By analyzing the portfolio allocations of target date funds (TDFs), we document that the observed durations of TDF portfolios are inconsistent with the durations predicted by classical portfolio theory. We call this stylized fact the duration puzzle. We investigate to what extent several extensions of classical portfolio theory can explain the duration puzzle. More specifically, we consider the impact of human capital, inflation risk, and portfolio restrictions on the duration of the optimal portfolio. We find that it is difficult to explain the duration puzzle, especially for individuals aged between 35 and 65 years.

Many households concurrently hold low-yield liquid assets while incurring costly credit card debt. In our sample, more than 80% of households with credit card debt also have low-yield liquid assets. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study (N = 30,517), we examine the role of noncognitive skills as well as the economic, financial, and demographic factors that affect the likelihood of co-holding. We find that the “Big Five” personality traits have a statistically significant and economically important effect: households with a more agreeable, introvert, and less conscientious head of household are more likely to co-hold. We also examine the role of intra-household dynamics.

If a nonlinear risk premium in a conditional asset pricing model is approximated with a linear function, as is commonly done in empirical research, the fitted model is misspecified. We use a generic reduced-form model economy with moderate risk premium nonlinearity to examine the size of the resulting misspecification-induced pricing errors. Pricing errors from moderate nonlinearity can be large, and a version of a test for nonlinearity based on risk premiums rather than pricing errors has reasonable power properties after properly controlling for the size of the test. We conclude by examining the importance of moderate nonlinearity in the context of the investment-specific technology shock models of Papanikolaou (2011) and Kogan and Papanikolaou (2014).

We present a possible explanation for the lack of permanence of the very high levels of concentration of ownership that accompany leveraged buyouts. We first argue that some diffusion of ownership can be beneficial to the shareholders of a firm by encouraging the employees of the firm to enter into implicit contracts with the firm. The level of concentration of ownership that maximizes firm value is therefore that which trades off the well-known gains from monitoring with the gains from implicit contracting. We then argue that, in the process of concentrating the ownership of a firm that has excessively diffuse ownership to a level that maximizes firm value, investors in leveraged buyouts will choose an initial level of concentration of ownership that is very high. They will do so in order to put pressure on managers to breach existing implicit contracts. Following the breach of these contracts, investors will decrease the level of concentration of ownership to the level that maximizes firm value. There will be no further breach of implicit contracts, for such breach is incidental to the transformation of the firm from one that has excessively diffuse ownership to one that has the optimal level of diffusion of ownership. No change in the concentration of ownership therefore occurs once the level of diffusion of ownership that maximizes firm value has been attained.

This article develops and empirically tests a tractable general equilibrium model of corporate financing and investment dynamics in a trade-off economy where heterogeneous firms face unobservable disaster risk and engage in rational Bayesian learning. The model sheds light on leverage cycles. During periods absent disasters: equity premia decrease; credit spreads decrease; expected loss-given-default increases; and leverage ratios increase. Time-since-prior-disaster is the key model conditioning variable. In response to a disaster, risk premia increase while firms sharply reduce labor, capital and leverage, with response size increasing in time-since-prior-disasters. Firms with high bankruptcy costs are most responsive to the time-since-disaster variable. Disaster responses are more pronounced than in an otherwise equivalent economy featuring observed disaster risk. Empirical tests of novel corporate finance predictions are conducted. Consistent with the model, we find empirically that leverage and investment are increasing in time-since-prior-recessions, with the effect more pronounced for firms with low recovery ratios.

Variation in the composition of the defaulted debt pool and credit conditions at the time of default generate time variation in the distribution of recoveries on defaulted debt, and the related distribution of losses on portfolios of credit sensitive debt. We quantify the importance of accounting for such time variation in out-of-sample comparisons of alternative approaches to forecasting recoveries or losses given default (LGD) on defaulted bonds. Using simulations of losses on defaultable bond portfolios, we show that conditional mixture models improve forecasts of expected credit losses through capturing time variation in the recovery/LGD distribution. However, the best forecasts of instrument or firm-level recovery/LGD do not necessarily provide the best forecasts of portfolio-level losses, as the latter depend on the association between errors in the default and recovery/LGD forecasts. Our systematic comparisons of cross-sectional and intertemporal forecasting performance are enabled by a fast maximum-likelihood approach to estimating conditional mixtures of distributions.

In this article, we show that when banks increase their use of wholesale funding they shorten the maturity of loans to corporations. This effect appears to be linked to banks’ exposure to rollover risk resulting from their increasing use of short-term uninsured funding. Banks that use more wholesale funding shorten both the maturity of newly issued loans and the maturity of their loan portfolios. These results are not present among banks that rely predominantly on insured deposits. The link between wholesale funding and loan maturity is robust, and holds when we include firm-year fixed effects, suggesting that the decline in loan maturity is bank driven. In line with this premise, we find that the slope of the loan yield curve becomes steeper for banks that use more wholesale funding and that borrowers turn to the bond market to raise funding with longer maturity in response to banks’ loan maturity shortening.

This paper examines the relation between information differences across investors (i.e., information asymmetry) and the cost of capital and establishes that with perfect competition information asymmetry makes no difference. Instead, a firm’s cost of capital is governed solely by the average precision of investors’ information. With imperfect competition, however, information asymmetry affects the cost of capital even after controlling for investors’ average precision. In other words, the capital market’s degree of competition plays a critical role for the relation between information asymmetry and the cost of capital. This point is important to empirical research in finance and accounting.

Multiple delivery specifications exist on nearly all commodity futures contracts. Sellers are typically allowed to choose among several grades of the underlying commodity. On the delivery day, the futures price converges to the spot price of the cheapest-to-deliver grade rather than to that of the par-delivery grade of the commodity, thereby imposing an additional delivery risk on hedgers. This paper derives the optimal production and futures hedging strategy for a risk-averse competitive firm facing delivery risk. We show that the option value of the multiple delivery specification induces the firm to produce more with than without the delivery risk if the firm gauges this value higher than the market. We further show that if the delivery risk is additively related to the commodity price risk, the firm optimally under-hedges its risk exposure. On the other hand, if the delivery risk is multiplicatively related to the commodity price risk, the firm may optimally choose an under- or over-hedge which we illustrate using a numerical example.

In the USA, state-level exemptions determine the amount of property that individuals can protect from creditor liquidation during the debt settlement process. We exploit within-metropolitan statistical area variation in personal bankruptcy exemptions created by state borders and a stacked regression approach to identify the spillover effects of these laws on business credit extended to small firms. Subsequent to exemption increases, we find a reduction of 1–2 percent in originations of business credit. The effect is strongest for the smallest firms, which are more financially constrained. We provide household-level evidence that both business debt and personal debt decline for borrowers whose home equity becomes covered by the exemption, suggesting an overall decrease in credit availability for small businesses. As a result, increases in exemptions lead to fewer small establishments and lower employment, especially in industries dependent on external finance, suggesting that negative real economic effects occur via a credit market channel.