Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines whether the presence of government-guaranteed lenders helps alleviate small business financial constraints during financial crises. The results indicate that during the 2007–09 financial crisis, areas with a greater share of Small Business Administration 7(a) lenders experienced: (1) a 2.2% increase in small business loan volume, (2) a 3.7% increase in small firm employment and 3.5% increase in establishments, and (3) lower loan default rates. Bank–county–year analysis suggests that SBA banks increase their share of lending when they are capital-constrained, and when local median income is lower. Instrumental variable analysis utilizing SBA program characteristics confirms the baseline results. The findings suggest that targeted government support can play a beneficial role in the presence of private credit market frictions, especially when bank capital is limited and small business financial constraints are severe.

The equity variance risk premium is the expected compensation earned for selling variance risk in equity markets. The variance risk premium is positive and shows only moderate persistence. High variance risk premiums coincide with the left tail of the consumption growth distribution shifting down. These facts, together with risk-neutral skewness being substantially more negative than physical return skewness, refute the bulk of the extant consumption-based asset pricing models. We introduce a tractable habit model that does fit the data. In the model, the variance risk premium depends positively (or negatively) on “bad” (or “good”) consumption growth uncertainty.

Borrower drawdowns on credit commitments reduce a bank’s capital buffer. Using Austrian credit register data and exploiting the 2008–09 financial crisis as an exogenous shock to bank health, we provide novel evidence that capital-constrained banks manage this risk by cutting credit commitments that are not fully used. Controlling for their capital position, we find that banks also respond to liquidity problems by cutting such commitments. However, banks manage the capital and liquidity risk posed by undrawn credit in a way that limits negative macroeconomic implications: credit cuts are targeted at financially less constrained firms, and we show that borrowers of more-affected banks can substitute lost credit with credit from other banks and do not suffer real effects. Additional findings suggest that voluntary agreements between constrained banks and strong firms to reduce spare borrowing capacity can explain why strong firms experience larger credit cuts.

We study the effects of time-varying volatility and investment horizon on the economic significance of stock market return predictability from the perspective of Bayesian investors. Using a vector autoregression framework with stochastic volatility (SV) in market returns and predictor variables, we assess a broad set of twenty-six predictors with both in-sample and out-of-sample designs. Volatility and horizon are critically important for assessing return predictors, as these factors affect how an investor learns about predictability and how she chooses to invest based on return forecasts. We find that statistically strong predictors can be economically unimportant if they tend to take extreme values in high volatility periods, have low persistence, or follow distributions with fat tails. Several popular predictors exhibit these properties such that their impressive statistical results do not translate into large economic gains. We also demonstrate that incorporating SV leads to substantial utility gains in real-time forecasting.

This paper studies the value relevance of the options market by focusing on convertible bond pricing. Pricing convertible bonds requires essentially the same set of information necessary to price options. Using a regression discontinuity design based on minimum stock price requirements for option listings, we find that the availability of stock options helps issuers attract more convertible bond buyers and reduces convertible issuers’ cost of financing. Our results highlight that the availability of individual stock options can add value to security issuers.

What drives short-term credit spreads: credit risk, liquidity risk, or both? We investigate this issue using the structural approach to credit risk modeling and a novel data set of secondary market transaction prices for Chinese commercial papers (CPs). In particular, we propose and test a structural model with jump risk and exogenous market illiquidity under which the predicted yield spreads can be decomposed into a credit component and a liquidity component. We find that credit risk and, especially liquidity risk, are important determinants of short-term yield spreads. Our model-based decomposition results show that, on average, credit risk and market liquidity account for about 25% and 52% of CP yield spreads, respectively. For comparison, we also examine the drivers of the US CP yield spreads using security-level data. We find that credit risk accounts for a small fraction of the observed yield spreads but liquidity contributes a much greater proportion.

This article shows that judicial enforcement has substantial effects on firms’ decisions with regard to their employment policies. To establish causality, I exploit a reorganization of the court districts in Italy involving judicial district mergers as a shock to court productivity. I find that an improvement in enforcement, as measured by a reduction in average trial length, has a large, positive effect on firm employment. The cross-sectional heterogeneity of the results suggests that stronger enforcement reduces financing constraints, boosting employment as a result, especially in firms characterized by higher complementarity between labor and capital. Moreover, in the presence of stronger enforcement, firms can raise more debt to dampen the impact of negative shocks and, in this way, reduce employment fluctuations. Consistent with this result, worker-level evidence shows that strong enforcement reduces the likelihood of unemployment.

This article develops a model to explore the implications of nondistressed debt renegotiation on debt prices and corporate policies. The model incorporates the empirical observation that creditors can influence firms also outside corporate distress through debt covenant renegotiation and not only in distress. We find that considering both distressed and nondistressed creditor interventions is key to investigating how creditor governance affects firms. The model explains cross-sectional patterns of control premiums and credit spreads that traditional debt renegotiation models do not capture. We also derive novel implications for the impact of firm characteristics associated with renegotiation on debt prices and corporate policies.

We test whether measures of influence on regulators affect stress test outcomes. The large trading banks—those most plausibly ‘Too Big to Fail’ – face the toughest tests. Supervisory stress tests have a greater effect on large trading banks’ portfolios; the large banks respond by making more conservative (initial) capital plans; and, despite their more conservative capital plans, the large banks still fail their tests more frequently than other banks. In contrast, while we find little evidence that political or regulatory connections affect the quantitative element of the stress tests, these connected banks do face less scrutiny under its qualitative dimension.

Following the crisis, macroprudential regulations targeting mortgage-market vulnerabilities were widely adopted, their success often relying on the response of financial intermediaries. We provide evidence from Canada suggesting banks may have behaved strategically to limit the effectiveness of recently implemented mortgage stress tests. Before implementation, borrowers had to prove they could make mortgage payments based on the interest rate specified in the contract. The new tests require borrowers to show they can afford payments based on a typically higher qualifying rate, derived from the mode of 5-year rates posted by the six largest banks. The government’s objective was to cool credit markets, but, since many mortgages are government-insured, the big banks’ interests were not aligned. We find evidence of rate manipulation using a difference-in-differences approach comparing changes in spreads for 5-year mortgages with 3-year spreads, unaffected by the policy. The qualifying rates were lowered encouraging continued borrowing, muting the tests’ impact.