Knowledge that Transforms

We investigate several asset pricing models in an international setting. We use data on a large number of assets traded in the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, and France. The model together with the hypothesis of capital market integration imply testable restrictions on multivariate regressions relating asset returns to various benchmark portfolios. We find that multifactor models tend to outperform single-index models in both domestic and international forms especially in their ability to explain seasonality in asset returns. We also find that the behavior of the models is affected by change in the regulatory environment in international markets.

We derive and test a dynamic discrete-time model of asset returns. Both the risks of individual securities and equilibrium risk premia change predictably in the model, but these changes can be attributed to movements in the returns and prices of only two well-diversified portfolios. Any other components of returns should be unpredictable. Using the generalized method of moments, the model is estimated and tested on portfolios of equities. We find the data supportive of the model’s restrictions, even when instruments designed to capture the January effect are employed.

This article develops a model of competitive bidding with a resale market. The primary market is modeled as a common-value auction, in which bidders participate for the purpose of resale. After the auction the winning bidders sell the objects in a secondary market, and the buyers in the secondary market receive information about the bids submitted in the auction. The effect of this information linkage between the primary auction and the secondary market on bidding behavior in the primary auction is examined. The auctioneer’s expected revenues from organizing the primary market as a discriminatory auction versus a uniform-price auction are compared, and sufficient conditions under which the uniform-price auction will yield higher expected revenues are obtained. An example of our model, with the primary market organized as a discriminatory auction, is the U.S. Treasury bill market.