Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract This study extends research on earnings conservatism – the degree to which the accounting system recognizes bad news regarding future cash flows in a more timely manner than good news – by arguing that heterogeneous executives' risk attitudes will influence the degree of conservatism. Prior research has demonstrated that differences in earnings conservatism are mainly the result of differences in institutional factors (Basu (1997) and Ball et al. (2000a)). We hypothesize that more risk-averse managers, who demand a risk premium that offsets the effects of the variance in their compensation, will report more conservative earnings. Earnings conservatism will temper expectations among stakeholders about the future cash flows to be distributed thereby diminishing the likelihood of disappointing outcomes and potential litigation or threats for executives of being fired. The more risk-averse manager would be more inclined to reduce such conflicts, since they will have a destabilizing effect on his future compensation. The empirical results for a sample of Dutch companies over the period of 1983 to 1995 confirm our hypothesis: more risk-averse managers report earnings more conservatively than do less risk-averse managers. JEL classification: G14, G38, M41.

Abstract In this paper I assess the degree of similarity in the cross-sectional pricing of Internet and non-Internet stocks during the tumultuous year of 2000. Despite large differences in their economic fundamentals, I find that the equity market values of Internet firms with immaterial web traffic, firms that are randomly selected, and firms that went public at the same time as Internet firms are similarly related to analysts' forecasts of earnings in 2001 and the long-term rate of growth in earnings. This is not the case for firms with intensive web traffic. I also find that at the peak of Internet prices in March 2000 the market rewarded losses of web-traffic-intensive firms but did not reward profits, while after the peak the market reversed its view, rewarding profits but not losses. Beyond earnings, web traffic is significantly positively priced both at and after the Internet peak. However, I find no evidence that two proxies for supply and demand forces – the degree of public float and short interest – are value-relevant for Internet firms. Overall, I argue that there are enough similarities in the cross-sectional pricing of Internet and non-Internet firms to make it unlikely that the pricing of Internet stocks during 2000 was entirely irrational. Moreover, any irrationality in the prices of Internet stocks cannot be linked to public float and short interest. JEL classifications: G12, G14, M41.

Abstract This paper examines a multiperiod production economy where investors do not observe the realizations of productivity factors or security expected returns. Unlike previous work, which expresses the equilibrium conditions as functions of unobservable (to both real-world investorsand empiricists) moments of the distributions of returns, we express the equilibrium real rate asa function of the observable sample paths of realizations of returns. We provide a framework for empirically testing this and other asset pricing models without outside-the-model econometric assumptions needed for producing the unobservable moments of returns. We construct versions of the restrictions for any time interval between observations. JEL codes: E43, G12, D92, D80, D51

Abstract We empirically compare Libor and Swap Market Models for the pricing of interest rate derivatives, using panel data on prices of US caplets and swaptions. A Libor Market Model can directly be calibrated to observed prices of caplets, whereas a Swap Market Model is calibrated to a certain set of swaption prices. For both models we analyze how well they price caplets and swaptions that were not used for calibration. We show that the Libor Market Model in general leads to better prediction of derivative prices that were not used for calibration than the Swap Market Model. Also, we find that Market Models with a declining volatility function give much better pricing results than a specification with a constant volatility function. Finally, we find that models that arechosen to exactly match certain derivative prices are overfitted; more parsimonious models lead to better predictions for derivative prices that were not used for calibration. JEL Classification: G12, G13, E43.