Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract Using a unique data set on the ownership composition of euro area equity funds, we find substantial differences in the flow-performance sensitivity across mutual fund clienteles. Households, followed by insurers, display the weakest sensitivity, whereas investment funds—as investors in mutual funds—exhibit the strongest sensitivity. Crucially, these behavioral differences hold within the same fund-quarter, ruling out heterogeneity across funds as a potential driver. We relate these clientele effects to monitoring incentives and balance sheet constraints. Lastly, we find that households respond more strongly to poor performance when surrounded by more performance-sensitive investors, indicating strategic interactions in investor flows.

Abstract We model credit competition between a bigtech platform and a bank lending to a merchant under limited commitment and asymmetric information about the merchant’s incentives to default. The platform leverages its control over a marketplace to enforce partial loan repayments, enabling it to serve certain unbanked borrowers. When directly competing with the bank, the platform gains an endogenous screening advantage as borrowers with stronger incentives to default self-select into bank loans to avoid the platform’s enforcement. Whereas the platform improves financial inclusion for unbanked borrowers, social welfare may decline because the bank tightens credit in response to adverse screening.

Abstract I investigate how index membership affects firms’ product-market strategy. After plausibly exogenous index inclusion, firms gain market share by reducing product prices, giving better trade credit, and increasing sales and marketing expenses. Firms reduce prices for products with low market share and higher switching costs and habits. This comes at the cost of lower profitability, which increases in subsequent periods. Further analysis suggests that managerial learning about an improved funding environment from the post–index inclusion stock price increase is the underlying channel that leads to the observed increase in investment to gain market share. A model further corroborates these findings.

Abstract In a monetary union, the risk-free rate cannot adjust to country-level fiscal positions, leaving only default spreads and convenience yields to respond. Empirically, we find that convenience yields explain a large share of the variation in eurozone (EZ) sovereign bond yields. EZ sovereign bonds earn larger convenience yields when their governments run larger surpluses. Since convenience yields generate substantial seigniorage revenue from debt issuance, our estimates imply economically large fiscal costs from low convenience yields for peripheral countries in the EZ.

Abstract We causally test alternative theories of expectation formation. Using a randomized information experiment we show overreaction is a key feature of individuals’ return expectations, and individuals’ response to the price-earnings ratio is opposite of academic consensus. Our evidence is inconsistent with standard models of expectation formation, but subjective mental models that deviate from objective benchmarks can jointly explain the updating behavior in the experiment, the link between individuals’ prior perceptions and expectations, and the heterogeneity of updating. Conditional on their beliefs, individuals’ sensitivity of equity shares in a hypothetical portfolio choice experiment is consistent with the standard Merton model.

Abstract Flooding is among the costliest natural disasters in many countries. To protect collateral, many mortgage borrowers in the United States are legally required to maintain flood insurance. However, lax enforcement leads to frequent policy lapses. This paper shows that lenders provide credit contingent on borrowers’ insurance incentives. Exploiting exogenous premium rises ($266 annually) that disincentivize insurance take-up, I find mortgage denial rates dramatically increase by 0.49–0.81 pp. By comparison, lowering income by $266 has an effect of only 0.01 pp. Mortgage applicants’ composition remains unchanged, refuting demand-side explanations. Evidence suggests lenders internalize ex-post monitoring costs into ex-ante credit restrictions.

Abstract Stock prices aggregate investor information about investment opportunities and reflect managerial performance. These dual roles may be in tension: when prices are more informative about investment opportunities, they may be less effective at incentivizing managerial effort. This tradeoff has novel consequences. Lower information costs can lead to both more efficient investment but lower firm value. The principal may strictly prefer to delegate investment to a manager who has no informational advantage and makes ex-post inefficient choices. Investment in diversifying and (ex-ante) negative NPV projects mitigate agency problems. Finally, standard measures of price efficiency provide an incomplete picture of firm value.

Abstract Corporate bonds include restrictive covenants that may prevent firms from pursuing valuable growth opportunities ex post and are virtually impossible to renegotiate. We study a common but little-known contractual provision—the defeasance option—which allows issuers to immediately remove all covenants without retiring the bond. Our theoretical model predicts, and our empirical analysis confirms, that defeasance inclusion is more likely when covenants are numerous and issuers face financial constraints, uncertainty, and growth opportunities. We also show that investors require lower yields when defeasance is included in noncallable bonds, and higher yields in fixed-price callable bonds, where it raises call risk.

Abstract We find widespread evidence that firms avoid overtime payments by strategically assigning “managerial” titles. Exploiting the exemption threshold under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), we find managerial titles increase almost fivefold just above the overtime pay cutoff, including suspect listings, such as “Director of First Impressions” for a role equivalent to “Front-Desk Clerk.” Avoidance is higher when firms have more bargaining power and are financially constrained. It is also more common in occupations with volatile demand and unpredictable worker scheduling. Patterns align with litigation and Department of Labor enforcement. Firms avoid roughly 13.5% in compensation costs, hiring strategic “managers.”

Abstract This paper studies how a borrower issues long- and short-term debt in response to shocks to the fundamental value. Short-term debt protects creditors from future dilution and incentivizes the borrower to reduce leverage after small negative shocks. Long-term debt postpones default and allows the borrower time to recover after large negative shocks. When borrowers are in distress, they rely on short-term debt; however, they issue both types of debt during more normal periods. Our model generates novel implications for the dynamic adjustment of debt maturities.