Knowledge that Transforms

We would like to inform all the readers and friends of the Review of Finance that there has been a change of guard among coeditors. Starting with this issue, Franklin Allen, Peter Bossaerts, Colin Mayer and Will Goetzmann are stepping down and are being replaced by Michael Brandt (Duke), Thierry Foucault (HEC Paris), Holger Mueller (NYU Stern) and Steven Ongena (Tilburg). We wish to express our gratitude to the departing coeditors for the splendid job that they have done for so many years: Franklin, Colin and Will since the start of the Review of Finance in 2004, and Peter since 2005. They have all played a crucial role in the journal's success with their hard work, good taste and ability to attract exciting and innovative papers. At the same time, we extend a very warm welcome to the new coeditors, who will contribute fresh energies as well as excellent competencies to the journal. We are also happy to inform you that Bernard Dumas will remain on board as coeditor, and that the departing coeditors have accepted to retain an active role in the journal: Franklin, Colin and Will as advisory editors, and Peter as associate editor.

Winners of the Best Paper Competition in Corporate Governance Get access Review of Finance, Volume 13, Issue 4, October 2009, Page v, https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfp027 Published: 01 October 2009

This paper argues, both theoretically and empirically, that sometimes no securities law may be better than a good securities law that is not enforced. The first part of the paper formalizes the sufficient conditions under which this happens for any law. The second part of the paper shows that a specific securities law – the law prohibiting insider trading – may satisfy these conditions. The third part of the paper takes this prediction to the data. We find that the cost of equity actually rises when some countries enact an insider trading law, but do not enforce it.

We perform an asset market experiment in order to investigate whether overconfidence induces trading. We investigate three manifestations of overconfidence: calibration-based overconfidence, the better-than-average effect and illusion of control. Novelly, the measure employed for calibration-based overconfidence is task-specific in that it is designed to influence behavior. We find that calibration-based overconfidence does engender additional trade, though the better-than-average also appears to play a role. This is true both at the level of the individual and also at the level of the market. There is little evidence that gender influences trading activity.

We analyze the effects that real-time domestic and foreign news about fundamentals have on the co-movement between stock returns of a small, open economy, Portugal, and a large economy, the United States. Consistent with our theoretical model, we find that US macroeconomic news and Portuguese earnings news do not affect stock market co-movement, whereas Portuguese macroeconomic news lowers stock market co-movement. We find that US news affects Portuguese stock market returns, though less so when US stock market returns are included in the regression. We provide evidence, contrary to common wisdom, that this last result does not derive from contagion.

We establish an empirical link between the ex-ante uncertainty about macroeconomic fundamentals and the ex-post resolution of this uncertainty in financial markets. We measure macroeconomic uncertainty using prices of economic derivatives and relate this measure to changes in implied volatilities of stock and bond options when the economic data is released. Higher macroeconomic uncertainty is associated with greater reduction in implied volatilities following the news release. It is also associated with increased volume and decreased open interest in option markets after the release, consistent with market participants using financial options to hedge or speculate on macroeconomic news.

We consider a pure exchange economy with incomplete information. Some agents display learning bias and over- or under-react to the arrival of new information. We show under which conditions biased agents survive over a finite horizon. We also study the distribution of irrational agents consumption shares. Irrational agents have a signiÞcant consumption share in the economy when (i) shocks are less persistent (ii) risk aversion is high (iii) volatility of aggregate consumption is high. We also show that agents impact on prices is increasing in their consumption share and conclude that biased agents can signiÞcantly influence equilibrium quantities.

I analyze the portfolios of individual investors who have changed their place of residence. As distance from a company they invest in changes, investors adjust their portfolio composition. The farther investors move away from the closest establishment of a company in their portfolio, the more of its shares they sell compared to investors who do not move. Among the companies that investors held before the move, after moving, investors abnormally increase their ownership in companies closer to their new location; these companies provide them with higher risk-adjusted returns than companies in which they kept holdings unchanged or abnormally reduced holdings.

We show that acquirer returns are significantly higher in stock-swap acquisitions of difficult-to-value targets, as measured by R&D intensity and idiosyncratic return volatility. This finding contributes to an explanation of the determinants of, and value gains from, using stock as a method of payment. The effects of target-valuation uncertainty on both the method of payment and the market reaction to acquisitions are more likely to be apparent in samples of private acquisitions, as these effects can be masked in samples of acquisitions of publicly held targets. Nevertheless, our results hold for publicly traded targets in multivariate analysis.

This paper characterizes equilibria in the Shleifer-Vishny model of limits of arbitrage. To prove existence, one has to consider types of equilibria ignored by Shleifer and Vishny, even if one adopts their parameter restrictions. For example, the only equilibrium may be one in which maximization of expected wealth requires an “all-or-nothing” investment strategy, with intermediate investment levels being strictly unprofitable. If one goes beyond Shleifer and Vishny's parameter restrictions, multiple equilibria may arise, and equilibrium selection may be governed by sunspots. Moreover, there may exist an equilibrium in which the asset price returns to fundamentals despite worsening noise trader sentiment.