This article applies the methodology of Bai and Ng (2002, 2004) for decomposing panel data into systematic and idiosyncratic components to both stock returns and turnover panels. This approach works well for both returns and turnover, despite the presence of severe heteroscedasticity and nonstationarity of individual stocks' turnover. We test the mutual fund separation model of Lo and Wang (2000). Trading due to systematic risk in returns can account for 66% of systematic turnover. Thus, portfolio rebalancing due to systematic risk is a very important motive for stock trading. Finally, several common turnover measures may understate the impact of stock trading.

We analyze proprietary internal capital allocation data from a large retail banking group consisting of member banks and a headquarters organization. We find that capital allocations from headquarters compensate for deposit shortfalls on the bank level, suggesting that the headquarters offers deposit smoothing to member banks. We then analyze how the distribution of influence within the group relates to capital allocations and lending behavior. More influential banks are allocated more funds from headquarters, and their loan growth is less sensitive to their deposit base. The effects of influence are stronger if banks have a greater demand for deposit smoothing.

The unique regulation of U.S. public pension funds links their liability discount rate to the expected return on assets, which gives them incentives to invest more in risky assets in order to report a better funding status. Comparing public and private pension funds in the United States, Canada, and Europe, we find that U.S. public pension funds act on their regulatory incentives. U.S. public pension funds with a higher level of underfunding per participant, as well as