Knowledge that Transforms

What determines the sustainability of sovereign debt? In this paper, we develop a model where myopic governments seek electoral popularity but can nevertheless commit credibly to service external debt. They do not default when they are poor because they would lose access to debt markets and be forced to reduce spending; they do not default when they become rich because of the adverse consequences to the domestic financial sector. Interestingly, the more myopic a government, the greater the advantage it sees in borrowing, and therefore the less likely it will be to default (in contrast to models where sovereigns repay because they are concerned about their long term reputation). More myopic governments are also likely to tax in a more distortionary way, and create more dependencies between the domestic financial sector and government debt that raise the costs of default. We use the model to explain recent experiences in sovereign debt markets.

A new methodology for equity valuation arises from the perspective of managers' supply of capital assets. Under q-theory, managers optimally adjust the supply of assets to changes in their market value. The first-order condition of investment then provides a valuation equation that infers asset prices from managers' costs of supplying the assets. This equation fits well the Tobin's q levels across many testing assets, including portfolios formed on q. With current investment-to-capital as the only input, the supply approach does not require cash flow forecasts or discount rate estimates, both of which are notoriously difficult to obtain in practice.

We assess the procyclical effects of bank capital regulation in a dynamic equilibrium model of relationship lending in which banks are unable to access the equity markets every period. Banks anticipate that shocks to their earnings as well as the cyclical position of the economy can impair their capacity to lend in the future and, as a precaution, hold capital buffers. We find that under cyclically-varying risk-based capital requirements (e.g. Basel II) banks hold larger buffers in expansions than in recessions. Yet, these buffers are insufficient to prevent a significant contraction in the supply of credit at the arrival of a recession. We show that cyclical adjustments in the confidence level underlying Basel II can reduce its procyclical effects on the supply of credit without compromising banks’ long-run solvency targets.

This paper examines whether unobservable differences in firm volatility are responsible for the global loan pricing puzzle, which is the observation that corporate loan interest rates appear to be lower in Europe than in the United States. We analyze whether equity volatility, an error prone measure of firm volatility, can explain this difference in loan spreads. We show that using equity volatility in OLS regressions will result in biased and inconsistent estimates of the difference in U.S. and European loan spreads. We use instrumental variable methods to identify consistent estimates and find no difference in U.S. and European loan spreads.

Average return differences among firms sorted on valuation ratios, past investment, profitability, market beta, or idiosyncratic volatility are largely driven by differences in exposures of firms to the same systematic factor related to embodied technology shocks. Using a calibrated structural model, we show that these firm characteristics are correlated with the ratio of growth opportunities to firm value, which affects firms' exposures to capital-embodied productivity shocks and risk premia. We thus provide a unified explanation for several apparent anomalies in the cross-section of stock returns—namely, predictability of returns by these firm characteristics and return comovement among firms with similar characteristics.

During the last decades households in the U.S. have experienced that residential house prices move in a persistent manner, i.e. that returns are positively serially correlated. Since an owner-occupied home is usually the largest investment of a household it is important to understand how households act when they base their consumption and investment decisions on this experience. We show in a setting with housing market cycles and households who can decide whether they rent or own the home, that -besides the consumption and the precautionary savings motive -serial correlation in house prices generates a new speculative motive for homeownership. In particular, we show how good and bad housing market cycles affect homeownership rates, leverage, stock investments and consumption and can explain empirically observed household behavior during housing market boom and bust periods.

Bank-affiliated private equity groups account for 30% of all private equity investments. Their market share is highest during peaks of the private equity market, when the parent banks arrange more debt financing for in-house transactions yet have the lowest exposure to debt. Using financing terms and ex post performance, we show overall that banks do not make superior equity investments to those of stand-alone private equity groups. Instead, they appear to expand their private equity engagement to take advantage of the credit market booms, while capturing private benefits from cross-selling of other banking services.

This paper shows that economic linkages among commodities create a source of long-term correlation between futures returns. We extend the theory of storage to a multi-commodity level and find that the convenience yield of a commodity depends on its relative scarcity with respect to other related commodities. This implies a feedback effect between commodities that is necessary to replicate the upward-sloping correlation term structure of futures returns observed for related commodities. We present a multi-commodity affine model that validates our theoretical predictions and considerably reduces the pricing errors in out-of-sample crack spread options.

We develop a tractable model of realization utility that studies the role of reference-dependent S-shaped preferences in a dynamic investment setting with reinvestment. Our model generates both voluntarily realized gains and losses. It makes specific predictions about the volume of gains and losses, the holding periods, and the sizes of both realized and paper gains and losses that can be calibrated to a variety of statistics, including Odean's measure of the disposition effect. Our model also predicts several anomalies, including, among others, the flattening of the capital market line and a negative price for idiosyncratic risk.

AFA Meetings in Chicago for helpful comments and suggestions. We are grateful for funding from the We demonstrate that a firm’s ability to innovate is predictable, persistent, and relatively simple to compute, and yet the stock market ignores the implications of past successes when valuing future innovation. We show that two firms that invest the exact same in research and development (R&D) can have quite divergent, but predictably divergent, future paths. Our approach is based on the simple premise that while future outcomes associated with R&D investment are uncertain, the past track records of firms may give insight into their potential for future success. We show that a long-short portfolio strategy that takes advantage of the information in past track records earns abnormal returns of roughly 11 percent per year. Importantly, these past track records also predict divergent future real outcomes in patents, patent citations, and new product innovations. Firms engage in a variety of activities. Some of these activities are straightforward, and easy to assess how they will impact firm value (e.g., maintenance capital expenditures). However, some of these activities, while crucially important for the discounted value of a