Knowledge that Transforms

We examine the effect of staggered changes in the state-level capital gains tax on venture capital (VC)-backed start-ups and show that an increase in the tax rate of VC firms reduces the quantity and quality of patents by the start-ups. The results are consistent with a reduction in VC firms’ incentives to provide effort: increases in the capital gains tax for VC firms lead to incrementally lower innovation exchanges between start-ups in the VC firm’s portfolio. VC firms also decrease the level of investment in start-ups and the size of their portfolio as well as increase the number of start-ups that they write off.

Mutual fund families set and report values of their private startup holdings, which affect the fund net asset value (NAV) at which investors buy/sell fund shares. We test three hypotheses related to the valuation practice: (i) information cost/access, (ii) litigation risk, and (iii) strategic NAV management. Consistent with (i), families with larger PE holdings and/or stronger information access update valuations more frequently in the absence of public information releases, their updates co-move less with other families, and their fund returns jump less at follow-on financings. We find no support for hypotheses (ii) or (iii). We also find that high-PE-exposure funds are subject to greater financial fragility.

This article develops a new approach to explain why risk factors constructed from index option returns are priced in the stock market. We decompose an option-based factor into three main components and identify the one responsible for the beta–return relationship. Applying this method to the bear risk factor proposed by Lu and Murray reveals that the negative correlation between bear betas and stock returns does not reflect systematic risk premia. Instead, it represents an anomaly closely related to the betting-against-beta puzzle. We trace the root of this anomaly to disagreement concerning the aggregate stock market. Our work reconciles the conflicting evidence concerning downside risk by showing that neither ex-post nor ex-ante downside risk is priced in the cross-section of stocks while making a methodological contribution that facilitates more accurate interpretation of option-based risk factors in future research.

An increasing number of studies depart from the rational expectations assumption to reconcile survey expectations with asset prices. While surveys are helpful to establish a link between subjective beliefs and investment decisions, precise inference about how investors depart from rational expectations can be challenging without relying on strong assumptions. In this article, we provide direct experimental evidence of how systematic distortions in investors’ expectations affect their risk-taking across market cycles. As mechanism, we identify an asymmetry in how individuals update their expectations across boom and bust markets. The documented mechanism is consistent with survey data and provides important implications for recently proposed asset pricing models.

This article studies how the three-way interaction among shareholders, creditors, and managers shapes firms’ executive compensation. Firms with a higher ownership share by “dual holders”—institutional investors that simultaneously hold equity and bond of the company—adopt a less risk-inducing compensation structure: less stock options and more inside debt. Exploiting financial institution mergers that increase or decrease dual ownership for portfolio companies, we identify a causal link between dual ownership and CEO compensation policies. Mutual fund proxy voting data suggest that shareholder voting is an important channel for dual holders to implement less convex contracts.

We study the effect of an asset’s volatility on the expected returns of European options on the asset. Deriving predictions from a stochastic discount factor model, we show that the effect depends on whether variations in the asset’s volatility are driven by systematic or idiosyncratic volatility. While idiosyncratic-volatility-induced variations only affect the option elasticity, systematic-volatility-induced variations also oppositely affect the expected return of the asset. Since the expected asset return (elasticity) effect dominates for options with more linear (non-linear) payoffs, systematic volatility prices sufficiently in-the-money (out-of-the-money) options with the opposite (same) sign as idiosyncratic volatility. Using single-stock calls as test assets, double-sorted portfolios and Fama–MacBeth (1973) regressions broadly support the model’s predictions.

We show that investors tend to hold the same securities as their parents. This intergenerational correlation is stronger for mothers and family members who are more likely to communicate with each other. An instrumental variables estimation and a natural experiment suggest that the correlation reflects social influence. This influence runs not only from parents to children, but also vice versa. The resulting holdings of identical securities increase intergenerational correlations in portfolio choice, exacerbate wealth inequality, and amplify the consequences of behavioral biases.

This article provides a comprehensive history of default risk for newly originated home mortgages in the USA over the past quarter century. The loan-level source data include the entire guarantee book for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. We track many loan characteristics and produce a summary measure of risk. Among our many results, we show that mortgage risk had already risen in the 1990s, planting seeds of the financial crisis well before the actual event. Our results also cast doubt on explanations of the crisis that focus on borrowers with low credit scores. The aggregate series are available for download at https://www.fhfa.gov/papers/wp1902.aspx.

We integrate bank and bond financing into a two-sector neoclassical growth model and identify an automatic stabilization effect due to endogenous bank leverage adjustment. We show that although bank leverage amplifies shocks, the increase of leverage due to a decline in bank equity partially offsets the post crisis decline of bank lending and accelerates economic recovery by reducing the persistence of the bank lending channel. In this case, endogenous leverage adjustment is an automatic stabilizer. Regulatory state-independent capital limits and wage rigidities impair the re-allocation of capital between sectors and weaken this automatic stabilization. A quantitative analysis of the US during the Great Recession shows that the magnitude of automatic stabilization can be significant and informs about potentially high costs of strict capital regulation or wage rigidities during banking crises.

This article examines the strategic nature of banks’ charitable giving by studying bank donations to local nonprofit organizations. Relying on the application of antitrust rules in bank mergers as an exogenous shock to local deposit market competition, we find that local competition affects banks’ local donation decisions. Using county-level natural disaster shocks, we show that banks with disaster exposure reallocate donations away from nonshocked counties, where they operate branches, and toward shocked counties. The reallocation of donations represents an exogenous increase in the local share of donations in nonshocked counties for banks with no disaster exposure and leads to an increase in the local deposit market shares of such banks. Furthermore, banks can potentially earn greater profits from making donations and tend to donate to nonprofits that have the most social impact. Overall, our evidence suggests that banks participate in corporate philanthropy strategically to enhance performance.