Journal Article Managerial Compensation and the Market Reaction to Bank Loans Get access Andres Almazan, Andres Almazan University of Texas Address correspondence to Andres Almazan, Department of Finance, McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin, TX 78712-1179, or e-mail: [email protected]. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Javier Suarez Javier Suarez CEMFI Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 16, Issue 1, January 2003, Pages 237–261, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/16.1.0237 Published: 16 June 2015

In a sample of 2,794 initial public offerings (IPOs), we test three potential explanations for the existence of IPO lockups: lockups serve as (i) a signal of firm quality, (ii) a commitment device to alleviate moral hazard problems, or (iii) a mechanism for underwriters to extract additional compensation from the issuing firm. Our results support the commitment hypothesis. Insiders of firms that are associated with greater potential for moral hazard lockup their shares for a longer period of time. Insiders of firms that have experienced larger excess returns, are backed by venture capitalists, or go public with high-quality underwriters are more likely to be released from the lockup restrictions.

This paper investigates the impact of demographic shocks on optimal decisions about saving, life insurance, and, most centrally, asset allocation. The analysis indicates that marital-status transitions can have important effects on optimal household decisions, particularly in the cases of widowhood and divorce. Children also play a fundamental role in portfolio choice; in addition to leading to substantially different average allocations, they also have strong interaction effects with changes in marital status. Panel data evidence on stockholding suggests that changes in marital status and children matter empirically as well, but not always in the manner that the model predicts. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

This paper proposes a representative agent habit-formation model where preferences are defined for both luxury goods and basic goods. The model matches the equity risk premium, risk-free rate, and volatilities. From the intratemporal first-order condition, one can substitute out basic good consumption and the habit level, yielding a stochastic discount factor driven by two observable risk factors: luxury good consumption and the relative price of the two goods. I estimate these processes and find them to be heteroskedastic, implying time variation in the conditional volatility of the stochastic discount factor. These dynamics occur both at the business cycle frequency and at a lower, "generational" frequency. The findings reveal that the time variation in aggregate stock market and Treasury bond risk premiums are consistent with the predictions of the model. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected], Oxford University Press.

When a loan is sold, it goes to a lower-cost financing source than its originator. Yet, lending markets are less than perfectly competitive. Despite the lower funding cost, therefore, the loan price is not necessarily more favorable to the borrower. However, corporate borrowers are averse to the participation of their loans to other lenders because of the complexity of dealing with multiple banks and the potential information costs of the sale announcement. Consequently, I conjecture that the borrower extracts a price concession in exchange for allowing the bank to sell participations in the loan. Using a hand-matched dataset of loans, borrowers, and lenders, I find that the average yield spread on loans originated by active loan sellers is about 20 basis points lower than the average spread on loans originated by moderate loan sellers.

Journal Article Optimal Portfolio Choice and the Valuation of Illiquid Securities Get access Francis A. Longstaff Francis A. Longstaff University of California, Los Angeles Address correspondence to Francis A. Longstaff, Anderson School, UCLA, Box 951481, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481, or e-mail [email protected]. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 14, Issue 2, April 2001, Pages 407–431, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/14.2.407 Published: 21 June 2015

Journal Article Valuing American Put Options Using Gaussian Quadrature Get access Michael A. Sullivan Michael A. Sullivan Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Address correspondence to Michael A. Sullivan, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 250 E. St. SW, Washington, DC 20219, or e-mail:[email protected]. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 13, Issue 1, January 2000, Pages 75–94, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/13.1.75 Published: 15 June 2015

This article presents a one-tick dynamic model of a limit order market. Agents choose to submit a limit order or a market order depending on the state of the limit order book. Each trader knows that her order will affect the order placement strategies of those who follow and the execution probability of her limit order is endogenous. All traders take this into account which, in equilibrium, generates systematic patterns in transaction prices and order placement strategies even with no asymmetric information. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

In the absence of frictions, the value of the underlying asset implied by option prices must equal its actual market value. With frictions, however, this requirement need not hold. Using S&P 100 index options data, I find that the implied cost of the index is significantly higher in the options market than in the stock market, and is directly related to measures of transaction costs and liquidity. I show that the Black-Scholes model has strong bid-ask spread, trading volume, and open interest biases. Option pricing models that relax the martingale restriction perform significantly better.

In this article, we consider the possibility that some liquidity traders preannounce the size of their orders, a practice that has come to be known as 'sunshine trading'. Two possible effects preannouncement might have on the equilibrium are examined. First, since it identifies certain trades as informationless, preannouncement changes the nature of any informational asymmetries in the market. Second, preannouncement can coordinate the supply and demand of liquidity in the market. We show that preannouncement typically reduces the trading costs of those who preannounce, but its effects on the trading costs and welfare of other traders are ambiguous. We also examine the implications of preannouncement for the distributions of prices and the amount of information that prices reveal.