Abstract Using micro-level data, we examine the behavior of socially responsible investment (SRI) funds. SRI funds select firms with lower pollution, more board diversity, higher employee satisfaction, and better workplace safety. Yet, both in the cross-section and using an exogenous shock to SRI capital, we find that SRI funds do not significantly change firm behavior. Moreover, we find little evidence that they try to impact firm behavior using shareholder proposals. Our results suggest that SRI funds are not greenwashing, but they are impact washing; they invest in a portfolio of firms with better environmental and social conduct but do not follow through on their promise of impact.

Abstract We present a real options model of a firm’s make-or-buy decision under demand uncertainty. “Making” is subject to decreasing returns to scale, fixed costs, and capital investment. “Buying” happens at a fixed price and requires no investment. Three distinct procurement regimes endogenously arise: buying, making, or concurrent sourcing for, respectively, low, intermediate, and high demand. Capital constraints encourage buying or concurrent sourcing. Operating leverage peaks when the firm switches between buying and making, and it is lowest (and negative) at the switch between making and concurrent sourcing. This non-monotonic pattern mirrors and drives the behavior of the firm’s beta.

Abstract We investigate the role of sentiment and its implications for real assets. Using shipping sentiment proxies that capture market expectations, valuation, and liquidity, we construct sentiment indices for the dry bulk shipping market. Evidence suggests that sentiment affects the monthly returns of real assets. The empirical findings also show that market sentiment serves as a contrarian indicator for future cycle phases in all sectors. Furthermore, a sentiment-based trading simulation exercise on the sale and purchase of vessels shows that investors can benefit from higher returns compared to the buy-and-hold benchmark, while partially offsetting the highly volatile nature of the shipping industry.

Abstract We exploit the exogenous shock to the Brazilian banking system caused by the international turmoil of 2008 and find evidence that the run to systemically important banks is better explained by the perception of a too-big-to-fail policy than by bank fundamentals. We infer that the extra inflow of deposits received by systemically important banks during crises gives them an important competitive advantage. Our analysis also indicates that a bank’s share of funding from institutional investors affects the nonfinancial firms’ and institutional investors’ decision to run.