Knowledge that Transforms

We show that firms with younger CEOs are more likely to experience stock price crashes, including crashes caused by revelation of negative news in the form of breaks in strings of consecutive earnings increases. Such strings are accompanied by large increases in CEO compensation that do not dissipate with crashes. These findings suggest that CEOs have financial incentives to hoard bad news earlier in their career, which increases future crashes. This negative impact of CEO age effect is strongest in the presence of managerial discretion. Overall, the findings highlight the importance of CEO age for firm policies and outcomes.

Rationality would suggest that advice-seeking investors receive benefits from costly financial advice. However, evidence documenting these benefits for US investors has so far been lacking. This article is the first to document that US mutual fund investors indeed receive one of the many previously hypothesized benefits associated with financial advice. The documented benefit comes from valuable tax-management advice that helps investors avoid taxable fund distributions and becomes even more valuable when investors face distributions that can cause large and hard-to-predict tax liabilities. Additional evidence suggests that financial advice helps with other aspects of tax management such as tax-loss selling.

In June 2014, the International Risk Management Conference (IRMC) held its 7th edition in the Warsaw School of Economics (Warsaw, Poland). The theme of the conference was “The Safety of the Financial System: From Idiosyncratic to Systemic Risk.” Thirty-three papers were submitted for review for publication in this special issue of the Review of Finance. The papers have been subjected to the same rigorous referring process as other papers submitted to the Journal. Three papers were accepted. One (Fiordilisi and Ricci, 2016) was published in the last issue (Review of Finance 20(6), 2321–2347) and the other two are published here. The first two papers deal with systemic and policy aspects of the financial system while the third deals with an important segment of the financial markets, defaulted bonds. The paper by Oet, Ong and Lyytinen “aims to determine whether policymakers’ discussions of financial stability and other factors systematically explain deviations of observed policy rates from the Taylor-rule-implied rates.” They have two main findings: first, they find that discussion themes obtained from Federal Open Market Committee meeting minutes provide explanatory power beyond standard Taylor rule variables. Second, the tri-mandate policy rule provides additional explanatory power that accounts for changes in the economic and financial system. They conclude that the tri-mandate policy model with financial stability dominates Taylor-type rules in zero lower bound conditions.

We study whether relative optimism leads to home bias in portfolio holdings by looking at two novel databases: a survey that includes expectations of identified professional asset management companies for equity, bonds, and currencies, and the International Monetary Fund portfolio holdings data for equity and bonds. We document that relative optimism for equity is persistent over the period 1997–2012, but relative optimism for bonds and currencies exhibits more time-series variation. Moreover, we show that relative optimism is an economically significant variable that helps explain home bias in portfolio holdings, not only for equity, but also for bonds.

Blockchains represent a novel application of cryptography and information technology to age-old problems of financial record-keeping, and they may lead to far-reaching changes in corporate governance. Many major players in the financial industry have began to invest in this new technology, and stock exchanges have proposed using blockchains as a new method for trading corporate equities and tracking their ownership. This essay evaluates the potential implications of these changes for managers, institutional investors, small shareholders, auditors, and other parties involved in corporate governance. The lower cost, greater liquidity, more accurate record-keeping, and transparency of ownership offered by blockchains may significantly upend the balance of power among these cohorts.

We determine the optimal lifecycle purchasing strategy for deferred income annuities (DIAs)—which are distinct from single-premium income annuities (SPIAs)—for an individual who wishes to maximize the expected utility of his/her annuity income at a fixed time in the future. In contrast to the vast portfolio-choice literature for SPIAs, we focus on the stochasticity of the DIA’s payout yield and address concerns that rates are currently “too low” to justify irreversible annuitization. We assume a mean-reverting model for payout yields and show that a risk-neutral consumer who wishes to maximize his/her expected retirement income should wait until yields reach a threshold—which lies above historical averages—and then purchase the DIA in one lump sum. In contrast, a risk-averse consumer who is concerned the payout yield will remain below average for an extended period and worries about losing mortality credits while waiting, should employ a barrier purchasing strategy, as in the portfolio choice problem under transaction costs. We illustrate how this insight is applied in the context of annuitization. In fact, the optimal behavior of a risk-averse consumer resembles an asymmetric dollar-cost averaging strategy, with a portion of the DIA-budget spent even while payout rates are below historical averages. As part of our analysis we offer an easy-to-use asymptotic approximation for the optimal purchasing strategy (threshold) and provide some numerical examples to illustrate the concept.

We argue that the relationship between managerial pay-for-performance incentives and risk taking is pro-cyclical. We study the relationship between incentives provided by stock-based compensation and firm risk for US non-financial corporations over the two business cycles between 1992 and 2009. We show that a given level of pay-for-performance incentives results in significantly lower firm risk when the economy is in a downturn. The documented pro-cyclical relationship between incentives and risk taking is consistent with state-dependent risk aversion. Our findings contribute to the literature on the depressive effects of performance incentives on firm risk by documenting the importance of the interaction between performance incentives and risk aversion.

The Taylor rule presents a traditional approach to guiding and evaluating contemporary monetary policy as a function of inflation and economic slack. While the responsibilities of the Federal Reserve (Fed) include price stability and long-run growth, its mission has grown to include financial stability. Surprisingly, the question of whether financial stability ought to be considered as an element of monetary policy is hotly contested. This study aims to determine whether policymakers’ discussions of financial stability and other factors systematically explain deviations of observed policy rates from the rates implied by the Taylor rule. To this end, we conduct content analysis of the Fed’s monetary policy discussions to discover actual topics that enter into policy. We offer two main findings: First, discussion themes extracted from released Federal Open Market Committee meeting minutes provide explanatory power beyond standard Taylor rule variables. Second, additional explanatory power is provided by a tri-mandate policy rule that accounts for changes in the economic and financial system as moderated by the evolving preferences of the policymakers. We show that a discussion-based thematic model with financial stability dominates Taylor-type rules during normal times. Moreover, the tri-mandate policy model with financial stability dominates Taylor-type rules in zero lower bound conditions. Taken together, these findings reveal that financial stability has mattered to the Fed continuously and remains critical in setting monetary policy in zero lower bound.

Macro-finance addresses the link between asset prices and economic fluctuations. Many models reflect the same rough idea: the market’s ability to bear risk is greater in good times, and less in bad times. Models achieve this similar result by quite different mechanisms. I contrast their strengths and weaknesses. I highlight directions for future research, including additional facts to be matched, and limitations of the models that should prod future theoretical work. I describe how macro-finance models can fundamentally alter macroeconomics, by putting time-varying risk premiums and risk-bearing capacity at the center of recessions rather than variation in the interest rate and intertemporal substitution.

In this article, I propose a general-equilibrium model with proportional adjustment costs and industry-specific capital to study the firm migration phenomenon across market-to-book ratio. In my model, investors’ desire to diversify their portfolios and investment frictions generate a mean-reverting dynamics of Tobin’s q consistent with the probabilities of migration found in the data, and a non-linear pattern in the conditional volatility of Tobin’s q. In addition, since firms’ market-to-book ratios are function of the state of the economy and contain information about stock returns, stock prices inherit these properties, yielding asset-pricing implications in line with the empirical evidence, namely the value premium and a non-monotone relationship between the volatility of stock returns and the Tobin’s q.