Better measurement of the output produced and capital employed by firms substantially improves the ability to explain capital structure variation in the cross section. For every firm, we construct the set of other firms producing the same output using the set of product market competitors listed in the firm’s public Securities and Exchange Commission filings. In addition, we improve measurement of capital structure by explicitly accounting for leased capital. These two steps increase the explanatory power of the average capital structure of other firms producing similar output on a firm’s capital structure by 50% compared to using only the average unadjusted debt ratio of other firms in the same three-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. We provide evidence that the large explanatory power of the capital structure of other firms producing similar output is related to the assets used in the production process. Our findings suggest that what a firm produces and the assets used in production are the most important determinants of capital structure in the cross section.

Previous research documents differences in trading desk skills across management companies that result in significant variation in execution costs. In this paper, we utilize links between management companies and their institutional clients to explore variation in execution costs within management companies. For a subset of management companies, we find that systematic differences in execution costs exist across clients; these differences are comparable to the variation documented across management companies and persist over time. Clients who receive lower execution costs reward management companies with an increase in dollar trading volume. We find no evidence that the results are driven by broker commissions or differences in trading practices. Given the economic significance of our findings and implications for institutional investors, this aspect of execution should be recognized regardless of the ultimate source of the differences.

This paper investigates why traders hide their orders and how other traders respond to hidden depth. Using a logit model, we provide empirical findings suggesting that traders use hidden orders to manage both exposure risk and picking off risk. Using probit models, we show that hidden depth increases order aggressiveness. Our interpretation of this empirical evidence is threefold. First, hidden depth detection is possible and frequent. Second, when traders detecthidden volume at the best opposite uote, they strategically adjust their order submission to seize the opportunity for depth improvement. Third, traders' response when hidden depth is detected suggests either that they do not associate hidden orders with informed trading or that the risk of trading with an informed trader is widely offset by the opportunity for depth improvement.

We use a mean-variance approach to address the classic puzzle of British capital export in the 19th century. Our analysis shows that foreign securities listed in London offered significant diversification benefits to British investors. In simple terms, international diversification reduced risk. Conservative estimates of the optimal investment portfolio for a domestic investor suggest that the balance between foreign and domestic security offerings on the London Exchange was close to what classic equilibrium models of asset prices would suggest.

We price the risky component of specialness spreads—identified by their deviations from the expected auction cycle—within a dynamic term structure model estimated using daily prices of all outstanding Treasury securities and corresponding special collateral (SC) repo rates. This allows us to derive a time-varying SC risk premium that we quantitatively link to various price anomalies, such as the on-the-run premium. The SC risk premium explains about 80% of the on-the-run premium and a substantial share of other Treasury price anomalies, suggesting that unexpected fluctuations in the specialness spreads of recently issued nominal Treasury securities are a common risk factor.

Using simulations controlling for the ability to time the equity, bond, and money markets, we compare daily and monthly performance measures. Our main results highlight the joint importance of the fictitious timer’s trading frequency and the data sampling frequency for estimation. Specifically, daily timing measures are superior to those estimated monthly for daily timers, but inferior for occasional or monthly timers. Global measures show more robustness to differences in trading and data sampling frequencies. Finally, conditional measures do not improve upon unconditional ones, and results are similar for performance detection versus ranking.

This article examines whether agency conflicts introduced by securitization affect servicers’ asset liquidation decisions. We find securitized loans are 25.4–28.5 percent less likely to be liquidated via short sales than portfolio loans. Securitized loan servicers’ bias against short sales does not represent an agency conflict if short sale and real estate owned (REO) liquidations are equally efficient. However, we find REOs have significantly lower average liquidation prices, higher average liquidation expenses, and longer average liquidation times than short sales. Although short sales benefit investors, securitized loan servicers have a financial incentive to pursue REOs.

We assemble a property-level panel of appraiser-reported attributes associated with 4.6 million loan applications from 2013 to 2017 to test whether attributes were consistently reported. Appraisers have an incentive to misreport property attributes to justify higher appraised values to ensure that associated mortgage loans are approved. We focus on property transactions with multiple sets of attributes reported by the same appraiser within four quarters and find evidence consistent with an intent to inflate valuations through attribute misreporting. We find that strategic misreporting of attributes is prevalent across markets, and that highly leveraged borrowers whose appraisals had inconsistently reported attributes were 9.8 percent more likely to become seriously delinquent in their loan payments.