Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract We study the classical problem of raising capital under asymmetric information. Following Myers and Majluf, we consider firms endowed with assets in place and riskier growth opportunities. When asymmetric information is concentrated on assets in place (rather than growth opportunities), equity-like securities are more likely to be optimal. In contrast, when asymmetric information falls on growth options, debt is optimal. Intuitively, this happens because when the asset with greater volatility is less affected by asymmetric information, issuing a security with greater exposure to upside potential (such as equity) can be less dilutive than issuing a security lacking such exposure (such as debt). Our results suggest that equity is more likely to dominate debt for younger firms with larger investment needs, endowed with riskier, more valuable growth opportunities. Thus, our model can explain why high-growth firms may prefer equity over debt, and then switch to debt financing as they mature.

Abstract This paper shows that the stock market misprices firms’ investment options. We build a real options model of optimal investment under uncertainty to estimate the value of firms’ investment options. We show that firms with valuable investment options have a higher likelihood of being mispriced. Importantly, this mispricing is not one-sided, as such firms are equally likely to be undervalued or overvalued. Our paper adds to the debate on whether public equity markets are myopic and systematically undervalue innovative firms. We show that this is not necessarily the case.

Abstract How can we design safe financial institutions, and how should we efficiently resolve them? We study these questions by empirically analyzing the failure of a derivatives central clearing counterparty (CCP) in Paris in 1974. First, we identify the risk management failures that caused the default and draw implications for CCP design. Second, we show evidence of new agency problems arising when supervisors have discretionary powers over debt restructuring for a failed entity. These conflicts, between managers and the supervisor (misreporting), as well as between managers and creditors (risk-shifting), are difficult to mitigate with regulation or covenants. Their existence has implications for the design of recovery and resolution rules for financial institutions.

Abstract We study the inner workings of internal capital markets during the 2008–09 recession using a unique dataset of loans between business group firms in an emerging market. Intragroup loans increase quickly during the recession. Firms that are more central in the ownership network simultaneously increase lending and borrowing. Acting like simple intermediaries, central firms do not increase net lending. Our results imply that formal control rights are essential for intermediation in internal capital markets, particularly during distress. In line with previous results on winner-picking, receivers of intragroup loans are high-Q, financially constrained firms, which also perform significantly better than providers during the recession.

Abstract We examine whether corporate bankruptcies influence bank loan characteristics of geographically proximate firms. Controlling for industry contagion and local economic conditions, firms headquartered near a bankruptcy event experience a 7 basis point increase in loan spreads. The effect is transitory and cannot be fully explained by local correlated information or lenders’ financial health. Instead, the effect is more pronounced for informationally opaque bankruptcies and borrowers, and weakened among loans with relationship lenders and lenders with significant local presence.

Abstract Manipulation of hard information has been at the center of a wave of investigations into fraudulent bank behavior, such as mis-selling of mortgages and rigging of London Interbank Offered Rate and Foreign Exchange rates. Despite these prominent cases, little is known as to why employees manipulate hard information. Using almost a quarter million retail loan applications, we show that loan officers who face volume-based incentives significantly manipulate ratings even in settings where ratings are computed using hard information only. Manipulation is widespread across loan officers, with low-performing loan officers manipulating more toward the end of the year. These incentives have a first-order effect on bank profitability, reducing return on equity by 1.5 percentage points. We conclude that reliance on hard information does not overcome loan officer agency problems, and it is important for banks and regulators to take manipulation of hard information into account when using hard information for risk assessment and regulation.

Abstract To explore the rationality and competitiveness of the mutual fund industry, we analyze the alpha of active and index mutual funds from a global sample of more than 60,000 equity and fixed income funds and test the null hypothesis that alphas to investors are zero. We distinguish between institutional and retail investors since there are significant differences in management fees, economies of scale, and information asymmetries between these two groups. Using a new robust statistical test, we cannot reject our null hypothesis for the majority of investment categories. We find that the average active fund has less exposure to traditional risk factors, but higher sensitivity to alternative risk premia. Fund persistence and the impact of size and fees add further support to our conclusion that the mutual fund industry is highly competitive, except for US domestic funds. This set of funds is excessively overfunded compared with other fund categories.

Abstract I show that the pricing of a bond liquidity shock depends on the current size of a firm’s bond rollover exposure. Using US corporate bond transactions data, I find that a market liquidity shock induces a larger yield spread increase among firms with nonzero rollover exposures. This effect is more pronounced for credit risky firms and increases in the size of the rollover exposure. Furthermore, I show that tests that do not control for the heterogeneity in firms’ rollover exposure policies provide biased estimates of the pricing impact of the rollover channel.

Abstract Constructing a novel database on the real-estate holdings of public firms, we show that distressed firms sell their real-estate assets at a discount relative to healthy firms. We find that distress discount in real-estate assets is less pronounced for sellers with less liquidity-constrained industry peers and in machinery-heavy industries. We also document that asset redeployability and the availability of potential buyers are two important property-specific determinants of the distress discount. Additionally, firms’ property portfolios that are less redeployable with less potential buyers exacerbate the negative impact of financial distress on the cost of borrowing.

Abstract We show in a theoretical asset pricing model incorporating heterogeneous beliefs that the expected excess return on a risky asset depends on its exposure to the risk arising from innovations in the average belief of investors about the expected return of a representative asset. Using the actual EPS data and the analyst EPS forecast data provided by I/B/E/S, we construct a market-wide average belief measure, which we call “the earnings belief measure.” We find that the average return on stocks with high sensitivity to earnings belief shocks is 7.14% per year higher than that on stocks with low sensitivity. This positive relationship holds after accounting for traditional risk factors, is prominent among large-cap stocks, and is invariant across sentiment levels.