Knowledge that Transforms

We study the stock market effects of the arrival of the three rounds of “stimulus checks” to U.S. taxpayers and the single round of direct payments to Hong Kong citizens. The first two rounds of U.S. checks appear to have increased retail buying and share prices of retail-dominated portfolios. The Hong Kong payments increased overall turnover and share prices on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. We cannot rule out that these price effects were permanent. The findings raise novel questions about the role of fiscal stimulus in the stock market.

This paper shows that standard disaster risk models are inconsistent with movements in stock market volatility and credit spreads during disasters. We resolve this shortcoming by incorporating persistent macroeconomic crises into a structural credit risk model. The model successfully captures the joint dynamics of aggregate consumption, financial leverage, and asset market risks, both unconditionally and during crises. Leverage strongly amplifies fundamental shocks by continuing to rise while crises endure. We structurally estimate the model and show that it replicates the firm-level implied volatility curve and its cross-sectional relation with observable proxies of default risk.

We present evidence that several popular low-frequency measures of effective spread suffer from a volatility-induced bias and that volatility is the primary driver of the variation of these liquidity proxies. Using data for U.S. equities and major foreign exchange rates, we show that the bias arises when the effective spread is small relative to volatility. We document that the bias has become more acute over time and show that volatility-biased measures fail to replicate some well-known results in empirical finance. We conclude by providing guidance on the choice of low-frequency measures in empirical applications.

We study how the growth of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) affects the sensitivity of international capital flows to the global financial cycle. Using comprehensive fund-level data on investor flows, we show that their sensitivity to global financial conditions for equity (bond) ETFs is 2.5 (2.25) times higher than for equity (bond) mutual funds. This higher sensitivity can be directly linked to ETFs underlying shorter-trading-horizon clientele that trades more often in response to shocks. Using country-level data, we find that where ETFs hold a larger share of financial assets, equity inflows and prices become more sensitive to global risk.

Does financing respond to changes in productive opportunities, even for the world’s poor? We answer this question by examining the response of private bank financing to an infrastructure program that brought road access to unconnected Indian villages. This program prioritized roads for villages above specific population thresholds, allowing us to exploit the resultant discontinuities for identification. Using detailed data from a large bank, we find that 75% more villagers get loans, and the average amount lent to them is 30%–35% higher, in villages just above these thresholds. District-level analyses further suggest that roads and loans are complements in the growth process.

Using the near universe of U.S. consumer credit cards, we show that banks transmit their wholesale funding shocks to consumers by reducing their credit card limits. Credit-constrained consumers who are unable to hedge against the transmitted shock by accessing other credit cards experience a stronger and more persistent reduction in aggregate credit card limits at the consumer level. Consequently, these credit-constrained consumers reduce their aggregate credit card borrowing. Our results document a credit card lending channel for the transmission of adverse bank shocks and show who bears the costs of fragile bank funding structures.

This paper develops a theory that generates an equilibrium relationship between product complexity, transparency, and trust in firms. Complexity, transparency, and the evolution of trust are all endogenous, and equilibrium transparency is nonmonotonic. The least-trusted firms choose the lowest product complexity, remain opaque, and substitute ex ante third-party verification for information disclosure and trust. Firms with an intermediate level of trust choose an intermediate level of complexity and transparency through disclosure, with more trusted firms choosing greater complexity and lower transparency. The most-trusted firms choose maximum complexity while remaining opaque, eschewing both verification and disclosure.

We estimate a model-free term structure of the ex ante dividend risk premium by combining two data sets with different information about future dividends. We aggregate survey forecasts about future dividends for single companies over multiple horizons to construct a term structure of expected S&P 500 dividend growth rates. We use European call and put option prices on the S&P 500 to estimate the term structures of options-implied dividend growth rates and risk-free rates. Applying the method to 2004–2021 data offers a new, ex ante perspective on the conditional time variation of the term structure of the dividend risk premium.

We develop a model of psychological-games-played-on-a-network to demonstrate a role for endogenously determined, rationally chosen ethics. Our analysis produces sharp results about contagion of nonethical or ethical behavior and the possible equilibrium configurations of each type of behavior. We find, and quantify, critical densities for clusters of each type of behavior that determine everything about contagion. We introduce society as a third player to investigate ethical failures as externalities. We use these results to show how regulations and network structure can affect whether clusters of ethical behavior can survive and how large they can be in a financial market setting.

Using Chinese data, we examine whether synchronous remote board meetings, which facilitate status equalization among directors and alleviate their pressure for conformity, affect board monitoring effectiveness. We find that compared to face-to-face meetings, synchronous remote meetings are associated with directors’ better meeting attendance behavior, a higher likelihood of director dissent on monitoring-related proposals, higher forced CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, and more effective investments. These results hold when we use remote meetings that include both synchronous and asynchronous remote meetings. Proposal-director level analysis further shows that remote meetings reduce the pressure to conform faced by young first-term directors and socially connected directors.