Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract We investigate the effect of scrutiny (e.g., credit ratings, analyst reports, or mandatory disclosures) on the security design problem of a privately informed issuer. We show that scrutiny has important implications for both the form of security designed and the amount of inefficient retention of cash flows. The model predicts that issuers will design informationally sensitive securities (i.e., levered equity) when scrutiny is sufficiently intense. Otherwise, issuers opt for a standard debt contract. Scrutiny increases efficiency by decreasing issuers’ reliance on retention to signal quality and, perhaps counterintuitively, decrease price informativeness.

Abstract Variable annuities, the largest liability of U.S. life insurers, are investment products containing long-dated minimum return guarantees. I show that guarantees with similar economic risks are treated differently by regulation and these differences impact insurers’ hedging behavior. When the regulatory regime recognizes certain risks, insurers start to hedge these risks in a substantial way. For some guarantees, this involves hedging both interest rate and equity market risks. However, for others, it involves hedging only equity market risk. As the regulatory regime still does not recognize the interest rate risk of all guarantees, insurers remain exposed to substantial interest rate risk. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract We construct text-based measures of the primary concerns listed firms associated with the spread of COVID-19 and other epidemic diseases. We identify which firms perceive to lose or gain from a given epidemic and textually decompose the epidemic’s effect on the firm’s demand and supply. We find that the effects of COVID-19 manifest as a simultaneous shock to demand and supply, with both shocks affecting firms’ market valuations in equal measure on average. By contrast, demand-related impacts appear more important in accounting for the observed collapse in firm-level investment during the COVID-19 crisis. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online

Abstract Violations of no-arbitrage conditions measure the shadow cost of intermediary constraints. Intermediary asset pricing and intertemporal hedging together imply that the risk of these constraints tightening is priced. We describe a “forward CIP trading strategy” that bets on CIP violations shrinking and show that its returns help identify the price of this risk. This strategy yields the highest returns for currency pairs associated with the carry trade. The strategy’s risk substantially contributes to the volatility of the stochastic discount factor, is correlated with both other near-arbitrages and intermediary wealth measures, and appears to be consistently priced across various asset classes. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract Corporations have accumulated record amounts of cash. We study whether firms’ cash retention has been excessive by examining a Korean reform that introduced a new tax on earnings retained as cash. Difference-in-differences tests show that treated firms reduce cash retention and instead increase payouts and investments. Market participants react favorably to the reform, consistent with excessive cash retention. The valuation effects and the alternative uses of the cash are associated with behavioral and agency frictions. Firms that are more subject to behavioral biases increase payouts and experience higher valuations, while poorly governed firms allocate more to investment and experience relatively lower valuations. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract A randomized encouragement design yields null average effects of a credit builder loan (CBL) on consumer credit scores. But machine learning algorithms indicate the nulls are due to stark, offsetting treatment effects depending on baseline installment credit activity. Delinquency on preexisting loan obligations drives the negative effects, suggesting that adding a CBL overextends some consumers and generates negative externalities on other lenders. More favorably for the market, CBL take-up generates positive selection on score improvements. Simple changes to CBL practice, particularly to provider screening and credit bureau reporting, could ameliorate the negative effects for consumers and the market. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.