Journal Article A Message from the President of the Society for Financial Studies Get access Joseph Williams Joseph Williams New York University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 1, Issue 1, January 1988, Pages 1–2, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/1.1.1 Published: 03 April 2015
We examine the sale of equity within the context of a model of negotiation between a firm and a less well informed purchaser. We introduce a simple form of negotiation by allowing the firm to set the price of the issue and by assuming that the purchase is a financier-underwriter who acts strategically. This transaction is analyzed as a noncooperative game, and we identify sequential equilibria that are consistent with observed behavior: namely that negotiations occasionally fail, that market reactions to equity offers are not uniformly negative, and that equity placements are often underpriced.
The role of ordinary options in facilitating the completion of securities markets is examined in the context of a model of contingent claims sufficiently general to accommodate the continuous distributions of asset pricing theory and option pricing theory. In this context, it is shown that call options written on a single security approximately span all contingent claims written on this security and that call options written on portfolios of call options on individual primitive securities approximately span all contingent claims that can be written on these primitive securities. In the case of simple options, explicit formulas are given for the approximating options and portfolios of options. These results are applied to the pricing of contingent claims by arbitrage and to irrelevance propositions in corporate finance. The role of complete contingent-claims markets in the optimal allocation of risk bearing is well known [Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959)] and is the cornerstone of the economic theory of financial markets [Mossin (1977)]. As a consequence, it becomes important from a practical as well as a scholarly perspective to determine how complex the securities markets must be in order to achieve the allocational efficiencies of complete markets. The literature on this question has grown to be sizable. Much of this literature has been reviewed in John (1981, 1984) and Amershi (1985). A seminal contribution concerning the complexity of complete securities markets was made by Ross (1976) in analyzing the role of conventional options in com-
In a model of the firm in which insiders are privately informed of the firm's prospects and investment is endogenous, this article shows the existence of coarse dividend-signaling equilibria: Dividends partition the space of possible prospects of the firm, and changes in dividends reflect "broad", or nonincremental, changes in these prospects. These equilibria are shown to exist under general preference and technology structures, and it is argued that they closely match the following "anomalous" empirical features of corporate dividend payouts: Dividend changes have nontrivial information effects, yet dividends are smoothed (in a world with cyclic prospects), and dividends are poor predictors of future earnings. Furthermore, in performing comparative statics, this article derives cross-sectional and time-series restrictions on the relation of dividend smoothing to observable firm attributes.
A restriction to nonnegative wealth is sufficient to preclude all arbitrage opportunities in financial models that have no arbitrage in limits of simple strategies. Imposing nonnegative wealth does not constrain agents from making the choice they would make under the standard integrability condition. These conclusions do not depend on whether markets are complete.
In this article we model the financing decisions of a firm as a sequential signaling game. We prove that, when insiders have perfect information regarding the firm's future cash flows, the application of “refinements” to the set of admissible equilibria leads to the dominance of debt over equity financing. However, we show that when insiders observe the firm's cash flows imperfectly, there may exist sequential equilibria in which this “pecking order” breaks down and some firms strictly prefer equity to debt financing. We also prove that, despite the breakdown of the pecking order, the announcement effect of equity financing will be negative relative to debt financing.
While most takeover models assume atomistic stockholders, we analyze a single-raider model with finitely many stockholders. Because the raider can always make some stockholders pivotal, he can overcome the free-rider problem identified by Grossman and Hart (1980) and others in atomistic-stockholder models and profitably take over even without exclusion. One might expect that it would be harder for the raider to make stockholders of more widely held firms pivotal and that exclusion would thus become necessary; however, the infinite-stockholder game cannot yield this conclusion. We also consider the limit of the finite-stockholder game and give conditions under which exclusion is unnecessary. Finally, we show that exclusion leads to the possibility of inefficient takeovers.
Journal Article Inefficient Dynamic Portfolio Strategies or How to Throw Away a Million Dollars in the Stock Market Get access Phillip H. Dybvig Phillip H. Dybvig Yale University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 1, Issue 1, January 1988, Pages 67–88, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/1.1.67 Published: 03 April 2015
How should new securities be designed? Traditional theories have little to say on this: the literature on capital structure and general equilibrium theories with incomplete markets takes the securities firms issue as exogenous. This article explicitly incorporates the transaction costs of issuing securities and develops a model in which the instruments that are traded are chosen optimally and the economy's market structure is endogenous. Among other things, it is shown that the firm's income stream should be split so that in every state all payoffs are allocated to the security held by the group that values it most.
Trading costs, in the form either of explicit charges or of the costs of becoming informed, limit the participation of some classes of traders in commodity future markets. When speculators face a fixed cost of participating in a futures market that is used by commodity producers to hedge their stochastic revenues, the futures risk premium deviates from the perfect market prediction. The deviation rises in absolute value with the square root of the trading cost and with the standard deviation of residual returns, and it is unrelated to the covariance of the futures price with producers' nonmarketable wealths. The residual-risk premium depends not on the total magnitude of the risk that producers hedge (i.e., aggregate revenue variance), but on the variability of their revenue relative to its mean (i.e., the coefficient of variation). Hence, even a commodity that constitutes a minor fraction of aggregate consumption may have a large premium for residual risk if the revenue derived from it has a large coefficient of variation.