Knowledge that Transforms

This paper demonstrates a positive effect of stock liquidity on blockholder governance. Liquidity increases the likelihood of block formation. Conditional upon acquiring a stake, liquidity reduces the likelihood that the blockholder governs through voice (intervention)—as shown by the lower propensity for active investment (filing Schedule 13D) than passive investment (filing Schedule 13G). The lower frequency of activism does not reflect the abandonment of governance, but governance through the alternative channel of exit (selling one's shares): A 13G filing leads to positive announcement returns and improvements in operating performance, especially in liquid firms. Moreover, taking into account the increase in block formation, liquidity has an unconditional positive effect on voice as well as exit. We use decimalization as an exogenous shock to liquidity to identify causal effects.

In a large panel of Compustat firms, we find that firm policy changes after exogenous CEO departures do not display abnormally high levels of variability, casting doubt on the presence of idiosyncratic-style effects in policy choices. After endogenous CEO departures, we do detect abnormally large policy changes. These changes are larger when the firm is likely to draw from a deeper pool of replacement CEO candidates, suggesting the presence of causal-style effects that are anticipated by the board. Our evidence suggests that managerial styles are not transferred across employers and that standard F-tests are inappropriate for identifying style effects.

We show that bond risk premia rise with uncertainty about expected inflation and fall with uncertainty about expected growth; the magnitude of return predictability using these uncertainty measures is similar to that by multiple yields. Motivated by this evidence, we develop and estimate a long-run risks model with timevarying volatilities of expected growth and inflation. The model simultaneously accounts for bond return predictability and violations of uncovered interest parity in currency markets. We find that preference for early resolution of uncertainty, time-varying volatilities, and non-neutral effects of inflation on growth are important to account for these aspects of asset markets.

Empirical evidence on the relations between board independence and board decisions and firm performance is generally confounded by serious endogeneity issues. We circumvent these endogeneity problems by demonstrating the strong impact of the local director labor market on board composition. Specifically, we show that proximity to larger pools of local director talent leads to more independent boards for all but the largest quartile of S&P 1500. Using local director pools as an instrument for board independence, we document that board independence has a positive effect on firm value, operating performance, fraction of CEO incentive-based pay, and CEO turnover.

We show that stock prices are more accurate when short sellers are more active. First, in a large panel of NYSE-listed stocks, intraday informational efficiency of prices improves with greater shorting flow. Second, at monthly and annual horizons, more shorting flow accelerates the incorporation of public information into prices. Third, greater shorting flow reduces post-earnings-announcement drift for negative earnings surprises. Fourth, short sellers change their trading around extreme return events in a way that aids price discovery and reduces divergence from fundamental values. These results are robust to various econometric specifications, and their magnitude is economically meaningful.

[We develop a theoretical model to analyze the effects of libertarian paternalism on information production and financial decision making. Individuals in our model appreciate the information content of the recommendations made by a social planner. This affects their incentive to gather information, and in turn the speed at which information spreads across market participants, via social learning or formal advice channels. We characterize situations in which libertarian paternalism improves welfare and contrast them with scenarios in which this policy is suboptimal because of its negative impact on the production and propagation of information.]

[We examine the impact on the quality of a securities market of hiding versus displaying orders that provide liquidity. Display expropriates informational rents from informed agents who trade as liquidity providers. The informed then exit liquidity provision in favor of demanding liquidity where they trade less aggressively. Trading costs to uninformed liquidity demanders are higher, bid-ask spreads are wider, and midquotes are less informationally efficient when orders that provide liquidity are displayed. Our analysis suggests that market innovations, which might seem to favor the informed over the uninformed, can enhance market quality by intensifying competition among the informed.]

[In recent decades U.S. households have experienced residential house prices moving persistently, that is, returns being positively serially correlated. We set up a realistically calibrated life cycle model with slow-moving time variation in expected housing returns, showing that not only age, labor income, and pre-existing housing wealth but also the state of the housing market significantly affect household decisions. Consistently with the data, the model predicts that in good states of housing market cycles (1) homeownership rates increase, (2) households buying homes invest a larger share of their net worth in their home, and (3) these households lever up more.]

[We use loan-level data to examine how large international banks reduced their cross-border lending after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Country, firm, and bank fixed effects allow us to disentangle credit supply and demand and to simultaneously control for the unobserved traits of banks and the countries and firms they lend to. We document substantial heterogeneity in the extent to which different banks retrenched from the same country. Banks reduced credit less to markets that were geographically close; where they were more experienced; where they operated a subsidiary; and where they were integrated into a network of domestic co-lenders.]

[We provide a model and empirical tests showing how an active acquisition market affects firm incentives to innovate and conduct R&D. Our model shows that small firms optimally may decide to innovate more when they can sell out to larger firms. Large firms may find it disadvantageous to engage in an "R&D race" with small firms, as they can obtain access to innovation through acquisition. Our model and evidence also show that the R&D responsiveness of firms increases with demand, competition, and industry merger and acquisition activity. All of these effects are stronger for smaller firms than for larger firms.]