This paper investigates the role of banking supervision in controlling bank risk. Banking supervision is measured in terms of enforcement outputs (i.e., on-site audits and sanctions). Our results show an inverted U-shaped relationship between on-site audits and bank risk, while the relationship between sanctions and risk appears to be linear and negative. We also consider the combined effect of effective supervision and banking regulation (in the form of capital and market discipline requirements) on bank risk. We find that effective supervision and market discipline requirements are important and complementary mechanisms in reducing bank fragility. This is in contrast to capital requirements, which prove to be rather futile in controlling bank risk, even when supplemented with a higher volume of on-site audits and sanctions.

Elementary portfolio theory implies that environmentalists optimally hold more shares of polluting firms than non-environmentalists, and that polluting firms attract more investment capital than otherwise identical non-polluting firms through a hedging channel. Pigouvian taxation can reverse the aggregate investment results, but environmentalists still overweight polluters. We introduce countervailing motives for environmentalists to underweight polluters, comparing the implications when environmentalists coordinate to internalize pollution, or have nonpecuniary disutility from holding polluter stock. With nonpecuniary disutility, introducing a green derivative may dramatically alter who invests most in polluters, but has no impact on aggregate pollution.

This article provides a comprehensive history of default risk for newly originated home mortgages in the USA over the past quarter century. The loan-level source data include the entire guarantee book for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. We track many loan characteristics and produce a summary measure of risk. Among our many results, we show that mortgage risk had already risen in the 1990s, planting seeds of the financial crisis well before the actual event. Our results also cast doubt on explanations of the crisis that focus on borrowers with low credit scores. The aggregate series are available for download at https://www.fhfa.gov/papers/wp1902.aspx.

Traders may run on financial markets merely out of fear of future liquidity shocks. We present a model that shows that adequately calibrated circuit breakers can prevent such coordination failures by curbing excessive trading. It suggests a novel, forward-looking circuit breaker that becomes most restrictive in cases when expected welfare losses of inefficient market runs are largest. The probabilities of current and future liquidity shortages are important determinants for such welfare-optimized circuit breakers. We empirically illustrate how to calibrate these parameters. We also determine under which economic conditions circuit breakers damage welfare and should not be implemented.

This paper examines the tying of lending to investment banking business by universal banks. Tying may alleviate credit rationing by assuring the lender of an adequate share of the social surplus that its lending generates; however, tying raises the profitability of loans to troubled entrepreneurs, softening entrepreneurial budget constraints and reducing effort levels. When investment banking is uncompetitive, the former effect dominates, and there is too little tying; when investment banking is competitive, there is too much tying. We relate our results to the authority structure of the universal bank, which we argue is the appropriate focus for regulation.

We construct a simple model with lumpy investment, cash accumulation, and costly external finance. Based on this model, we propose a new savings specification aimed at examining savings behavior in the presence of investment lumpiness and financial constraints. We then test a key prediction of our model, namely that under costly external finance, savings–cash flow sensitivities vary significantly by investment regime. We make use of a panel of firms from transition and developed economies to estimate the new savings regression which controls for investment spikes and periods of inactivity. Our findings confirm the validity of the model’s prediction.

Using simulations controlling for the ability to time the equity, bond, and money markets, we compare daily and monthly performance measures. Our main results highlight the joint importance of the fictitious timer’s trading frequency and the data sampling frequency for estimation. Specifically, daily timing measures are superior to those estimated monthly for daily timers, but inferior for occasional or monthly timers. Global measures show more robustness to differences in trading and data sampling frequencies. Finally, conditional measures do not improve upon unconditional ones, and results are similar for performance detection versus ranking.

Why do firms pay dividends? To answer this question, we use a hand-collected data set of companies traded on the London stock market between 1825 and 1870. As tax rates were effectively zero, the capital market was unregulated, and there were no institutional stockholders, we can rule out these potential determinants ex ante. We find that, even though they were legal, share repurchases were not used by firms to return cash to shareholders. Instead, our evidence provides support for the information–communication explanation for dividends, while providing little support for agency, illiquidity, catering, or behavioral explanations.

We investigate the relation between sovereign and corporate bond issuance. Sovereign bond issues that increase a country’s maximum maturity are followed by increases in the maximum maturity of corporate issues. Our results point to issuance complementarities based on the benchmarking of corporate bonds to sovereign bonds. Sovereign and corporate bond issues are also substitutes, but substitutability requires the availability of a high-quality sovereign bond benchmark. By adding to existing theories focusing on substitutability, our findings highlight the role that the maturity of sovereign debt plays in capital market development.

News media plays an important role in modern financial markets. In this article, we analyze the role played by the news media in an historical financial market. Using The Times’s coverage of companies listed on the London stock market between 1825 and 1870, we examine the determinants of media coverage in this era and whether media coverage affected returns. Our main finding is that a media effect mainly manifests itself after the mid-1840s and that the introduction of arm’s-length ownership along with markedly increased market participation was the main reason for the emergence of this media effect.