Knowledge that Transforms

In line with the psychological theory of place attachments, managers favor hometown workers over others. Consistent with this prediction, I find that following periods of industry distress, establishments located near CEOs’childhood homes experience fewer employment and pay reductions and are less likely to be divested relative to other firm establishments. While it is not possible to directly test whether this employment bias destroys firm value, managers only implement these policies when governance is weak, suggesting that this favoritism is suboptimal. Together, these results provide direct evidence of employee favoritism and show that idiosyncratic manager styles impact corporate employment decisions.

We examine the implications of short-run and long-run consumption risks on the momentum and long-term contrarian profits and the value premium in a unified economic framework. By introducing time-varying firm cash flow exposures to the short-run and long-run shocks in consumption growth, we find the otherwise standard intertemporal asset pricing model goes a long way toward generating the momentum and long-term contrarian profits and the value premium. The model also reproduces the size effect, the pairwise correlations between the profitabilities of these investment strategies, and the performance of the standard CAPM and the consumption CAPM in explaining these well-documented return behaviors. Received January 25, 2016; editorial decision July 21, 2016 by Editor Leonid Kogan.

We study how relationship lending determines the financing of innovation. Exploiting a negative shock to relationships, we show that it reduces the number of innovative firms, especially those that depend more on relationship lending such as small, opaque firms. This credit supply shock leads to reallocation of inventors whereby young and productive inventors leave small firms and move out of geographical areas where lending relationships are hurt. Overall, our results show that credit markets affect both the level of innovation activity and the distribution of innovative human capital across the economy.

We analyze pricing differences between U.S. and European syndicated loans over the 1992–2014 period. We explicitly distinguish credit lines from term loans. For credit lines, U.S. borrowers pay significantly higher spreads, but lower fees, resulting in similar total costs of borrowing in both markets. Credit line usage is more cyclical in the United States, which provides a rationale for the pricing structure difference. For term loans, we analyze the channels of the cross-country loan price differential and document the importance of: the composition of term loan borrowers and the loan supply by institutional investors and foreign banks. Received September 18, 2015; editorial decision July 13, 2016 by Editor Philip Strahan.

When the fraction of a firm's cash held overseas is greater, its shareholders value that cash lower. This goes beyond a pure tax effect: the repatriation tax friction disrupts the firm's internal capital market, distorting its investment policy. Firms underinvest domestically and overinvest abroad. Our findings are more pronounced when firms are subject to higher repatriation tax rates, higher costs of borrowing, and more agency problems. Overall, our evidence suggests that a combination of taxes, financing frictions, and agency problems leads to a valuation discount for foreign cash and documents real effects of how foreign earnings are taxed.

We propose a new method to estimate the bid-ask spread when quote data are not available. Compared to other low-frequency estimates, this method utilizes a wider information set, namely, readily available close, high, and low prices. In the absence of end-of-day quote data, this method generally provides the highest cross-sectional and average time-series correlations with the TAQ effective spread benchmark. Moreover, it delivers the most accurate estimates for less liquid stocks. Our estimator has many potential applications, including an accurate measurement of transaction cost, systematic liquidity risk, and commonality in liquidity for U.S. stocks dating back almost one century.

This paper studies how expected returns interact with product market competition. The model predicts that (1) competition erodes markups, such that firms are more exposed to systematic risk; (2) the threat of entry by new firms lowers exposure to systematic risk of incumbents; and (3) higher industry aggregate risk represents a barrier to entry, such that riskier industries become less competitive. We provide empirical evidence consistent with these three channels and for an overall negative relation between returns and competition. We also consider a sample selection correction for publicly listed firms and use it to construct an alternative concentration measure.

Following surprise independent director departures, affected firms have worse stock and operating performance, are more likely to restate earnings, face shareholder litigation, suffer from an extreme negative return event, and make worse mergers and acquisitions. The announcement returns to surprise director departures are negative, suggesting that the market infers bad news from surprise departures. We use exogenous variation in independent director departures triggered by director deaths to test whether surprise independent director departures cause these negative outcomes or whether an anticipation of negative outcomes is responsible for the surprise director departure. Our evidence is more consistent with the latter.

We examine the impact of actual share repurchases on stock prices using several measures of price efficiency and manually collected data on U.S. repurchases. We find that share repurchases make prices more efficient and reduce idiosyncratic risk. Further analyses reveal that the effects are primarily driven by repurchases in down markets. We conclude that share repurchases help to maintain accurate stock prices by providing price support at fundamental values. We find no evidence that managers use share repurchases to manipulate stock prices when selling their equity holdings or exercising stock options.

We develop a dynamic agency model of a public corporation. Managers underinvest because of risk aversion. They smooth rents and payout. They do not exploit interest tax shields fully. The interactions of investment, debt, and payout decisions can change drastically depending on managers’preferences. Managers with power utility set investment, debt, and payout proportional to the firm’s net worth, generating a constant (possibly negative) net debt ratio. With exponential utility, investment decisions are separated from decisions about debt and payout. More profitable firms become cash cows, and less profitable firms accumulate debt, as in a pecking-order model.