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Trading Costs, Liquidity, and Asset Holdings

Review of Financial Studies 1991 4(2), 343-360 open access
In this article I develop a model that accounts for interdependence between trading costs in various asset markets arising from the optimizing behavior of liquidity traders. The model suggests that noise trading is an important determinant of the liquidity of asset markets and provides a positive theory for diversified asset holding by risk-neutral liquidity traders. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

Market Microstructure Effects of Government Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market

Review of Financial Studies 1991 4(3), 513-541 open access
An asymmetric information model of the bid–ask spread is developed for a foreign exchange market subject to occasional government interventions. Traditional tests of the unbiasedness of the forward rate as a predictor of the future spot rate are shown to be inconsistent when the rates are measured as the average of their respective bid and ask quotes. Larger bid–ask spreads on Fridays are documented. Reliable evidence of asymmetric bid–ask spreads for all days of the week, albeit more pronounced on Fridays, are presented. The null hypothesis that the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate continues to be rejected. The regression slope coefficients increase toward unity, however, indicating a less variable risk premium.

Sunshine Trading and Financial Market Equilibrium

Review of Financial Studies 1991 4(3), 443-481 open access
In this article, we consider the possibility that some liquidity traders preannounce the size of their orders, a practice that has come to be known as “sunshine trading”. Two possible effects preannouncement might have on the equilibrium are examined. First, since it identifies certain trades as informationless, preannouncement changes the nature of any informational asymmetries in the market. Second, preannouncement can coordinate the supply and demand of liquidity in the market. We show that preannouncement typically reduces the trading costs of those who preannounce, but its effects on the trading costs and welfare of other traders are ambiguous. We also examine the implications of preannouncement for the distribution of prices and the amount of information that prices reveal.