Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract Using confidential microdata, we show that shocks to primary dealers’ constraints have significant effects on the U.S. Treasury securities market. We consider two types of constraints: the supplementary leverage ratio and trading desk value-at-risk constraints. In response to tighter constraints, dealers reduce their Treasury positions, triggering a reduction in aggregate turnover and an increase in dealer intermediation margin. Impaired intermediation also amplifies the yield response to net demand shifts and weakens Treasury auction outcomes. Our estimates suggest that the (shadow) cost of dealer constraints is as high as 9% of dealers’ profit margins.

Abstract We study how terminated correspondent banking relationships affect international trade. Drawing on firm-level export data from emerging Europe, we show that when local banks lose access to correspondent services, their corporate clients, especially small- and medium-sized enterprises, experience significant export declines. Firms only partially offset lost exports with higher domestic sales, resulting in lower total revenues and employment. Other firms cease operations entirely. These firm-level impacts aggregate to lower product-level exports from countries more exposed to correspondent bank retrenchment.

Abstract We propose a statistical model of heterogeneous beliefs wherein investors are represented as different machine learning model specifications. Investors form return forecasts from their individual models using common data inputs. We measure disagreement as forecast dispersion across investor-models (MFD). Our measure aligns with analyst forecast disagreement but more powerfully predicts returns. We document a large and robust association between belief disagreement and future returns. A decile spread portfolio that sells stocks with high disagreement and buys stocks with low disagreement earns a value-weighted return of 13% per year. Further analyses suggest MFD-alpha is mispricing induced by short-sale costs and limits-to-arbitrage.

Abstract We show that scale in active equity portfolios is understated by at least 65% because the majority of mutual funds have “twin” institutional vehicles (IVs) managed under the same strategies. Omitting these IVs can severely skew crucial estimates in asset management research: by including IV assets, diminishing returns to scale of active investments is significantly reduced, and dollar value added of active strategies is more substantial and persistent than previously suggested. We further show that IV assets meaningfully influence managers’ portfolio decisions. In addition, these measurement issues apply to common flow measures and extend to passive funds and bond funds.

A core responsibility of a central bank is to ensure financial stability by acting as the “lender of last resort” through its Discount Window. The Discount Window, however, has not been effective because its usage is stigmatized. In this paper, we study experimentally how such stigma can be cured. We find that, once a Discount Window facility is stigmatized, removing stigma is difficult. This result is consistent with the Federal Reserve’s experiences which have been unsuccessful at removing the stigma associated with its Discount Window.

Abstract We extract information from earnings call transcripts to develop a comprehensive and reliable measure of labor shortage exposure. After validating the measure at the state, industry, and firm levels, we show that firms with labor shortage exposures experience lower earnings call CARs, future stock returns and operating performance. Firms respond to labor shortages by substituting labor with capital and R&D investments, and by producing more production-process patents. Such responses help mitigate the negative effects on future performance. Our measure has broad applicability, and our findings provide new insight into labor-capital substitution in imperfectly competitive labor markets.

Abstract Long-dated inflation swap contracts provide widely used estimates of expected inflation. We develop methods to estimate complementary tail probabilities for persistently very high or low inflation using inflation options prices. We show that three new adjustments to conventional methods are crucial: inflation, horizon, and risk. We find that: (a) U.S. deflation risk in 2011–2014 has been overstated, (b) ECB unconventional policies lowered deflation disaster probabilities, (c) inflation expectations deanchored in 2021–2022, (d) reanchored as policy tightened, (e) but the 2021–2024 disaster left scars, and (f) U.S. expectations are less sensitive to inflation realizations than in the eurozone.

Abstract By aggregating information into stock prices, financial markets help guide the allocation of resources. We show that speculators without information about firms’ fundamentals can exploit this role of prices and profit from inflating firm valuations. Uninformed speculation is profitable because high valuations attract employees, business partners, and investors, creating value at targeted firms at the cost of diverting resources from better firms. Both large and small speculators, without pre-existing stock positions, can profit from uninformed speculation, particularly when targeting firms with moderate Q, operating in “normal” (neither hot nor cold) markets, and using performance pay or equity to attract stakeholders.

Abstract We study the interplay between a “one person-one vote” political system and a “one share-one vote” corporate governance regime. If shareholders push firms for more prosocial policies, political backlash may arise, undoing these initiatives. If public policy is frictionless, shareholder democracy becomes irrelevant: the political system fully offsets shareholder influence. With public policy frictions, prosocial corporations can mitigate regulatory shortcomings and enhance corporate public goods provision. Nevertheless, shareholder democracy can hurt citizens due to the representation problem: it favors the preferences of the wealthy. Investor diversification, pass-through voting, and corporate greenwashing have important implications for these trade-offs of shareholder democracy.

Abstract We derive optimal characteristics of contribution rates into defined contribution pension plans based on consumption-savings theory. Contribution rates should increase with age and decrease with the balance-to-income ratio. Using Swedish registry data, we show that on average, individuals save according to those principles. However, almost half of the population behaves hand-to-mouth and does not undo the mandated constant contribution rates. In a quantitative model, designing contribution rates to follow the principles implies a 1.8% welfare gain and less dispersed replacement rates, while maintaining the same average replacement rate. Results are robust to various sources of model misspecification, including temptation preferences.