Knowledge that Transforms

We test whether measures of influence on regulators affect stress test outcomes. The large trading banks—those most plausibly ‘Too Big to Fail’ – face the toughest tests. Supervisory stress tests have a greater effect on large trading banks’ portfolios; the large banks respond by making more conservative (initial) capital plans; and, despite their more conservative capital plans, the large banks still fail their tests more frequently than other banks. In contrast, while we find little evidence that political or regulatory connections affect the quantitative element of the stress tests, these connected banks do face less scrutiny under its qualitative dimension.

Abstract The federal mortgage policy, the conforming loan limit (CLL), was spatially uniform before the 2008 crisis, despite remarkable heterogeneity across geography. I show that in areas that experienced a larger decline in the jumbo loan share following an increase in the CLL, lenders raised jumbo loan approval rates, lowered mortgage rates to defend short-term market share, extended credit to riskier borrowers, and incurred deteriorated asset quality in the long run. This result is not explained away by credit supply or demand changes, the bunching effect, or reverse causality. Instead, my evidence is consistent with a competition channel: the effect of CLL increases on jumbo loan credit expansion is significantly exaggerated in a more competitive jumbo-lending market. Overall, my findings suggest that the securitization policies of the government-sponsored enterprises can induce spillovers on the jumbo market segment and influence credit allocation.

Abstract Using a comprehensive dataset collected by the Federal Reserve, I find that over one-third of corporate loans issued by US banks are fully guaranteed by legal entities separate from borrowing firms. Using an empirical strategy that accounts for time-varying firm and lender effects, I find that the existence of a third-party credit guarantee is negatively related to loan risk, loan rate, and loan delinquency. Third-party credit guarantees alleviate the effect of collateral constraints in credit market. Firms (particularly smaller firms) that experience a negative shock to their asset values are less likely to use collateral and more likely to use credit guarantees in new borrowings.

Abstract Hedge funds that endorse the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) underperform other hedge funds after adjusting for risk but attract greater investor flows, accumulate more assets, and harvest greater fee revenues. Consistent with an agency explanation, the underperformance is driven by PRI signatories with low environmental, social, and governance (ESG) exposures and is greater for hedge funds with poor incentive alignment. To address endogeneity, we exploit regulatory reforms that enhance stewardship and show that the ESG exposure and relative performance of signatory funds improve post reforms. Our findings suggest that some hedge funds endorse responsible investment to pander to investor preferences.

Abstract Sustainable finance—the integration of environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) issues into financial decisions—is an increasingly important topic. Within companies, sustainability is no longer an ancillary issue confined to corporate social responsibility departments, but a CEO-level issue fundamental to the core business. Within the investment industry, sustainability used to be the exclusive domain of “socially responsible investors” who had social as well as financial objectives, but is now mainstream and includes investors with purely financial goals. This article introduces the RF Special Issue on Sustainability. It highlights three reasons for the rapid rise in sustainable finance—its financial relevance, its contribution to nonfinancial objectives, and investor tastes. It then summarizes the eight articles in the Special Issue, in particular drawing out their contributions to the literature. Finally, we offer ideas for future research.

Abstract In this article, we examine whether comovement in the stock prices of pairs of Chinese firms connected to the same political network are systematically shaped by the prevailing coordination versus competition incentives of that network’s politicians. We find strong evidence from 2000 to 2012 (Jiang’s and Hu’s regimes) that stock price comovement is affected by the embeddedness of the firm–politician ties within the network. Among pairs of firms connected to a network through a common politician, we document an increase in stock price comovement. For those pairs of firms connected to a common network via separate politicians (rather than a common politician), we document a relative decrease in stock price comovement. This negative effect suggests that politicians’ relationships within these political networks are generally adversarial rather than cooperative in nature. These results become significantly weaker during Xi’s regime from 2013 to 2017, suggesting that Xi’s anti-corruption campaign and state-owned enterprise reforms may have attenuated these political network effects on the firms. Our additional tests also show that stock price comovement becomes even more positive (negative) in settings which are expected to increase the coordination or decrease the competition (decrease the coordination or increase the competition) of the politicians.

Abstract We examine the personal investment decisions of 60,000 households following a cancer diagnosis. To create a control group that minimizes the likelihood that the results are confounded by lifestyle factors, we rely on households diagnosed with the same diagnosis but a few years later. Our estimates show that a cancer diagnosis reduces households’ willingness to take risks with their financial wealth. We use the vast heterogeneity among cancers regarding its impact on life expectancy (LE) and income to analyze through which channels cancer impact risk-taking. We find that cancers that have a greater impact on LE and income cause a larger reduction in risk-taking. These two channels account for about 40–90% of the estimated effects of cancer on personal investment decisions. We do not find any association between having dealt with cancer many years ago and current portfolio choices.

Abstract We show that lenders charge higher interest rates for mortgages on properties exposed to a greater risk of sea level rise (SLR). This SLR premium is not evident in short-term loans and is not related to borrowers’ short-term realized default or creditworthiness. Further, the SLR premium is smaller when the consequences of climate change are less salient and in areas with more climate change deniers. Overall, our results suggest that mortgage lenders view the risk of SLR as a long-term risk and that attention and beliefs are potential barriers through which SLR risk is priced in residential mortgage markets.

Abstract This article documents new and empirically important interactions between cash-balance and leverage dynamics. Cash ratios typically vary widely over extended horizons, with dynamics remarkably similar to (and complementary with) those of capital structure. Leverage and cash dynamics interact approximately as predicted by the internal-versus-external funding regimes in Myers and Majluf (1984, J. Finan. Econ., 13, 187–221.). Leverage is quite volatile when cash ratios are stable and vice-versa, while net-debt ratios are almost always volatile. Most firms increase leverage sharply as cash balances (internal funds) become scarce. Capital structure models that extend Hennessy and Whited (2005, J. Finan., 60, 1129–1165.) to include cash-balance dynamics explain some, but not all, aspects of the observed relation between cash squeezes and leverage increases.

Abstract We suggest that forward guidance, via publicly committing the central bank to future actions and creating associated expectations, fundamentally affects bank lending decisions independently of other forms of monetary policy. To test this hypothesis, we build a forward guidance measure based on the language used in the Federal Open Market Committee meetings and match this measure with syndicated loans. Our results show that expansionary forward guidance decreases corporate loan spreads and that this effect is stronger for well-capitalized banks lending to riskier firms. Forward guidance also affects nonprice lending terms, such as covenants, performance pricing provisions, and the loan syndicate structure. Additionally, banks tend to initiate new lending relationships with lower spreads after forward guidance issuance.