Knowledge that Transforms

Using standard Industrial Organization tools, we analyze the relation between competition in arm's length financial markets and the prevalence of close bank-firms ties. We show how the degree of competition between financial intermediaries affects the intensity of relationships between banks and client firms, and explore the idea that investment in bank-firm relationships can be used strategically by incumbent multi-product (universal) banks to limit competition in arm's length markets. The analysis implies that reforms designed to facilitate entry of new intermediaries may actually induce incumbent banks to increase investment in relationship banking, so that regulatory entry barriers are replaced by entry barriers created endogenously, namely, there is “path dependence” in the market structure of financial systems. This result suggests that increased (potential) competition in the financial services industry will not always destroy bank-firm relationships but, on the contrary, may actually strengthen them.

We study the effects of structural changes in banking markets on the supply of credit to small businesses. Specifically, we examine whether bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and entry have “external” effects on small business loans by other banks in the same local markets. The results suggest modest positive external effects from these dynamic changes in competition, except that large banks may reduce small business lending in reaction to entry. We confirm bank size and age as important determinants of this lending, and show that the measured age effect does not appear to be driven by local market M&A activity.

The paper analyzes bank performance in the context of the integrated European Union market and its member countries. First, the paper investigates the technical efficiency of banks in each country sample using a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model incorporating only banking variables. Then, a second DEA model is defined incorporating environmental factors together with banking variables in order to standardize the country-specific environmental conditions. Based on these models, the paper systematically analyzes the efficiency position for each of the European banking industry if average banks decide to operate in any other country. The results indicate that adverse (advantageous) environmental conditions are a positive (negative) factor for the home banking industry and being technically efficient appears to be a significant deterrence to foreign competition.

This paper solves numerically the intertemporal consumption and portfolio choice problem of an infinitely-lived investor who faces a time-varying equity premium. The solutions we obtain are very similar to the approximate analytical solutions of Campbell and Viceira (1999), except at the upper extreme of the state space where both the numerical consumption and portfolio rules flatten out. We also consider a constrained version of the problem in which the investor faces borrowing and short-sales restrictions. These constraints bind when the equity premium moves away from its mean in either direction, and are particularly severe for risk-tolerant investors. The constraints have substantial effects on optimal consumption, but much more modest effects on optimal portfolio choice in the region of the state space where they are not binding.

Comment on ‘A Wealth Based Explanation for Earnings Conservatism’ Get access Simon Benninga Simon Benninga Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Review of Finance, Volume 5, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 351–352, https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013834904395 Published: 01 December 2001

This paper presents a theory of initial public offerings based on the idea that the optimal ownership structure of a company changes over the life cycle of the firm. Insiders take the company public when they have lost the comparative advantage over outsiders in gathering information to evaluate the firm's growth prospects. The size of the share sold to the public depends on the relative abilities of the market and insiders to gather this information and on the frictions in the going-public process. Intermediaries help to reduce these frictions and lead to a more efficient allocation if IPOs are conducted more frequently. Discrimination between different classes of investors may be beneficial. Learning by the market about projects in a new industry can lead to a clustering of new issues (hot issue markets).

This study extends research on earnings conservatism – the degree to which the accounting system recognizes bad news regarding future cash flows in a more timely manner than good news – by arguing that heterogeneous executives' risk attitudes will influence the degree of conservatism. Prior research has demonstrated that differences in earnings conservatism are mainly the result of differences in institutional factors (Basu (1997) and Ball et al. (2000a)). We hypothesize that more risk-averse managers, who demand a risk premium that offsets the effects of the variance in their compensation, will report more conservative earnings. Earnings conservatism will temper expectations among stakeholders about the future cash flows to be distributed thereby diminishing the likelihood of disappointing outcomes and potential litigation or threats for executives of being fired. The more risk-averse manager would be more inclined to reduce such conflicts, since they will have a destabilizing effect on his future compensation. The empirical results for a sample of Dutch companies over the period of 1983 to 1995 confirm our hypothesis: more risk-averse managers report earnings more conservatively than do less risk-averse managers.

In this paper I assess the degree of similarity in the cross-sectional pricing of Internet and non-Internet stocks during the tumultuous year of 2000. Despite large differences in their economic fundamentals, I find that the equity market values of Internet firms with immaterial web traffic, firms that are randomly selected, and firms that went public at the same time as Internet firms are similarly related to analysts' forecasts of earnings in 2001 and the long-term rate of growth in earnings. This is not the case for firms with intensive web traffic. I also find that at the peak of Internet prices in March 2000 the market rewarded losses of web-traffic-intensive firms but did not reward profits, while after the peak the market reversed its view, rewarding profits but not losses. Beyond earnings, web traffic is significantly positively priced both at and after the Internet peak. However, I find no evidence that two proxies for supply and demand forces – the degree of public float and short interest – are value-relevant for Internet firms. Overall, I argue that there are enough similarities in the cross-sectional pricing of Internet and non-Internet firms to make it unlikely that the pricing of Internet stocks during 2000 was entirely irrational. Moreover, any irrationality in the prices of Internet stocks cannot be linked to public float and short interest.

This paper examines a multiperiod production economy where investors do not observe the realizations of productivity factors or security expected returns. Unlike previous work, which expresses the equilibrium conditions as functions of unobservable (to both real-world investorsand empiricists) moments of the distributions of returns, we express the equilibrium real rate asa function of the observable sample paths of realizations of returns. We provide a framework for empirically testing this and other asset pricing models without outside-the-model econometric assumptions needed for producing the unobservable moments of returns. We construct versions of the restrictions for any time interval between observations. JEL codes: E43, G12, D92, D80, D51

We empirically compare Libor and Swap Market Models for the pricing of interest rate derivatives, using panel data on prices of US caplets and swaptions. A Libor Market Model can directly be calibrated to observed prices of caplets, whereas a Swap Market Model is calibrated to a certain set of swaption prices. For both models we analyze how well they price caplets and swaptions that were not used for calibration. We show that the Libor Market Model in general leads to better prediction of derivative prices that were not used for calibration than the Swap Market Model. Also, we find that Market Models with a declining volatility function give much better pricing results than a specification with a constant volatility function. Finally, we find that models that arechosen to exactly match certain derivative prices are overfitted; more parsimonious models lead to better predictions for derivative prices that were not used for calibration.