Knowledge that Transforms

Pressure from institutional money managers to generate profits in the short run is often blamed for corporate myopia. Theoretical research suggests that money managers' short term focus stems from their career concerns and greater fund transparency can amplify these concerns. Using a difference-in-differences design around a regulatory shock that increased transparency about fund managers' portfolio choices, we examine whether increased transparency encourages myopic corporate investment behavior. We find that corporate innovation declines following the regulatory shock. Moreover, evidence from mutual fund trading behavior corroborates that these results are driven by increased short-term focus of money managers.

We develop a three-factor no-arbitrage model for valuing mortgage-backed securities in which we solve for the implied prepayment function from the cross-section of market prices. This model closely fits the cross-section of mortgage-backed security prices without needing to specify an econometric prepayment model. We find that implied prepayments are generally higher than actual prepayments, providing direct evidence of significant macroeconomic-driven prepayment risk premiums in mortgage-backed security prices. We also find evidence that mortgage-backed security prices were significantly affected by Fannie Mae credit risk and the Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing programs. Received May 10, 2016; editorial decision September 22, 2017 by Editor Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh.

This paper uses new data from the PSID to quantify the relative importance of negative equity versus ability to pay, in driving mortgage defaults between 2009 and 2013. These data allow us to construct household budgets sets that provide better measures of ability to pay. Changes in ability to pay have large estimated effects. Job loss has an equivalent effect on the propensity to default as a 35% decline in equity. Strategic motives are also found to be quantitatively important, as we estimate more than 38% of households in default could make their mortgage payments without reducing consumption.

Standard option valuation models leave no room for option illiquidity premia. Yet we find the risk-adjusted return spread for illiquid over liquid equity options is 3.4% per day for at-the-money calls and 2.5% for at-the-money puts. These premia are computed using option illiquidity measures constructed from intraday effective spreads for a large panel of U.S. equities, and they are robust to different empirical implementations. Our findings are consistent with evidence that market makers in the equity options market hold large and risky net long positions, and positive illiquidity premia compensate them for the risks and costs of these positions. (JEL G12)

We study cross-subsidization among U.S. equity products managed by institutional asset management firms. We find returns-based evidence consistent with both cross-subsidization receipt by strong recent performers that are relatively small in their firms and provision by products that are relatively large in their firms. Tax-exempt investors and taxable investors do not have a clear ranking by expertise, but tax-exempt investors’ agency issues are more complex. Accordingly, taxable clients have more flow-performance nonlinearity and receive more (and provide less) cross-subsidization. Taxable investor flows appear more discerning, but only under the circumstances conducive to cross-subsidization, suggesting that “more discerning” likely means “more cross-subsidized.”Received May 11, 2015; editorial decision April 22, 2017 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

We use stock market data to test cross-sectional implications of theories of sovereign default and provide a market-based estimate of sovereign default costs. We find that the stock prices of firms vulnerable to financial intermediation disruption, or firms more exposed to the government, are particularly sensitive to changes in sovereign credit spreads. This is consistent with theories in which default is costly because it disrupts financial intermediation and damages government reputation. Estimation of a structural valuation model indicates that the market prices stocks as if sovereign default has large effects on vulnerable stocks, translating to a 12% destruction of the value of their productive assets. Received July 9, 2011; editorial decision August 16, 2017 by Editor Geert Bekaert.

We document that backfilling in the ExecuComp database introduces a data-conditioning bias that can affect inferences and make replicating previous work difficult. Although backfilling can be advantageous due to greater data coverage, if not addressed, the oversampling of firms with strong managerial incentives and higher subsequent returns leads to a significant upward bias in abnormal compensation, pay-for-performance sensitivity, and the magnitudes of several previously established relations. The bias also can lead to one misinterpreting the appropriate functional form of a relation and whether the data support one compensation theory over another. We offer methods to address this issue. Received May 12, 2014; editorial decision May 10, 2016 by Editor David Hirshleifer.

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, institutions have been asked to reduce leverage in order to reduce risk. To address the effectiveness of this measure, we build a model of equity volatility that accounts for leverage. Our approach blends Merton’s insights on capital structure with traditional time-series models of volatility. We estimate that precautionary capital needs for the entire financial sector reached $2 trillion during the crisis. We also investigate the long-standing observation that equity volatility asymmetrically responds to positive and negative news. Volatility asymmetry is mostly explained by exposure to the aggregate market, not a mechanical leverage effect. Received March 27, 2015; editorial decision February 25, 2017 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.