Knowledge that Transforms

[The Tokyo Grain Exchange (TGE)'s itayose mechanism provides the opportunity to analyze functioning Walrasian ta.tonnement auctions (WTA). In 15,677 auctions conducted over 1997-1998 for corn and redbean futures contracts, price formation is unexpectedly similar to that observed in continuous double auctions. Provisional prices and pledges are informative. In contrast to behavior observed in experiments, few pledges are deceptive, because the traders participate repeatedly and because the auctioneer has flexibility when changing the provisional price and ending the auction. Both the risk of the auction ending and the more equitable dispersion of information increase depth and the speed at which information is embodied in price.]

[It is well known that risk increases the value of options. This article makes that precise in a new way. The conventional theorem says that the value of an option does not fall if the underlying asset becomes riskier in the conventional sense of the mean-preserving spread. This article uses two new definitions of "riskier" to show that the value of an option strictly increases (i) if the underlying asset becomes "pointwise riskier," and (ii) only if the underlying asset becomes "extremum riskier."]

[We examine the theoretical predictions that link acquirer returns to diversity of opinion and information asymmetry. Theory suggests that acquirer abnormal returns should be negatively related to information asymmetry and diversity-of-opinion proxies for equity offers but not cash offers. We find that this is the case and that, more strikingly, there is no difference in abnormal returns between cash offers for public firms, equity offers for public firms, and equity offers for private firms after controlling for one of these proxies, idiosyncratic volatility.]

[This study examines how heterogeneity of private information may induce financial contagion. Using a model of multi-asset trading in which the three main channels of contagion through financial linkages in the literature (correlated information, correlated liquidity, and portfolio rebalancing) are ruled out by construction, I show that financial contagion can still be an equilibrium outcome when speculators receive heterogeneous fundamental information. Risk-neutral speculators trade strategically across many assets to mask their information advantage about one asset. Asymmetric sharing of information among them prevents rational market makers from learning about their individual signals and trades with sufficient accuracy. Incorrect cross-inference about terminal payoffs and contagion ensue. When used to analyze the transmission of shocks across countries, my model suggests that the process of generation and disclosure of information in emerging markets may explain their vulnerability to financial contagion.]

[Agency problems limit firms' access to capital markets, curbing investment. Firms and investors seek contractual ways to mitigate these problems. What are the implications for investment? We present a theory of a firm's investment dynamics in the presence of agency problems and optimal long-term financial contracts. We derive results relating firms' investment decisions, current and past cash flows, firm size, capital structure, and dividends. Among the results, optimal investment is increasing in current and past cash flow; and optimal investment is positively serially correlated over time (after controlling for investment opportunities). These results hold for a range of agency problems.]

[We analyze the optimal investment decisions of heterogeneous firms in a competitive, uncertain environment, characterizing firms' investment strategies explicitly and deriving closed-form solutions for firm value. Real option premia remain significant, and are even unmitigated relative to the standard partial-equilibrium model when both are calibrated to observables. Firms consequently delay investment, choosing not to undertake some positive NPV projects. We compare competitive behavior to that of a strategic monopolist, and quantify the welfare loss associated with monopoly. Finally, the model predicts business cycle dependence on firm returns, with returns negatively skewed during industry expansions but positively skewed in industry recessions.]

[We examine whether spin-offs or divestitures cause improvements in conglomerate investment efficiency. At issue are endogeneity of these restructuring decisions and correct measurement of investment efficiency. Endogeneity is a problem because the factors that induce firms to spin off or divest divisions may also improve investment efficiency; measurement error is a problem because efficiency measures employ Tobin's q as a noisy proxy for investment opportunities. We find important differences between firms that divest or spin off and a control sample. After accounting for these differences and for measurement error in q, we find no evidence of improvements in investment efficiency.]

[This article examines underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned offerings in the corporate bond market. We investigate whether underpricing represents a solution to an information problem or a liquidity problem. We find that underpricing occurs with both IPOs and seasoned offerings and is highest among riskier, unknown firms. Our evidence suggests that information problems drive underpricing, with support for both the bookbuilding view of underpricing and the asymmetric information theory. We do not find evidence in favor of the Rock model of underpricing or any evidence that illiquidity causes underpricing.]

[We study the implications of introducing demand shocks and trade in goods into an otherwise standard international asset pricing model. Trade in goods gives rise to an additional channel of international propagation-through the terms of trade-absent in traditional single-good models. The inclusion of demand shocks helps overturn many unrealistic implications of existing international finance models in which productivity shocks are the sole source of uncertainty. Our model generates a rich set of implications on how stock, bond, and foreign exchange markets co-move. We solve the model in closed-form, which yields a system of equations that can be readily estimated empirically. Our estimation validates the main predictions of the theory.]

[We develop a one-period model of investor asset holdings where investors have heterogeneous preference for skewness. Introducing heterogeneous preference for skewness allows the model's investors, in equilibrium, to underdiversify. We find support for our model's three key implications using a dataset of 60,000 individual investor accounts. First, we document that the portfolio returns of underdiversified investors are substantially more positively skewed than those of diversified investors. Second, we show that the apparent mean-variance inefficiency of underdiversified investors can be largely explained by the fact that investors sacrifice mean-variance efficiency for higher skewness exposure. Furthermore, we show that idiosyncratic skewness, and not just coskewness, can impact equilibrium prices. Third, the underdiversification of investors does not appear to be coincidentally related to skewness. Stocks most often selected by underdiversified investors have substantially higher average skewness-especially idiosyncratic skewness-than stocks most often selected by diversified investors.]