The paper by B. Chowdhry and J. Howe examines if production delocalization can play a useful role for corporate exchange rate risk management. Such “operational hedging” transfers the production costs into the foreign currency area and may thus reduce the operating exposure of a firm. The authors claim that operational hedging emerges only if a firm faces a combination of exchange rate and demand uncertainty. Exchange rate uncertainty alone cannot justify production delocalization because it can be hedged with foreign exchange instruments. Only the interaction of exchange rate risk with demand uncertainty can justify delocalization to the extend that market incompleteness prevents insurance of demand risk. The authors derive their conclusions from ad hoc assumptions which lack proper microfoundations. They concede this flaw in a short note on page 4 without fixing it. Two assumptions are in contradiction to microeconomic principles: First, the authors assume that local prices of a multinational firm are fixed in advance and do not change for any given exchange rate change. Second, they assume that the quantity sold in each market and the exchange rate are independent variables. Both assumptions present a dubious starting point and need to be rectified. The following section tries to clean up their model setting. Thereafter, I proceed to the central claim of the paper about the necessity of both demand and exchange rate uncertainty for delocalizations. It turns out this claim cannot be sustained if firm pricing behavior is properly modeled.

The early stage of the 2007/2008 financial crisis was marked by large value losses for bank stocks. This article identifies the equity funds most affected by this valuation shock and examines its consequences for the nonfinancial stocks owned by the respective funds. We document three key empirical findings. First, ownership links to these distressed equity funds lead to large temporary underperformance of the most exposed nonfinancial stocks. Second, distressed equity funds make the better performing stocks in their portfolio the preferred liquidation choice. Third, stocks with higher overall fund ownership generally performed better throughout the crisis.