Knowledge that Transforms

[This article proposes a new explanation for the large cross-sectional variation in the excess values of diversified firms. The model applies the idea of shareholders' limited liability affecting firms' output market strategies to the analysis of financial and operating choices of conglomerates. The inability of conglomerates to commit to unconstrained optimal operating strategies, following from the lack of flexibility in choosing their divisions' capital structures, reduces their value. Thus, the model highlights a new type of inefficiency of the conglomerate organizational structure, which is suboptimal financing. The predictions of the model are generally supported by the data.]

[This article proposes a test for the cost-based explanation of nonparticipation, by estimating a lower bound to the forgone gains of incomplete portfolios; these are in turn a lower bound to the costs that could rationalize nonparticipation in financial markets: high bounds would imply implausibly high costs. Assuming isoelastic utility and a relative risk aversion of three or less, for the stock market I estimate an average lower bound of between 0.7 and 3.3 percent of consumption. Since total annual (observable plus unobservable) participation costs are likely to exceed these bounds, the cost-based explanation is not rejected by this test.]

[We examine the optimal mixture and priority structure of bank and market debt using a trade-off model in which banks have the unique ability to renegotiate outside formal bankruptcy. Flexible bank debt offers a superior trade-off between tax shields and bankruptcy costs. Ease of renegotiation limits bank debt capacity, however. Optimal debt structure hinges upon which party has bargaining power in private workouts. Weak firms have high bank debt capacity and utilize bank debt exclusively. Strong firms lever up to their (lower) bank debt capacity, augment with market debt, and place the bank senior. Therefore, the trade-off theory offers an explanation for: (i) why young/small firms use bank debt exclusively; (ii) why large/mature firms employ mixed debt financing; and (iii) why bank debt is senior. The trade-off theory also generates predictions consistent with international evidence. In countries in which the bankruptcy regime entails soft (tough) enforcement of contractual priority, bank debt capacity is low (high), implying greater (less) reliance on market debt.]

[Numerous measures have been proposed to gauge the performance of active management. Unfortunately, these measures can be gamed. Our article shows that gaming can have a substantial impact on popular measures even in the presence of high transactions costs. Our article shows there are conditions under which a manipulation-proof measure exists and fully characterizes it. This measure looks like the average of a power utility function, calculated over the return history. The case for using our alternative ranking metric is particularly compelling for hedge funds whose use of derivatives is unconstrained and whose managers' compensation itself induces a nonlinear payoff.]

[We derive an asymptotic expansion formula for option implied volatility under a two-factor jump-diffusion stochastic volatility model when time-to-maturity is small. We further propose a simple calibration procedure of an arbitrary parametric model to short-term near-the-money implied volatilities. An important advantage of our approximation is that it is free of the unobserved spot volatility. Therefore, the model can be calibrated on option data pooled across different calendar dates to extract information from the dynamics of the implied volatility smile. An example of calibration to a sample of S&P 500 option prices is provided.]

[The Black-Scholes-Merton option valuation method involves deriving and solving a partial differential equation (PDE). But this method can generate multiple values for an option. We provide new solutions for the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR) term structure model, the constant elasticity of variance (CEV) model, and the Heston stochastic volatility model. Multiple solutions reflect asset pricing bubbles, dominated investments, and (possibly infeasible) arbitrages. We provide conditions to rule out bubbles on underlying prices. If they are not satisfied, put-call parity might not hold, American calls have no optimal exercise policy, and lookback calls have infinite value. We clarify a longstanding conjecture of Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross.]

[We develop a model in which limit order traders possess volatility information. We show that in this case the size of the bid-ask spread is informative about future volatility. Moreover, if volatility information is in part private, we establish that (i) the size of the bid-ask spread and (ii) its informativeness about future volatility should change in the same direction when limit order traders' identifiers stop being disclosed. We test these predictions using data from the Paris Bourse. As expected, we find that the average quoted spread and its informativeness are significantly smaller when limit order traders' identifiers are concealed. These findings suggest that the limit order book is a channel for volatility information.]

[I argue that the slow diffusion of industry information is a leading cause of the lead-lag effect in stock returns. I find that the lead-lag effect between big firms and small firms is predominantly an intra-industry phenomenon. Moreover, this effect is driven by sluggish adjustment to negative information, and is robust to alternative determinants of the lead-lag effect. Small, less competitive and neglected industries experience a more pronounced lead-lag effect. The lead-lag effect is related to the post-announcement drift of small firms following the earnings releases of big firms within the industry.]

[This article reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the impact of lastsale trade reporting on the liquidity of BBB corporate bonds. Overall, adding transparency has either a neutral or a positive effect on liquidity. Increased trans is not associated with greater trading volume. Except for very large trades, spreads on newly transparent bonds decline relative to bonds that experience no transparency change. However, we find no effect on spreads for very infrequently traded bonds. The observed decrease in transaction costs is consistent with investors' ability to negotiate better terms of trade once they have access to broader bond-pricing data.]

[Implied risk aversion estimates reported in the literature are strongly U-shaped. This article explores different potential explanations for these "smile" patterns: (i) preference aggregation, both with and without stochastic volatility and jumps in returns, (ii) misestimation of investors' beliefs caused by stochastic volatility, jumps, or a Peso problem, and (iii) heterogeneous beliefs. The results reveal that preference aggregation and misestima of investors' beliefs caused by stochastic volatility and jumps are unlikely to be the explanation for the smile. Although a Peso problem can account for the smile, the required probability of a market crash is unrealistically large. Heterogeneous beliefs cause sizable distortions in implied risk aversion, but the degree of heterogeneity required to explain the smile is implausibly large.]