Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract This paper provides evidence on the strategic lending decisions made by banks facing a negative funding shock. Using bank–firm level credit data, we show that banks reallocate credit within their loan portfolio in at least three different ways. First, banks reallocate to sectors where they have a high market share. Second, they also reallocate to sectors in which they are more specialized. Third, they reallocate credit toward low-risk firms. These reallocation effects are economically large. A standard deviation increase in sector market share, sector specialization, or firm soundness reduces the transmission of the funding shock to credit supply by 22%, 8%, and 10%, respectively.

Abstract This article examines the question: Does regulatory approval of prospectuses act as a “certification” of securities offerings? Rational investors should generally ignore prospectus approval due to its being uninformative regarding either the quality of, or motives for, the underlying offering. Our survey experiment demonstrates that salient references to regulatory oversight in investment advertisements can lead to significant increases in willingness to invest and concomitant decreases in perceived risks. Conversely, salient disclosure of risk factor information increases risk perceptions and reduces the intention to search for additional information. Various robustness tests confirm that investors can perceive regulatory oversight of securities offerings as an endorsement. Our results provide insight regarding the design of the disclosure and the effective regulation of financial marketing.

Abstract Empirical studies of structural credit risk models so far are often based on calibration, rolling estimation, or regressions. This paper proposes a GMM-based method that allows us to estimate model parameters and test model-implied restrictions in a unified framework. We conduct a specification analysis of five representative structural models based on the proposed GMM procedure, using information from both equity volatility and the term structure of single-name credit default swap (CDS) spreads. Our test results strongly reject the Merton (1974) model and two diffusion-based models with a flat default boundary. The other two models, one with jumps and one with stationary leverage ratios, do improve the overall fit of CDS spreads and equity volatility. However, all five models have difficulty capturing the dynamic behavior of both equity volatility and CDS spreads, especially for investment-grade names. On the other hand, these models have a much better ability to explain the sensitivity of CDS spreads to equity returns.

Abstract I model the effect of associative memory on asset prices. The model includes mood-congruent memory, which predicts that the subjective goodness (or badness) of the agent’s affective state (e.g., mood) is a cue for positive (negative) information stored in long-term memory. I also include rehearsal, which implies that data recalled in the recent past are more likely to be recalled in the present. I show that mood-congruent memory causes the set of recalled information to be biased, and rehearsal generates autocorrelation in the biases across periods. The theory provides novel explanations for short-run continued overreaction to news, long-run correction of these effects, and excess volatility. I also make the novel predictions that excess volatility is highest during downturns, price biases are increasing in fundamental volatility, knowledge/experience may intensify these biases, and asset prices exhibit excess comovement.

Abstract We show that executives cut investment when their incentives become more short term. We examine a unique event in which hundreds of firms eliminated option vesting periods to avoid a drop in income under accounting rule FAS 123-R. This event allowed executives to exercise options earlier and thus profit from boosting short-term performance. Our identification exploits that FAS 123-R’s adoption was staggered almost randomly by firms’ fiscal year-ends. CEOs cut investment and reported higher short-term earnings after option acceleration, and they subsequently increased equity sales.

Abstract We examine the causal impact of public-sector spending on corporate investment. Making use of population count revisions in census years as exogenous shocks to the cross-sectional allocation of federal funds, we find that increases in federal spending reduce firms’ investment, R&D spending, employment growth, sales growth, and firm-level equity volatility. The effect is stronger for firms that are labor-intensive, smaller, geographically concentrated, financially constrained, or in regions with higher employment or more generous unemployment insurance benefits. We find that exogenous increases in government hiring reduce corporate hiring, and positive federal spending shocks reduce the flow of workers from the public-sector to the private sector. Overall, our results show that positive government spending reduces corporate investment by hurting firms’ investment opportunity sets and highlight the significant role of the labor market as an underlying mechanism.

Abstract We exploit threshold rules governing margin trading eligibility in India to identify a causal link between margin trading and increased comovement during crises. Margin trading explains more than one-quarter of the increase return comovement that we observe during crises. To understand the mechanisms driving this result, we evaluate the relative importance of stock connections through common brokers (who provide margin financing) versus common margin traders. We find that common brokers are most important. Margin-eligible stocks that are more connected through common brokers experience larger crisis-period increases in pairwise return comovement, especially when those brokers’ clients have experienced recent portfolio losses, when their clients have outstanding margin loans in more volatile stocks, and when the brokers are large. These findings are consistent with Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), in which initial shocks propagate due to the tightening of margin constraints imposed by financial intermediaries.

Abstract Global risks allow theoretical models of the currency market to explain currency risk premia. Yet, there is no consensus in the empirical literature on which factors can represent global risks. We develop an asset pricing test for global risk factors that relies on the key assumption of a distinct US global risk exposure. Using perspective-invariant test assets that are particularly suitable for studying global risks, we apply the test on a large set of factors used in recent studies of currency risk. We find that only equity market risk can represent a global risk in the currency market.

Abstract This paper examines empirically the announcement effect of commercial corporate governance ratings on share returns. Rating downgrades by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) are associated with negative returns of –1.14% over a 3-day announcement window. The returns are highly correlated with the proprietary analysis of ISS and are decreasing in agency costs, consistent with ratings providing independent information on underlying corporate governance quality. We thus show that the influence and impact of ISS extends beyond proxy recommendations and subsequent voting outcomes. Our findings contrast with the insignificant price impact of Daines, Gow, and Larcker (2010), whose analysis we replicate and successfully reconcile to ours by pooling upgrades and downgrades together.

Abstract Using unique data on employee ownership plans, we find that negative shocks lead to changes in portfolio choices among previously inattentive investors. Employees within employee ownership plans did not actively select into ownership, but instead received grants upon employment. Many employees remain initially passive within these plans. However, following the 2008 Financial Crisis, they become more likely to exercise options, sell restricted stock, and participate in an Employee Stock Purchase Plan (ESPP). These changes likely improve welfare. For example, nonparticipation in an ESPP leaves money on the table. Our results improve our understanding of how investors’ personal return experiences affect investment choices. Negative shocks can increase attention among previously passive investors, yielding decisions that are closer to the optimum.