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195 results ✕ Clear filters

Optimal Filtering of Jump Diffusions: Extracting Latent States from Asset Prices

Review of Financial Studies 2009 22(7), 2759-2799
[This paper provides an optimal filtering methodology in discretely observed continuoustime jump-diffusion models. Although the filtering problem has received little attention, it is useful for estimating latent states, forecasting volatility and returns, computing model diagnostics such as likelihood ratios, and parameter estimation. Our approach combines time-discretization schemes with Monte Carlo methods. It is quite general, applying in nonlinear and multivariate jump-diffusion models and models with nonanalytic observation equations. We provide a detailed analysis of the filter's performance, and analyze four applications: disentangling jumps from stochastic volatility, forecasting volatility, comparing models via likelihood ratios, and filtering using option prices and returns.]

Optimal Filtering of Jump Diffusions: Extracting Latent States from Asset Prices

Review of Financial Studies 2009 22(7), 2759-2799
This paper provides an optimal filtering methodology in discretely observed continuous-time jump-diffusion models. Although the filtering problem has received little attention, it is useful for estimating latent states, forecasting volatility and returns, computing model diagnostics such as likelihood ratios, and parameter estimation. Our approach combines time-discretization schemes with Monte Carlo methods. It is quite general, applying in nonlinear and multivariate jump-diffusion models and models with nonanalytic observation equations. We provide a detailed analysis of the filter's performance, and analyze four applications: disentangling jumps from stochastic volatility, forecasting volatility, comparing models via likelihood ratios, and filtering using option prices and returns.

The “Wall Street Walk” and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice

Review of Financial Studies 2009 22(7), 2645-2685 open access
We examine whether a large shareholder can alleviate conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders through the credible threat of exit on the basis of private information. In our model, the threat of exit often reduces agency costs, but additional private information need not enhance the effectiveness of the mechanism. Moreover, the threat of exit can produce quite different effects depending on whether the agency problem involves desirable or undesirable actions from shareholders' perspective. Our results are consistent with empirical findings on the interaction between managers and minority large shareholders and have further empirical implications.

Analyst Behavior Following IPOs: The "Bubble Period" Evidence

Review of Financial Studies 2008 21(1), 101-133
[We examine over 7400 analyst recommendations made in the year after going public for IPOs from 1999 to 2000. Initiations of coverage at the end of the quiet period come almost exclusively from affiliated analysts, whereas initiations afterward are predominantly from unaffiliated analysts. Contrary to previous findings, we find no evidence that the market discounts recommendations from affiliated analysts once we control for recommendation characteristics and timing. Moreover, analyst coverage in the first year is not affected by underpricing, and after the flurry of initiations at the end of the quiet period, the number of analysts covering a firm during the following 11 months is unrelated to the number of managing underwriters.]

Transparency and Liquidity: A Controlled Experiment on Corporate Bonds

Review of Financial Studies 2007 20(2), 235-273
[This article reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the impact of lastsale trade reporting on the liquidity of BBB corporate bonds. Overall, adding transparency has either a neutral or a positive effect on liquidity. Increased trans is not associated with greater trading volume. Except for very large trades, spreads on newly transparent bonds decline relative to bonds that experience no transparency change. However, we find no effect on spreads for very infrequently traded bonds. The observed decrease in transaction costs is consistent with investors' ability to negotiate better terms of trade once they have access to broader bond-pricing data.]

Capital Controls, Liberalizations, and Foreign Direct Investment

Review of Financial Studies 2006 19(4), 1433-1464
This article evaluates the impact of capital controls and their liberalization on the activities of US multinational firms. These firms attempt to circumvent capital controls by reducing reported local profitability and increasing the frequency of dividend repatriations. As a result, the reported profit impact of local capital controls is comparable with the effect of 27% higher corporate tax rates, and affiliates located in countries imposing capital controls are 9.8% more likely than other affiliates to remit dividends to parent companies. Multinational affiliates located in countries with capital controls face 5.25% higher interest rates on local borrowing than do affiliates of the same parent borrowing locally in countries without capital controls. Capital control liberalizations are associated with significant increases in multinational activity-property, plant, and equipment grow at 6.9% faster annual rates following liberalizations. The combination of the costliness of avoidance and higher interest rates discourages investment in countries with capital controls, and this effect is reversed upon liberalization of controls.

Why Don’t Issuers Get Upset About Leaving Money on the Table in IPOs?

Review of Financial Studies 2002 15(2), 413-444
One of the puzzles regarding initial public offerings (IPOs) is that issuers rarely get upset about leaving substantial amounts of money on the table, defined as the number of shares sold times the difference between the first-day closing market price and the offer price. The average IPO leaves $9.1 million on the table. This number is approximately twice as large as the fees paid to investment bankers and represents a substantial indirect cost to the issuing firm. We present a prospect theory model that focuses on the covariance of the money left on the table and wealth changes. Our reasoning also provides an explanation for a second puzzling pattern: much more money is left on the table following recent market rises than after market falls. This results in an explanation of hot issue markets. We also offer a new explanation for why IPOs are underpriced.

Disentangling the Dividend Information in Splits: A Decomposition Using Conditional Event-Study Methods

Review of Financial Studies 2001 14(4), 1083-1116
While folklore in finance holds that split valuation effects are due to dividend increases associated with splits, little is known about magnitudes of dividend and nondividend components of split announcement effects. We find that splits and dividends are indeed informational substitutes, a notion we characterize more precisely, but a significant portion of split valuation effects, 46% according to our estimates, cannot be attributed to dividend information in splits. Our techniques extend the literature on conditional event-study methods and we illustrate their practical value in testing hypotheses and analyzing data not amenable to analysis by standard procedures.

Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure Regulation and Externalities

Review of Financial Studies 2000 13(3), 479-519
We analyze a model of voluntary disclosure by firms and the desirability of disclosure regulation. In our model disclosure is costly, it has private and social value, and its precision is endogenous. We show that (i) a convexity in the value of disclosure can lead to a discontinuity in the disclosure policy; (ii) the Nash equilibrium of a voluntary disclosure game is often socially inefficient; (iii) regulation that requires a minimal precision level sometimes but not always improves welfare; (iii) the same is true for subsidies that change the perceived cost of disclosures; and (iv) neither regulation method dominates the other.

Survivorship Bias and Mutual Fund Performance

Review of Financial Studies 1996 9(4), 1097-1120
[Mutual fund attrition can create problems for a researcher because funds that disappear tend to do so due to poor performance. In this article we estimate the size of the bias by tracking all funds that existed at the end of 1976. When a fund merges we calculate the return, taking into account the merger terms. This allows a precise estimate of survivorship bias. In addition, we examine characteristics of both mutual funds that merge and their partner funds. Estimates of survivorship bias over different horizons and using different models to evaluate performance are provided.]