Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines the role of local politicians’ patronage connections to top political leaders (i.e., the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China) in privatization outcomes. We find that connected local politicians are more likely to sell state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to corrupt buyers at substantially discounted prices. The SOEs purchased by corrupt buyers engage in significantly more fraudulent and corrupt activities following privatization and thus perform worse. For identification, we use the mandatory retirement ages of Central Committee members in a fuzzy regression discontinuity design. When local politicians lose their connections because Central Committee members step down after reaching mandatory retirement ages, we find a 14.4 percentage point drop in the likelihood of choosing corrupt buyers and a 90.13% drop in price discounts for privatization sales. Consequently, the privatized SOEs experience jumps in efficiency gains after the age cut-offs for mandatory retirement.

We survey a large sample of Swedish households and connect the responses to administrative data to relate pro-environmental attitudes and values to actual investment decisions. Pro-environment households are not more likely to hold pro-environment portfolios. This results from financial disengagement: they are less likely to own stocks, check pension balances, or make green active retirement planning choices. Green financial engagement is stronger in settings where financial literacy is higher or where informational hurdles are lower. Informational barriers appear to prevent financial market prices and returns from fully reflecting household environmental preferences.

How large is entrepreneurs’ personal importance to startups? We use the death of nearly 1,500 entrepreneurs as a source of exogenous variation, and find large and sustained negative effects on growth and profitability. For small startups, the effects go mainly via firm survival, while for larger startups the effects are mainly on firm growth. For larger startups, the mean effect on sales is about 60%. The effects appear to be driven by entrepreneur specialness rather than leadership transition; the effects of death of entrepreneur managers are economically and statistically stronger than the death of managers that are not entrepreneurs.

Despite the prevalence of private equity (PE) buyouts of private firms, little is known about how these transactions create value. We provide evidence that PE acquirers disproportionately target private firms with weak operating profitability and those that have growth potential but are highly levered and dependent on external financing. Target firms grow rapidly post-buyout, especially those undertaking add-on acquisitions, and profitability increases for both profitable and unprofitable targets. Our evidence suggests that PE acquirers create value by relaxing financing constraints for firms with strong investment opportunities and improving the performance of weak firms, while financial engineering plays a limited role.

How should long-term investors form portfolios in our time-varying, multi-factor and friction-filled world? Two conceptual frameworks may help: first, look directly at the stream of payments that a portfolio and payout policy can produce. Second, include a general equilibrium view of the markets’ economic purpose, and the nature of investors’ different preferences, risk-taking ability, and function in that equilibrium. These perspectives can rationalize some of investors’ behaviors, suggest substantial revisions to standard portfolio theory, and help us to apply portfolio theory in a way that is useful in practice.

This paper explores how a prominent place-based policy in China, the national high-tech zones, affects local innovation output and entrepreneurial activities. Making use of staggered establishments of national high-tech zones in various Chinese cities, we find that the establishment of national high-tech zones has positive effects on local innovation output and entrepreneurial activities. A number of additional tests suggest that the effects appear causal. Access to finance, reductions in administrative burdens, and talent cultivation are three plausible underlying economic channels. Our paper sheds new light on the evaluation of the effectiveness of China’s place-based policies.

Can shareholders’ divestitures and threats of exit trigger improvements in firms’ environmental and social (E&S) policies? We show that E&S incidents are followed by some, but relatively small, divestitures. Nevertheless, following E&S incidents, firms with a one-standard-deviation higher E&S-conscious institutional ownership decrease their greenhouse gas emissions by 36.5% and improve their E&S scores by 7.2% more than other firms if their managers receive equity compensation. We do not observe any improvements associated with sales in E&S-conscious countries. Our results suggest that the threats of future exits and divestitures can improve E&S policies if shareholders are E&S-conscious and managers’ compensation is linked to the stock price.

We study the role of social networks in hedge fund activism. Actively managed funds whose managers are socially connected to activists are more likely than unconnected managers to invest in target stocks; their investment decisions are profitable. Importantly, such effects are greater for funds facing more severe information asymmetry. Connected funds are 14.2 percentage points more likely to support activists in proxy contests and contribute to reducing proxy contest costs. Our evidence shows that social ties benefit both connected investors and activists, and suggests that social networks reduce information asymmetry around activist campaigns by facilitating information exchange and increasing trust.

We study how the recent run-up in housing and rental prices affects the outlook for inflation in the USA. Housing held down the overall inflation in 2021. Despite record growth in private market-based measures of home prices and rents, the government-measured residential services inflation was only 4% for the 12 months ending in January 2022. After explaining the mechanical cause for this divergence, we estimate that, if past relationships hold, the residential inflation components of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) are likely to move close to 7% during 2022. These findings imply that housing will make a significant contribution to overall inflation in 2022, ranging from one percentage point for headline PCE, to 2.6 percentage points for core CPI. We expect residential inflation to remain elevated in 2023.

There have been important methodological changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) over time. These distort comparisons of inflation from different periods, which have become more prevalent as inflation has risen to 40-year highs. To better contextualize the current run-up in inflation, this article constructs new historical series for CPI headline and core inflation that are more consistent with current practices and expenditure shares for the post-war period. Using these series, we find that current inflation levels are much closer to past inflation peaks than the official series would suggest. In particular, the rate of core CPI disinflation caused by Volcker-era policies is significantly lower when measured using today’s treatment of housing: only 5 percentage points of decline instead of 11 percentage points in the official CPI statistics.