Knowledge that Transforms

We construct a "universe" of over 18,000 fundamental signals from financial statements and use a bootstrap approach to evaluate the impact of data mining on fundamental-based anomalies. We find that many fundamental signals are significant predictors of cross-sectional stock returns even after accounting for data mining. This predictive ability is more pronounced following high-sentiment periods and among stocks with greater limits to arbitrage. Our evidence suggests that fundamental-based anomalies, including those newly discovered in this study, cannot be attributed to random chance, and they are better explained by mispricing. Our approach is general and we also apply it to past return–based anomalies.

We study the impact of the financial condition of firms on firms' ability to produce safer products that result in fewer recalls. Using a variety of tests, including two quasi-natural experiments that result in exogenous negative industry cash-flow shocks, we find that firms with higher leverage or distress likelihood have a greater probability of a product recall. These firms also face more frequent and severe recalls. Further, firms with more debt due at the onset of the financial crisis experience a greater likelihood and frequency of recalls. We conclude that a firm's financial condition has real effects that impact product safety.

We exploit state-level changes in the amount of personal wealth individuals can protect under Chapter 7 to analyze the effect of debtor protection on the financing structure and performance of a representative panel of U.S. startups. The effect of increasing debtor protection depends on the entrepreneur's level of wealth. Firms owned by mid-wealth entrepreneurs whose assets become fully protected suffer a reduction in credit availability, employment, operating efficiency, and survival rates. We find no such negative effects for low-wealth and high-wealth owners. Our results are consistent with theories that predict that asset protection in bankruptcy leads to a redistribution of credit.

We develop and estimate a tractable equilibrium term structure model populated with rational but heterogeneously informed traders that take on speculative positions to exploit what they perceive to be inaccurate market expectations about future bond prices. The speculative motive is an important driver of trading volume. Yield dynamics due to speculation are (1) statistically distinct from classical term structure components due to risk premiums and expectations about future short rates and are orthogonal to public information available to traders in real time and (2) quantitatively important, accounting for a substantial fraction of the variation of long maturity U. S. bond yields.

I show that the stock prices of firms subject to greater information frictions have a weaker reaction to monetary policy. The claim is robust to a broad set of proxies for financial constraints and information frictions. Moreover, I use the Enron accounting scandal and Arthur Andersen’s demise as a large exogenous shock, temporarily raising other Andersen clients’ information frictions and, thereby, their financial constraints. The scandal’s disclosure lowered Andersen’s clients’ stock price sensitivity to monetary policy to about half that of other firms. Received February 12, 2016; editorial decision August 22, 2017 by Editor Robin Greenwood.

We investigate the role of industry specialization in horizontal cross-border mergers and acquisitions. We find that acquirers from more specialized industries in a country are more likely to buy foreign targets in countries that are less specialized in these same industries. The role of industry specialization in foreign acquisitions is more prevalent when contracting inefficiencies and exporting costs limit arm's-length relationships. The economic gains in cross-border deals are larger when specialized acquirers purchase assets in less specialized industries. These results are consistent with an internalization motive for foreign acquisitions, through which acquirers can apply localized intangibles on foreign assets.

We investigate whether automatic selling devices causally reduce investors' disposition effect (DE) in a laboratory experiment. Investors can actively buy and sell assets. Investors in the treatment group use stop-loss and take-gain options to automatically sell assets. In addition, we introduce a reminder condition that reminds investors about their selling plan if a limit is hit. Results show that the automatic selling device treatment significantly reduces the DEs, but the reminder treatment does not. Thus, the opportunity to ex ante commit to automatically selling at a loss causally reduces the disposition effect.

Investor attention matters for corporate actions. Our new identification approach constructs firm-level shareholder "distraction" measures, by exploiting exogenous shocks to unrelated parts of institutional shareholders' portfolios. Firms with "distracted" shareholders are more likely to announce diversifying, value-destroying, acquisitions. They are also more likely to grant opportunistically timed CEO stock options, more likely to cut dividends, and less likely to fire their CEO for bad performance. Firms with distracted shareholders have abnormally low stock returns. Combined, these patterns are consistent with a model in which the unrelated shock shifts investor attention, leading to a temporary loosening of monitoring constraints.

We investigate the impact of increasing bank concentration on bank loan contracts in a lightly regulated environment that allows us to abstract from possible confounding effects of regulation and focus on the “pure” effects of competition on bank lending. We study over 30,000 British bank loans over the period 1885 to 1925. Borrowers in counties with high bank concentration received smaller loans and posted more collateral than borrowers in other counties. In high concentration counties, the quality of loan applicants improved, suggesting that banks restricted credit, not that the quality of loan applicants had worsened.

We exploit an exogenous change in basis risk in the oil and gas industry to analyze the channels through which hedging affects firm value. Using a difference-in-differences framework, we find that firms affected by a basis risk shock reduce investment, have lower valuations, sell assets, and reduce debt. Our findings are driven by firms with ex ante high leverage. Overall, our results provide evidence that reducing the probability of financial distress and underinvestment risk are first-order channels through which hedging affects firm value.