We analyze the impact of a requirement similar to the Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio on the bank intermediation applying Regression Discontinuity Designs. Using a unique dataset on Dutch banks, we show that a liquidity requirement causes long-term borrowing and lending rates as well as demand for long-term interbank loans to increase. Lower levels of aggregate liquidity increase the estimated effects. Short-term borrowing and lending rates only rise during periods of lower market-wide liquidity. Further, banks do not seem able to pass on the increased funding costs in the interbank market to their private sector clients. Rather, a liquidity requirement seems to decrease banks’ interest margins

We propose and test a new channel that links liquidity risk and interest rates in short-term funding markets. Unlike existing theories that focus on premiums demanded by lenders, the liquidity risk channel postulates that borrowers that are more exposed to urgent liquidity needs are willing to pay a markup for immediate funding. We test and quantify the channel using unique trade-by-trade data and uncover systematic differences across individual banks’ funding cost driven by differences in banks’ liquidity risk. These differences are persistent over a decade, suggesting that the liquidity risk channel is relevant in general and not only arises during crisis times

This article uses the 2007–09 financial crisis as a negative liquidity shock on banks in the USA and analyzes its transmission to the real economy. The ex ante heterogeneity in the amount of long-term debt that matured during the crisis is used to measure the variation in banks’ exposure to the liquidity shock. I find that banks transmitted the liquidity shock to the real economy by reducing their loan supply. The reduction was particularly strong for real estate loans. As a result, house prices declined in the MSAs where these banks have branches. Bank capital plays a significant role in the transmission: under-capitalized banks transmitted the liquidity shock, whereas well-capitalized banks’ lending did not show any decline

In a proposed model of a multinational bank, interest margins determine local lending by foreign affiliates and the internal funding by parent banks. We exploit detailed parent-affiliate-level data of all German banks to empirically test our theoretical predictions in pre-crisis times. Local lending by affiliates depends negatively on price margins, the difference between lending and deposit rates in foreign markets. The effect of funding cost margins, the gap between local deposit rates faced by affiliates abroad and the funding costs of their parents, on internal capital market funding is positive but statistically weak. Interest margins are central to explain the interaction between internal capital markets and foreign affiliates lending

Recent literature suggests that higher capital requirements for banks might lead to a socially costly crowding out of deposits by equity. This paper shows that additional equity in banks can help to crowd in deposits. Intuitively, as banks have more equity and become safer, the cost of deposit funding may decline; this, in turn, can encourage banks to expand their deposits. However, I also find that, for this effect to occur, capital requirements may have to be stringent enough: When bank capital is low, a small rise in capital requirements can cause banks to substitute equity for deposits. Overall, a non-monotonic relationship between the required amount of equity in banks and their level of deposit funding obtains

This paper provides evidence on the strategic lending decisions made by banks facing a negative funding shock. Using bank–firm level credit data, we show that banks reallocate credit within their loan portfolio in at least three different ways. First, banks reallocate to sectors where they have a high market share. Second, they also reallocate to sectors in which they are more specialized. Third, they reallocate credit toward low-risk firms. These reallocation effects are economically large. A standard deviation increase in sector market share, sector specialization, or firm soundness reduces the transmission of the funding shock to credit supply by 22%, 8%, and 10%, respectively

How does the availability of alternative investment opportunities for banks’ depositors affect the reaction of the banking system to aggregate liquidity shocks? And what are the implications, if any, for banking regulation? To answer these questions, I study a Diamond–Dybvig environment, where banks hedge against aggregate liquidity risk in the interbank market or default, and depositors borrow and lend in a hidden-bond market. In this framework, banks offer an endogenously incomplete contract, and default in equilibrium only when facing systemic liquidity risk. In this case, the allocation at default is inefficient, and countercyclical liquidity requirements are welfare-improving

We quantify the importance to mutual fund flows of affiliation between funds and their distributors. Bank failures create exogenous variation in retail customers’ exposure to bank-affiliated mutual funds. When a bank fails, its customers are moved to other banks that distribute their own affiliated mutual funds. Following such exogeneous bank shifts, customers sell their fund holdings and replace them with funds affiliated with their new banks. Customers react sequentially over time. After 4 years, a third of customers’ investments have been reallocated. In spite of large reallocations, investors do not end up with better-performing fund portfolios

In this article, we show that when banks increase their use of wholesale funding they shorten the maturity of loans to corporations. This effect appears to be linked to banks’ exposure to rollover risk resulting from their increasing use of short-term uninsured funding. Banks that use more wholesale funding shorten both the maturity of newly issued loans and the maturity of their loan portfolios. These results are not present among banks that rely predominantly on insured deposits. The link between wholesale funding and loan maturity is robust, and holds when we include firm-year fixed effects, suggesting that the decline in loan maturity is bank driven. In line with this premise, we find that the slope of the loan yield curve becomes steeper for banks that use more wholesale funding and that borrowers turn to the bond market to raise funding with longer maturity in response to banks’ loan maturity shortening

Using novel monthly data for 226 euro-area banks from 2007 to 2015, we investigate the determinants of banks’ sovereign exposures and their effects on lending during and after the crisis. Public, bailed-out and poorly capitalized banks responded to sovereign stress by purchasing domestic public debt more than other banks, consistent with both the “moral suasion” and the “carry trade” hypothesis. Public banks’ purchases grew especially in coincidence with the largest ECB liquidity injections, which therefore reinforced the “moral suasion” mechanism. Bank exposures significantly amplified the impact of sovereign stress on bank lending to domestic firms, as well as on lending by foreign subsidiaries of stressed-country banks to firms in non-stressed countries. Altogether, our evidence connects this amplification effect and its cross-border transmission to the moral suasion exerted by domestic governments on banks during the crisis