Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract At long horizons, multiplicative compounding induces strong-to-extreme positive skewness into stock returns; the magnitude of the effect is primarily determined by single-period volatility. Consequently, at horizons greater than 5 years, returns—individual or portfolio—will be positively skewed under reasonable parameterizations. From an investor perspective, the strong positive skewness implies that the mean compound return will serve as a poor guide for typical long-horizon outcomes. Moreover, the large effects of compounding on higher-order moments are shown to affect the validity of Taylor expansions used to approximate preferences for skewness, when applied to returns of annual or longer horizons.

Abstract We find that heightened cross-border bank flows are associated with lower systemic risk in a target country’s banking system. The reductions in systemic risk are stronger for flows coming from source countries with stronger regulatory oversight than the target country. Such cross-border bank flows linked to regulatory arbitrage are also associated with improvements in target banking sector profitability, asset quality, and efficiency. We assess several alternative channels of influence for cross-border bank flows but interpret the evidence on these flows as mostly consistent with a benign form of regulatory arbitrage.

Abstract Using micro-level data, we examine the behavior of socially responsible investment (SRI) funds. SRI funds select firms with lower pollution, more board diversity, higher employee satisfaction, and better workplace safety. Yet, both in the cross-section and using an exogenous shock to SRI capital, we find that SRI funds do not significantly change firm behavior. Moreover, we find little evidence that they try to impact firm behavior using shareholder proposals. Our results suggest that SRI funds are not greenwashing, but they are impact washing; they invest in a portfolio of firms with better environmental and social conduct but do not follow through on their promise of impact.

Abstract Levered noise occurs when no-arbitrage replication hedges fundamentals but amplifies price errors. Motivated by our theory, we use widely-available end-of-day OptionMetrics data to improve accuracy of synthetic dividend strip prices and provide longer samples than prior studies. Term structure point estimates are approximately flat in simple returns (88 bp/month vs. 87 bp/month for short-term dividends vs. index), and upward-sloping in measurement-error-robust logarithmic returns (43 bp/month vs. 77 bp/month). These results from prominent index options show the importance of diagnosing noise in no-arbitrage prices. Prior conclusions of an average downward slope in the equity term structure are not robust.

Abstract We examine the pecuniary externalities that arise when active fund manager compensation contracts have common components. This commonality in the compensation structure and loadings on each component across funds reduces asset price informativeness, amplifies the distortions from active managers’ benchmark-hedging demand, and lowers the price of risk in financial markets. This is because contract commonality distorts investors’ capital allocation to active management, and active managers’ information acquisition and trading decisions. From a normative perspective, contract commonality increases the rigidity of the active industry size and performance-based fee. As a result, they do not vary enough with financial market conditions compared with a Planner’s economy. Quantitatively, an increase in asset payoff uncertainty increases the size and performance-based fee twice as much in the Planner economy compared with the decentralized economy. From a positive perspective, contract commonality contributes to the inconsistency of several widely adopted measures of active manager skill.

Abstract We study how firms build relations with local governments in emerging markets without established rules of political lobbying. We document that following a turnover of the Party Secretary or mayor of a city in China, firms (especially privately owned enterprises, POEs hereafter) headquartered in that city significantly increase their “perk spending,” for example, expenses for travel and entertainment among others. Both the instrumental-variable-based results and heterogeneity analysis are consistent with the interpretation that the perk spending is used to build relations with local governments. In addition, we find that local political turnover in a city tends to be followed by changes of the Chairmen or the CEOs of state-owned enterprises that are controlled by the local government. We also discuss and rule out several alternative explanations for the above findings.

We exploit the release of a mobile application for a financial aggregation platform to analyze how technology adoption changes consumer financial decision making. The app reduced the cost of accessing personal financial information, and we find that this led to a drop in non-sufficient fund fees. Because of the manner in which these fees are incurred, this represents an unambiguous welfare improvement for users of the platform. The leading explanation for this result appears to be mistake avoidance due to easier access to information.

Abstract We propose and test a new channel that links liquidity risk and interest rates in short-term funding markets. Unlike existing theories that focus on premiums demanded by lenders, the liquidity risk channel postulates that borrowers that are more exposed to urgent liquidity needs are willing to pay a markup for immediate funding. We test and quantify the channel using unique trade-by-trade data and uncover systematic differences across individual banks’ funding cost driven by differences in banks’ liquidity risk. These differences are persistent over a decade, suggesting that the liquidity risk channel is relevant in general and not only arises during crisis times.

Abstract This article studies optimal capital structure when firms learn from financial markets. We present a tractable model of stock market feedback with imperfect information aggregation. Debt issuance affects speculators’ incentives to trade both directly, by changing the payoff structure of equity holders, and indirectly, through an asset substitution effect. We show that issuing debt can increase market informativeness and firm value, and may eliminate a coordination failure equilibrium with no provision of market information. We derive the optimal capital structure in this setting and present novel empirical predictions regarding the relationship between market frictions, market informativeness, and capital structure. Once the effect of debt on market informativeness is considered, risky debt does not necessarily lead to risk shifting.

Abstract We examine the links between human capital and endowment investing. Harnessing detailed information on university endowments, we find that higher asset allocations to alternative assets accompany higher levels of human capital in the endowment’s investment process. Moreover, high levels of human capital are linked to larger returns, even on a risk-adjusted basis. The improved investment outcomes arise because endowments (i) capture higher returns that can accompany alternative assets, (ii) select or have access to high performing managers, and (iii) minimize fees by accessing funds directly rather than through funds of funds. Our measures of human capital include expertise in alternatives on governing bodies, the presence of a chief investment officer, and the size of the investment staff. Finally, we conduct a novel survey of endowments and confirm that human capital is central in facilitating alternative investments.