Knowledge that Transforms

International law prescribes that in a cross-border merger where the acquiror buys 100 percent of the target, the target firm becomes a national of the country of the acquiror. Among other effects, the change in nationality implies a change in investor protection, because the law that is applicable to the newly merged firm changes as well. Therefore, cross-border mergers provide a natural experiment to analyze the effects of changes - both improvements and deteriorations - in corporate governance on firm value. We construct measures of the change in investor protection induced by cross-border mergers in a sample of 506 acquisitions from 39 countries, spanning the period 1989 to 2002. We find that the announcement effect of a cross-border merger for the target firm is higher - relative to a matching, domestic acquisition - the better the shareholder protection and the accounting standards in the country of origin of the acquiror. This result is only significant in acquisitions where the acquiror buys 100 percent of the target, and therefore where the nationality of the target firm changes. In addition, this result is only significant when the acquiror comes from a more-protective country, which suggests that target firms avoid addopting weaker protection via private contracting. Interestingly, we do not find a symmetric effect on the acquiror's return. All in all, we present evidence that the transfer of better corporate governance practices through cross-border mergers is positively valued by markets with weaker corporate governance.

Despite extensive disclosure requirements, mutual fund investors do not observe all actions of fund managers. We estimate the impact of unobserved actions on fund returns using the return gap—the difference between the reported fund return and the return on a portfolio that invests in the previously disclosed fund holdings. We document that unobserved actions of some funds persistently create value, while such actions of other funds destroy value. Our main result shows that the return gap predicts fund performance. (JEL G11, G23) Despite extensive disclosure requirements, mutual fund investors do not observe all actions of fund managers. For example, fund investors do not observe the exact timing of trades and the corresponding transaction costs. On the one hand, fund investors may benefit from unobserved interim trades by skilled fund managers who use their informational advantage to time the purchases and the sales of individual stocks optimally. On the other hand, they may bear hidden costs, such as trading costs, agency costs, and negative investor externalities. In this paper, we analyze the

When the market is incomplete, a new non-redundant derivative security cannot be priced by no-arbitrage arguments alone. Moreover, there will be a multiplicity of stochastic discount factors and each of them may give a different price for the new derivative security. This paper develops an approach to the selection of a stochastic discount factor for pricing a new derivative security. The approach is based on the idea that the price of a derivative security should not vary too much when the payoff of the primitive security is slightly perturbed, i.e., the price of the derivative should be robust to model misspecification. The paper develops two metrics of robustness. The first is based on robustness in expectation. The second is based on robustness in probability and draws on tools from the theory of large deviations. We show that in a stochastic volatility model, the two metrics yield analytically tractable bounds for the derivative price, as the underlying stochastic volatility model is perturbed. The bounds can be readily used for numerical examination of the sensitivity of the price of the derivative to model misspecification.

Nonlinear drift models of the short rate are estimated using data on the short end of the term structure, where the cross-sectional relation is obtained by an analytical approximation. The findings reveal that (i) nonlinear physical drift is not implied unless it is strongly affected by cross-sectional dimensions of the data; (ii) nonlinear risk-neutral drift that allows for fast mean reversion for high rates is desirable to explain and predict observed patterns of yield spreads; and (iii) for higher frequency data from which transitory shocks are removed, (ii) still remains valid although the nonlinearity is somewhat reduced. The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected], Oxford University Press.

We explain and provide evidence for effects of leverage on pricing. Our model identifies two effects that either counteract or reinforce each other, depending on the debt maturity structure: (i) firms set higher prices (underinvest in market share) if they have more debt, and (ii) firms engage in dynamic risk-shifting by setting lower (higher) prices if the current debt obligation will be higher (lower) in the next period than in the present period. Using a unique dataset of owner-managed hotels in Austrian ski resorts, we provide empirical evidence of both effects. The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

We analyze event abnormal returns when returns predict events. In fixed samples, we show that the expected abnormal return is negative and becomes more negative as the holding period increases. Asymptotically, abnormal returns converge to zero provided that the process of the number of events is stationary. Nonstationarity in the process of the number of events is needed to generate a large negative bias. We present theory and simulations for the specific case of a lognormal model to characterize the magnitude of the small-sample bias. We illustrate the theory by analyzing long-term returns after initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

Twenty countries around the world have used $27 billion in incentives such as bonus shares and discounts to attract retail investors to participate in privatizations and to discourage them from flipping their shares. Our results show that incentives have performed well, increasing retail investor participation much more cost effectively than underpricing. Flipping is not only much reduced in the short term but remains cumulatively at least 15% lower after 1000 trading days. The expiration of bonus share plans is associated with a 6-day abnormal return of –1.0% and a long-term increase in trading volume.

We develop a strategy for utilizing higher moments, variance risk premia, and conditioning information efficiently, and hence improve on the variance bounds computed by Hansen and Jagannathan (1991); Gallant, Hansen, and Tauchen (1990); and Bekaert and Liu (2004). Our bounds reach existing bounds when nonlinearities in returns are not priced. We also use higher moments, variance risk premia, and conditioning information to provide distance measures that improve on the Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) distance measure. Empirical results indicate that when accounting for the impact of higher moments and variance risk premia, the existing pricing kernels have difficulty in explaining returns on the assets and derivatives. The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected], Oxford University Press.

On August 12–13, 2005, the department of finance at the Kelley School of Business, Indiana University, collaborated with the Review of Financial Studies to host a conference titled “The Causes and Consequences of Recent Financial Market Bubbles.” This article begins with our overview of the themes and findings of the conference, and it ends with the questions that the literature has yet to answer.

This paper proposes a new family of specification tests and applies them to affine term structure models of the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)-swap curve. Contrary to Dai and Singleton (2000), the tests show that when standard estimation techniques are used, affine models do a poor job of forecasting volatility at the short end of the term structure. Improving the volatility forecast does not require different models; rather, it requires a different estimation technique. The paper distinguishes between two econometric procedures for identifying volatility. The 'cross-sectional' approach backs out volatility from a cross section of bond yields, and the 'time-series' approach imputes volatility from time-series variation in yields. For an affine model, the volatility implied by the time-series procedure passes the specification tests, while the cross-sectionally identified volatility does not. This is surprising, since under correct specification, the 'cross-sectional' approach is maximum likelihood. One explanation is that affine models are slightly misspecified; another is that bond yields do not span volatility, as in Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2002). , Oxford University Press.