Knowledge that Transforms

Using plant-level data from France, we document a potential cost of political connections for firms that is not offset by other benefits. Politically connected CEOs alter corporate employment decisions to help (regional) politicians in their re-election efforts by having higher job and plant creation rates, and lower rates of destruction in election years, especially in politically contested areas. There is little evidence that connected firms benefit from preferential access to government resources, such as subsidies or tax exemptions. Connected firms are less profitable in the cross-section and also experience a drop in profitability when a connected CEO comes to power.

In contrast to past studies that assume service flow of durable goods consumption to be a constant fraction of the stock, we study a consumption-based asset pricing model featuring time-varying utilization of durable goods. We propose an innovative measure of the unobserved usage of durable goods from carbon dioxide emissions. We find that the time-varying utilization of durable goods is a valid pricing factor. Our model exhibits a stronger cross-sectional pricing power than several consumption-based capital asset pricing models, including Yogo’s (2006) durable goods model. Finally, our model mitigates the joint risk premium and implied risk-free rate puzzle.

This study analyzes how promotion-based tournament incentives for non-CEO senior executives affect corporate innovation. We measure tournament incentives using the pay gap between a CEO and the next layer of senior executives. We find that tournament incentives are positively related to innovative efficiency, as measured by the number of patents and patent citations generated per million dollars of R&D expense. Our main finding holds in an instrumental-variable analysis and regressions using alternative innovation measures, including patent generality and originality indices and stock market reactions to patent grants. Consistent with prior theories, the positive effect of tournament incentives is found to be particularly pronounced during the period prior to CEO turnovers.

This article develops and empirically tests a tractable general equilibrium model of corporate financing and investment dynamics in a trade-off economy where heterogeneous firms face unobservable disaster risk and engage in rational Bayesian learning. The model sheds light on leverage cycles. During periods absent disasters: equity premia decrease; credit spreads decrease; expected loss-given-default increases; and leverage ratios increase. Time-since-prior-disaster is the key model conditioning variable. In response to a disaster, risk premia increase while firms sharply reduce labor, capital and leverage, with response size increasing in time-since-prior-disasters. Firms with high bankruptcy costs are most responsive to the time-since-disaster variable. Disaster responses are more pronounced than in an otherwise equivalent economy featuring observed disaster risk. Empirical tests of novel corporate finance predictions are conducted. Consistent with the model, we find empirically that leverage and investment are increasing in time-since-prior-recessions, with the effect more pronounced for firms with low recovery ratios.

We find a robust negative relation between skewness/lottery-like features, proxied by maximum return (MAX) over the last month, and future returns for stocks preferred by individual investors. This negative relation is nonexistent for the rest of stocks. We identify stocks preferred by individual investors through bundling ten stock characteristics associated with their stock preferences. The negative relation between MAX and future return is produced by the stocks preferred by individuals that account for less than 5% of the overall market capitalization. Our results are robust to alternative definitions of MAX and lottery-like features such as total, idiosyncratic, and expected skewness.

We use an experimental approach to study the effect of market structure on the incidence of misreporting by credit rating agencies. In the game, agencies receive a signal regarding the type of asset held by the seller and issue a report. The sellers then present the asset, with the report if one is solicited, to the buyer for purchase. We find that competition among rating agencies significantly reduces the likelihood of misreporting.

Using a large sample of firms from developed and developing countries over the 1990–2010 period, we document evidence of zero-leverage firms around the world. Further, we find strong and robust evidence that in countries with high scores on Schwartz’s Conservatism and Mastery indices as well as high levels of trust, firms are more likely to employ a zero-leverage policy, after controlling for various firm- and country-level determinants of leverage. Finally, we find that firms with zero leverage have a lower cost of equity capital in countries where a zero-leverage policy is more compatible with the local culture.

We solve a rich life-cycle model of household decisions involving consumption of perishable goods and housing services, habit formation for housing consumption, stochastic labor income, stochastic house prices, home renting and owning, stock investments, and portfolio constraints. In line with empirical observations, the optimal decisions involve (i) stock investments that are low or zero for many young agents and then gradually increasing over life, (ii) an age- and wealth-dependent housing expenditure share, (iii) non-housing consumption being significantly more sensitive to wealth and income shocks than housing consumption, and (iv) non-housing consumption being hump-shaped over life.

We evaluate the effects of three European Central Bank (ECB) policies (the Securities Markets Programme (SMP), the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), and the Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs)) on government bond yields. We use a novel Kalman-filter augmented event-study approach and yields on euro-denominated sovereign bonds, dollar-denominated sovereign bonds, corporate bonds, and corporate credit default swap (CDS) rates to understand the channels through which policies reduced sovereign bond yields. On average across Italy, Spain and Portugal, considering both the SMP and the OMT, yields fall considerably. Decomposing this fall, default risk accounts for 37% of the reduction in yields, reduced redenomination risk for 13%, and reduced market segmentation effects for 50%. Stock price increases in distressed and core countries suggest that these policies also had beneficial macro-spillovers.

We study a competitive market for risk-sharing, in which risk-tolerant providers of risk protection, who face frictional costs in holding capital, offer coverage over a range of risk classes to risk-averse agents. We distinguish monoline and multiline industry structures and characterize when each structure is optimal. Markets for which the risks are limited in number, asymmetric or correlated will be served by monoline structures, whereas markets characterized by a large number of essentially independent risks will be served by many multiline firms. Our results are consistent with observed structures within insurance, and also have general implications for the financial services industry.