Knowledge that Transforms

We consider an incomplete market in the form of a multidimensional Markovian factor model, driven by a general marked point process (representing discrete jump events), as well as by a standard multidimensional Wiener process. Within this framework, we study arbitrage-free gooddeal pricing bounds for derivative assets, thereby extending the results by Cochrane and Saá Requejo (2000) to the point process case, while, at the same time, obtaining a radical simplification of the theory. To illustrate, we present numerical results for the classic Merton jump-diffusion model. As a by-product of the general theory, we derive extended Hansen-Jagannathan bounds for the Sharpe Ratio process in the point process setting.

Repudiations rarely occur due to their extreme nature. This paper provides an empirical study based on an original database: prices of a Tsarist bond traded in Paris before and after its repudiation by the Soviets. A structural VAR is used to disentangle French market shocks from repudiation specific ones. After the repudiation, we identify shocks that are related with bailouts, hopes of partial bailouts, negotiations with the Soviets and the Russian civil war. We argue that bond prices essentially reflected expected extreme events that never took place and were thus subject to a “Peso problem”.

This paper shows novel evidence on the mechanism through which financial constraints amplify fluctuations in asset prices and credit demand. It does so using contractual features of housing finance. Among agents whose housing demand is constrained by the availability of collateral, those who can borrow against a larger fraction of their housing value (achieve a higher loan-tovalue, or LTV, ratio) have more procyclical debt capacity. This procyclicality underlies the financial accelerator mechanism. Our study uses international variation in LTV ratios over three decades to test whether (a) housing prices and (b) demand for new mortgage borrowings are more sensitive to income shocks in countries where households can achieve higher LTV ratios. The results we obtain are consistent with the dynamics of a collateral-based financial accelerator in international housing markets.

San Giorgio (1407–1805) was a formal association aimed at protecting creditors' rights and reducing the risk of debt repudiation by the Republic of Genoa. The behavior of this institution is broadly consistent with debt models that predict lending if lenders can impose big penalties on debtors, and models in which lenders can differentiate between excusable and inexcusable defaults. San Giorgio shareholders enjoyed low credit risk but also lower returns on capital than those prevailing on comparable foreign assets for which creditors' protection mechanisms were lacking. The Republic's quid pro quo was a low cost of financing. Differences in credit risk were an important explanation of differences in long-term interest rates across countries in 16th and 17th century Europe, a point not sufficiently emphasized by the literature.

What is the impact of internationalization (firms raising capital and trading in international markets) on the liquidity of the remaining firms in domestic markets? To address this question, we assemble a panel database of nearly 2,900 firms from 45 emerging economies over the period 1989–2000, constructed from annual and daily data. First, we find evidence of migration. The domestic trading of firms that cross-list or issue depositary receipts in foreign public exchanges tends to decrease, while a significant proportion of their trading activity concentrates in international markets. Second, this migration is negatively related to the liquidity of the remaining firms in their home market through two separate channels. There are liquidity spillovers within markets: Aggregate domestic trading activity is positively associated with the liquidity of individual firms in the same market. Moreover, the proportion of trading abroad is negatively related to the liquidity of firms in the domestic market.

We provide empirical evidence that deviations from the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition display significant nonlinearities, consistent with theories based on transactions costs or limits to speculation. This evidence suggests that the forward bias documented in the literature may be less indicative of major market inefficiencies than previously thought. Monte Carlo experiments allow us to reconcile theseresults with the large empirical literature on the forward bias puzzle since we show that, if the true process of UIP deviations were of the nonlinear form we consider, estimation of conventional spot-forward regressions would generate the anomalies documented in previous research.

Economic theory suggests that asymmetric information between incumbents and entrants can generate barriers to entry into credit markets. Incumbents have superior information about their own customers and the overall economic conditions of the local credit market. This implies that entrants are likely to experience higher loan default rates than the incumbents. We test these theoretical predictions using a unique database of 7,275 observations on 729 individual banks' lending in 95 Italian local markets. We find that informational asymmetries play a significant role in explaining entrants' loan default rates. The default rate is significantly higher for those banks that entered local markets without opening a branch, suggesting that having a branch on site may help to reduce the informational disadvantage. We also uncover a positive correlation between banks' loan default rates in individual local markets and the number of banks lending in that market. We argue that these informational barriers can help to explain why entry into many local credit markets by domestic and foreign banks was slow, even after substantial deregulation.

Corners were prevalent in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. We first develop a rational expectations model of corners and show that they can arise as the result of rational behavior. Then, using a novel hand-collected data set, we investigate price and trading behavior around several well-known stock market and commodity corners which occurred between 1863 and 1980. We find strong evidence that large investors and corporate insiders possess market power that allows them to manipulate prices. Manipulation leading to a market corner tends to increase market volatility and has an adverse price impact on other assets. We also find that the presence of large investors makes it risky for would-be short sellers to trade against the mispricing. Therefore, regulators and exchanges need to be concerned about ensuring that corners do not take place since they are accompanied by severe price distortions.

Based on daily prices (amtliche Kurse) we estimate effective spreads of securities traded at the Berlin Stock Exchange in 1880, 1890, 1900 and 1910. Several extensions of the Roll measure are applied. We find surprisingly tight effective spreads for the historical data, comparable with similar measures of the MDAX and DAX at the end of the 20th century.