We analyze the impact of credit default swap (CDS) trading on bank syndication activity. Theoretically, the effect of CDS trading is ambiguous: on the one hand, CDS can improve risk-sharing and hence be a more flexible risk management tool than loan syndication; on the other hand, CDS trading can reduce bank monitoring incentives. We document that banks are less likely to syndicate loans and retain a larger loan fraction once CDS are actively traded on the borrower’s debt. We then discern the risk management and the moral hazard channel. We find no evidence that the reduced likelihood to syndicate loans is a result of increased moral hazard problems

We show that the propensity of a bank to experience extreme co-movements in its credit default swap (CDS) premia together with the market is priced in the bank’s default swap spread during the financial crisis. We measure a bank’s CDS tail beta by estimating the upper tail dependence between its default swap spreads and a CDS market index. Our study shows that protection sellers receive a premium for bearing the risk of extreme upward co-movements in default risk. The economic significance of this effect is large yet limited to the recent financial crisis. Banks in the upper quintile of CDS tail beta have spreads that are on average 140 basis points higher than those of banks in the lower CDS tail beta quintile

We analyze the reactions of stock returns and the spreads of credit default swaps (CDS) of banks from Europe and the USA to four major regulatory reforms in the aftermath of the subprime crisis, employing an event study analysis. Contrary to public perception, we find that financial markets indeed reacted to the structural reforms enacted at the national level. The reforms succeeded in reducing bail-out expectations relative to the post-bail-out period, especially for systemic banks. The strongest effects were found for the Dodd–Frank Act and in particular for the Volcker rule. Bank profitability was affected in all countries, showing up in lower equity returns

What types of policy intervention had a greater impact during the financial crisis? By using a detailed dataset of worldwide policy, we answer this question focusing on Global Systemically Important banks (G-SIBs), looking both to stock returns and Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads reactions. As robustness checks, we also analyze a control sample of 31 large Non-Financial Companies (NFCs). Overall, we show that different policy interventions from governments and central banks have produced diverse market reactions: investors generally appreciate monetary policy interventions for G-SIBs (but not for NFCs) and do not welcome bank failures and bailouts (for both G-SIBs and NCFs