We propose to impose a weighted l1 and squared l2 norm penalty on the portfolio weights to improve out-of-sample (OOS) performances of portfolio optimization when the number of assets becomes large. We show that under certain conditions, the realized risk of the optimal minimum variance portfolio (MVP) obtained from the strategy can asymptotically be lower than those of benchmark portfolios with a high probability. Our theoretical results imply that penalty parameters for the weighted-norm penalty can be specified as a simple function of the number of assets and sample size. With the theoretical results, we also develop an automatic calibration procedure for choosing the penalty parameters. We demonstrate superior OOS performances of the weighted-norm MVP with two real data sets. Finally, we propose several alternative norm penalties and show that their OOS performances are comparable to the weighted-norm strategy.

We document that leased capital accounts for about 20% of total physical productive assets used by US public firms, and its proportion is more than 40% among small and financially constrained firms. The leased capital ratio exhibits a strong countercyclical pattern over business cycles and a positive correlation with cross-sectional idiosyncratic uncertainty. We argue that existing macro models with financial frictions assume that firms cannot rent capital and overlook the effects of leasing activities on business cycle dynamics. We explicitly introduce a buy-versus-lease decision into the Bernanke–Gertler–Gilchrist financial accelerator model setting to demonstrate a novel and quantitatively important economic mechanism: that the increased use of leased capital when financial constraints become tighter in bad states significantly mitigates the financial accelerator mechanism and thus also mitigates the response of macroeconomic variables to negative total factor productivity shocks and risk shocks. We provide strong empirical evidence to support our mechanism.

Based on a textual analysis of initial public offering (IPO) prospectuses, we obtain a number of important findings regarding the relation between the conservatism in prospectuses, IPO pricing, and subsequent operating and stock return performance. First, prospectus conservatism is positively related to underpricing, with the relation more pronounced for technology than nontechnology firms. Second, for nontechnology IPOs, prospectus conservatism is able to predict the firm’s post-IPO operating performance. Specifically, we find that conservatism is inversely related to the firm’s operating performance for the 3 years following the IPO. However, this predictability is limited to nontechnology IPOs. Finally, we find some evidence that for nontechnology IPOs conservatism is inversely related to the firm’s post-IPO abnormal stock return. We conclude that the conservatism contained in an IPO’s prospectus contains useful information about pricing and subsequent operating and stock return performance. Moreover, prospectus conservatism for nontechnology IPOs deserves more attention from investors.

We consider a model in which shareholders provide a risk-averse CEO with risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We show that the optimal contract protects the CEO from losses for bad outcomes and is convex for medium outcomes and concave for good outcomes. We calibrate the model to data on 1,707 CEOs and show that it explains observed contracts much better than the standard model without risk-taking incentives. When we apply the model to contracts that consist of base salary, stock, and options, the results suggest that options should be issued in the money. Our model also helps us rationalize the universal use of at-the-money options when the tax code is taken into account. Moreover, we propose a new way of measuring risk-taking incentives in which the expected value added to the firm is traded off against the additional risk a CEO has to bear.

Exploiting China’s anti-corruption campaign, we show that following a decrease in corruption, firm performance improves. Small and young firms benefit more. We identify the channels through which corruption hampers firm performance. Following the anti-corruption campaign, the allocation of capital and labor becomes more efficient. Firms operating in ex ante more corrupt environments experience larger productivity gains, higher growth of sales, and lower cost of debt than other firms. Taken together, our results suggest that corruption is an inefficient equilibrium for an economy because it creates negative externalities.

This article examines whether foreign investor heterogeneity plays a role in stock liquidity in a sample of 27,828 firms from thirty-nine countries worldwide. Foreign direct ownership is negatively associated with stock liquidity, while foreign portfolio ownership is positively associated with stock liquidity. Consistent with theoretical predictions, foreign ownership explains stock liquidity through both trading activity and information channels. The value-enhancing benefits of foreign direct investors’ monitoring efforts outweigh their liquidity costs and high adverse selection premium. However, the positive impact of foreign portfolio ownership on firm performance becomes negative and is not robustly significant after controlling for liquidity.

This article investigates how transportation networks shape firms’ geographic footprint by reducing monitoring costs of distant investments. Exploiting the staggered expansions of China’s passenger high-speed rail (HSR) network, we document that the amount of intercity investment between a pair of cities increases by 45% with the introduction of an HSR line connecting the cities. We enhance the causal inference by applying high-dimensional fixed effects, and focusing on city pairs that are “accidentally” connected in the network. The HSR effect is the strongest in industries that require on-site monitoring, as well as for controlling stakes in large distant investments.