arrangers to greater systemic risk. Overall, our finding is consistent with the explanation that strictly regulated banks rely on the expertise of loosely regulated banks to procure risky deals outside the border.

From January 2011 through March 2018, the Bank of Japan purchased equity index exchange-traded funds (ETFs) worth about 3.5% of GDP. Identification of the effect of central bank ETF purchases on stock valuations and corporate responses is via differently-weighted and changing stock indices. BOJ purchases lift valuations, increase share issuances, and increase total assets. On average, the latter increase is due to cash and short-term securities rather than capital investment. However, firms with worse corporate governance do increase capital investment. These findings suggest central bank equity purchases are a problematic tool for stimulating economic growth through high broad-based private-sector corporate investment.

Firms rely on patenting and trade secrecy to protect their intellectual property. We study how changes in the trade-off between patenting and secrecy affect firms’ stock liquidity and financing outcomes. We show that an international trade agreement (TRIPS) that strengthened patent protection led to a 10.2% increase in patenting, accompanied by a 14.0%–27.1% improvement in stock liquidity for firms in patent-reliant industries. This in turn allows the affected firms to increase equity financing by 1.9% and reduce leverage by 5.9%. Our results suggest that policies that promote use of patenting over secrecy can reduce informational frictions in equity markets.

Directed links in cash flow networks affect the cross-section of risk premia through three channels. In a tractable consumption-based equilibrium asset pricing model, we obtain closed-form solutions that disentangle these channels for arbitrary directed networks. First, shocks that can propagate through the economy command a higher market price of risk. Second, shock-receiving assets earn an extra premium since their valuation ratios drop upon shocks in connected assets. Third, a hedge effect pushes risk premia down: when a shock propagates through the economy, an asset that is unconnected becomes relatively more attractive and its valuation ratio increases.

We offer new evidence on how currency risk is priced in the cross-section of global stock returns. The focus is on two currency risk factors—a dollar-risk factor and a carry-trade-risk factor—and their explanatory power for a variety of test assets comprised monthly returns for over 37,000 stocks from forty-six countries and over four decades. We obtain reliable positive evidence of the pricing of carry-trade factor risk and the implied premia are statistically significant and economically as expected. The pricing of the dollar-risk factor is less reliable. Our inferences depend critically on the inclusion of emerging markets.

We consider a macroprudential approach to analyze the optimal lending policy for the central bank, focusing on spillover effects that policy exerts on money markets. Lending against high-quality collateral protects central banks against losses, but can adversely affect liquidity creation in markets since high-quality collateral gets locked up with the central bank rather than circulating in markets. Lending against low-quality collateral creates counterparty risk but can improve liquidity in markets. We illustrate the optimal policy incorporating these trade-offs. Contrary to what is generally accepted, lending against high-quality collateral can have negative effects, whereas it may be optimal to lend against low-quality collateral.

We document changes in borrowers’ sensitivity to negative equity and show heightened borrower default propensity as a fundamental driver of crisis period mortgage defaults. Estimates of a time-varying coefficient competing risk hazard model reveal a marked run-up in the default option beta from 0.2 during 2003–06 to about 1.5 during 2012–13. Simulation of 2006 vintage loan performance shows that the marked upturn in the default option beta resulted in a doubling of mortgage default incidence. Panel data analysis indicates that much of the variation in default option exercise is associated with the local business cycle and consumer distress. Results also indicate elevated default propensities in sand states and among borrowers seeking a crisis-period Home Affordable Modification Program loan modification.

We study the effects of country-level creditor protections on the firm-level choice of debt structure concentration. Using data from forty-six countries, we show that firms form more concentrated debt structures in countries with stronger creditor protection. We propose a trade-off framework of optimal debt structure and show that in strong creditor rights regimes, the benefit of forming concentrated structures outweighs its cost. Because strong creditor protections increase liquidation bias, firms choose concentrated debt structures to improve the probability of successful distressed debt renegotiations. Firms with ex ante higher bankruptcy costs, including those with higher intangibility, cash flow volatility, R&D expenses, and leverage, exhibit stronger effects. Firms with restricted access to capital are also affected more. A difference-in-differences analysis of firms’ debt structure responses to creditor rights reforms confirms the cross-country results. Our findings are robust to alternative settings and a battery of robustness checks.