Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract This paper examines why large private equity (PE) funds earn lower returns. The article argues that large PE funds are suited to making large investments and small PE funds are suited to nurturing start-ups. Thus, the suboptimal investment in small companies is one driver of the size effect in PE. A theoretical model and empirical results from a sample of 1,222 funds in the USA support this prediction. The largest 25% of PE funds earn internal rates of return of 5.17% when they invest in the largest 25% of companies but only −2.98% when they invest in the smallest 25%. This suggests that investment size is a driver of the size effect in PE.

Abstract Equity risk measured by beta is of great interest to both academics and practitioners. Existing estimates of beta use historical returns. Many studies have found option-implied volatility to be a strong predictor of future realized volatility. We find that option-implied volatility and skewness are also good predictors of future realized beta. Motivated by this finding, we establish a set of assumptions needed to construct a beta estimate from option-implied return moments using equity and index options. This beta can be computed using only option data on a single day. It is therefore potentially able to reflect sudden changes in the structure of the underlying company.

Abstract Using a detailed German data set on venture capital contracts, the authors document that contracts between venture capitalists (VC) and their portfolio firms specify more complete conditions for future financing for firms that do have no suitable outside financing option and therefore lower ex post bargaining power. The authors’ result is consistent with theories of holdup, where complete contracts protect the entrepreneur from expropriation by the financier. Moreover, there is evidence of learning by VCs. Other possible explanations for observed contracts, such as multitasking or coordination costs, instead have little explanation power.

Abstract When contracts are unobserved (and nonexclusive), agents can promise the same asset to multiple counterparties and subsequently default. I show that a central mechanism can extract all relevant information about contracts that agents enter by inducing them to report one another. The mechanism sets position limits and reveals the names of agents who hit the limits according to (voluntary) reports from their counterparties. This holds even if sending reports is costly and even if agents can collude. In some cases, an agent’s position limit must be nonbinding in equilibrium. The mechanism has some features of a clearinghouse.

Abstract This paper develops a real options model in which firms may use the timing of their initial public offerings (IPOs) to signal the quality of their investment prospects to outside investors. When adverse selection is more relevant (cold markets), firms with better investment prospects accelerate their IPO relative to their perfect information benchmark to reveal their type to outside investors. When adverse selection is less relevant (hot markets), all firms issue simultaneously, issuers are younger on average, and IPO timing is uninformative. An extension with multiple signals and the empirical evidence show that better ranked firms are younger, issue a lower fraction of shares, and underprice more during cold markets, and that issuers are younger on average during hot markets.

Abstract We use a unique data set to show how firms in Europe used credit lines during the financial crisis. We find that firms with restricted access to credit (small, private, non-investment-grade, and unprofitable) draw more funds from their credit lines during the crisis than their large, public, investment-grade, profitable counterparts. Interest spreads increased (especially in “market-based economies”), but commitment fees remained unchanged. Our findings suggest that credit lines did not dry up during the crisis and provided the liquidity that firms used to cope with this exceptional contraction. In particular, credit lines provided the liquidity companies needed to invest during the crisis.

Abstract Despite the enormous growth of the asset management industry during the past decades, little is known about the asset pricing implications of investment intermediaries. Standard models of investment theory neither address the distinction between individual and institutional investors nor the potential implications of direct investing and delegated investing. In a model with endogenous delegation, the authors find that delegation leads to a more informative price system and lower equity premia. In the presence of relative return objectives, stocks exhibiting high correlations with the benchmark have significantly lower returns than stocks with low correlations. The authors' empirical results support the model's predictions.

Abstract The authors investigate optimal capital requirements in a model in which banks decide on their investment in credit scoring systems. The main result is that regulators should encourage sophisticated banks to keep their asset portfolios safe, while assets with high systematic risk should be concentrated in smaller banks. The proposed regulatory differentiation follows the Basel Accord’s distinction between internal ratings-based approach and standard approach. Sophisticated banks should increase their equity capital relative to other banks, leading to further size differentiation. The moral hazard problem of banks misrepresenting their loan portfolio risk is analyzed, with the result that it induces stricter capital requirements.