The asset allocation of defined benefit pension plans is a setting where both risk shifting and risk management incentives are likely be present. Empirically, firms with poorly funded pension plans and weak credit ratings allocate a greater share of pension fund assets to safer securities such as government debt and cash, whereas firms with well-funded pension plans and strong credit ratings invest more heavily in equity. These relations hold both in the cross-section and within firms and plans over time. The incentive to limit costly financial distress plays a considerably larger role than risk shifting in explaining variation in pension fund investment policy among U.S. firms.

Using a novel dataset that records individual debt issues on the balance sheets of public firms, we demonstrate that traditional capital structure studies that ignore debt heterogeneity miss substantial capital structure variation. Relative to high-credit-quality firms, low-credit-quality firms are more likely to have a multi-tiered capital structure consisting of both secured bank debt with tight covenants and subordinated non-bank debt with loose covenants. We discuss the extent to which these findings are consistent with existing theoretical models of debt structure in which firms simultaneously use multiple debt types to reduce incentive conflicts.

What explains wealth and portfolio differences between black and white Americans? We find that disparities in economic factors explain portfolios well, but only partly explain the wealth gap. In a dynamic setting, economic factors often change optimal saving rates in ways that offset their effects on income and returns. Consequently, their net wealth effect is often limited, making the wealth gap harder to explain. We estimate that differences in income levels, income risk, family structures, mortality, health expenditures, property taxes, mortgage rates, and asset returns explain half of the differential between the racial wealth gap and the racial income gap.

The return expectations of public pension funds are positively related to cross-sectional differences in past performance. This positive relation operates through the expected risk premium, rather than the expected risk-free rate or inflation rate. Pension funds act on their beliefs and adjust their portfolio composition accordingly. Persistent investment skills, risk taking, efforts to reduce costly rebalancing, and fiscal incentives from unfunded liabilities cannot fully explain the reliance of expectations on past performance. The results are consistent with extrapolative expectations, since the dependence on past returns is greater when executives have personally experienced longer performance histories with the fund.

Stock return volatility during the Great Depression has been labeled a “volatility puzzle” because the standard deviation of stock returns was 2 to 3 times higher than any other period in American history. We investigate this puzzle using a new series of building permits and leverage. Our results suggest that volatility in building permit growth and financial leverage largely explain the high level of stock volatility during the Great Depression. Markets factored in the possibility of a forthcoming economic disaster. Received September 30, 2017; editorial decision August 27, 2018 by Editor Philip E. Strahan.

Conventional estimates of the costs of taking liquidity in options markets are large. Nonetheless, options trading volume is high. We resolve this puzzle by showing that options price changes are predictable at high frequency, and many traders time executions by buying (selling) when the option fair value is close to the ask (bid). Effective spreads of traders who time executions are less than 40% of the size of conventional measures, and the overall average effective spread is one-quarter smaller than conventional estimates. Price impact measures are also affected. These findings alter conclusions about the after-cost profitability of options trading strategies.

The dynamics of the unobservable short rate are frequently estimated directly using a proxy. We examine the biases resulting from this practice (the “proxy problem”). Analytic results show that the proxy problem is not economically significant for single-factor affine models. In the two-factor affine model of Longstaff and Schwartz (1992), the proxy problem is only economically significant for pricing discount bonds with maturities of more than five years. We also describe two different numerical procedures for assessing the magnitude of the proxy problem in a general interest rate model. When applied to a nonlinear single-factor model, they suggest that the proxy problem can be economically significant.

We use brokerage account records to study trading during the Chinese put warrants bubble and find evidence consistent with extrapolative theories of speculative asset price bubbles. We identify the event that started the bubble and show that investors engaged in a form of feedback trading based on their own past returns. The interaction of feedback trading with the precipitating event caused additional buying and price increases in a feedback loop, and estimates of the trading volume due to this mechanism explain prices and returns during the bubble.

Do potential entrepreneurs remain in wage employment because of concerns that they will face worse job opportunities should their entrepreneurial ventures fail? Using a Canadian reform that extends job-protected leave to one year for women giving birth after a cutoff date, we study whether the option to return to a previous job increases entrepreneurship. A regression discontinuity design reveals that a longer job-protected leave increases entrepreneurship by 1.9 percentage points. These entrepreneurs start incorporated businesses that hire employees, in industries in which experimentation before entry has low costs and high benefits.