Knowledge that Transforms

[We investigate the effects of bank control over borrower firms whether by representation on boards of directors or by the holding of shares through bank asset management divisions. Using a large sample of syndicated loans, we find that banks are more likely to act as lead arrangers in loans when they exert some control over the borrower firm. Bank-firm governance links are associated with higher loan spreads during the 2003—2006 credit boom but lower spreads during the 2007—2008 financial crisis. Additionally, these links mitigate credit rationing effects during the crisis. The results are robust to several methods to correct for the endogeneity of the bank-firm governance link. Our evidence, consistent with intertemporal smoothing of loan rates, suggests that there are costs and benefits from banks' involvement in firm governance.]

[This article rationalizes empirical patterns of market leverage, book leverage, book-to-market ratios, and stock returns across different book-to-market portfolios, using a model of firm financing and investment. The model analytically shows that tax deductibility of interest payments increases effective investment irreversibility and that investment irreversibility weakens the relation between book-to-market values and returns. This provides a clear and novel mechanism showing how financial leverage affects stock returns beyond the standard Modigliani-Miller paradigm. The article argues that market leverage, rather than operating leverage or investment irreversibility, explains a major portion of the value premium. Empirical evidence supports this argument.]

[The returns of short-term reversal strategies in equity markets can be interpreted as a proxy for the returns from liquidity provision. Using this approach, this article shows that the return from liquidity provision is highly predictable with the VIX index. Expected returns and conditional Sharpe ratios from liquidity provision spike during periods of financial market turmoil. The results point to withdrawal of liquidity supply and an associated increase in the expected returns from liquidity provision, as a main driver behind the evaporation of liquidity during times of financial market turmoil, consistent with theories of liquidity provision by financially constrained intermediaries.]

[Hedge funds significantly reduced their equity holdings during the recent financial crisis. In 2008: Q3-Q4, hedge funds sold about 29% of their aggregate portfolio. Redemptions and margin calls were the primary drivers of selloffs. Consistent with forced deleveraging, the selloffs took place in volatile and liquid stocks. In comparison, redemptions and stock sales for mutual funds were not as severe. We show that hedge fund investors withdraw capital three times as intensely as mutual fund investors do in response to poor returns. We relate this stronger sensitivity to losses to share liquidity restrictions and institutional ownership in hedge funds.]

[We theoretically and empirically address the endogeneity of corporate ownership structure and the cost of debt, with a novel emphasis on the role of control concentration in post-default firm restructuring. Control concentration raises agency costs of debt, and dominant shareholders trade off private benefits of control against higher borrowing costs in choosing their ownership stakes. Based on our theoretical predictions, and using an international sample of syndicated loans and unique dynamic ownership structure data, we present new evidence on the firm- and macro-level determinants of corporate control concentration and the cost of debt.]

[Fair value accounting forces institutions to revalue inventory whenever a transaction occurs. An institution that faces a balance sheet constraint may have incentives to suspend trading in Level 3 assets (traded on opaque over-the-counter markets) in order to avoid such marking-to-market. This keeps the book valuation artificially high, relaxing the balance sheet constraint. But, the institution loses direct control of the risk of its position. Solving this "real options" problem, the institution will report profits as they occur but delay reporting losses. A regulator trying to control risk imposes fines for balance sheet manipulation and capital requirements. Both these tools can increase risk-taking and balance sheet manipulation. Audits in comparision generally decrease risk-taking but may be costly to the regulator. The model provides predictions on the distribution of a bank's trading gains in illiquid markets.]

[We show that familiarity affects the portfolio decisions of mutual fund managers. Controlling for fund location, funds overweight stocks from their managers' home states by 12% compared with their peers. In team-managed funds, home-state overweighting is 37% larger than the fund location effect. The home-state bias is stronger if the manager is inexperienced, is resource-constrained, or spent more time in his home state. Home-state stocks do not outperform other holdings, confirming that home-state investments are not informed. The overweighting also leads to excessively risky portfolios.]

[Cross-listed firms in the United States have a higher investment-to-price sensitivity than do firms that never cross-list. This difference is strong, does not exist prior to the cross-listing date, and does not vanish afterward. Moreover, it does not appear to be primarily driven by improvements in governance, disclosure, and access to capital associated with a U.S. crosslisting. Instead, we argue that a cross-listing enhances managers' reliance on stock prices because it makes stock prices more informative to them. Consistent with this explanation, U. S. cross-listings that are more likely to strengthen the informativeness of stock prices for managers feature a higher investment-to-price sensitivity.]

[We use a natural experiment in Denmark to test the hypothesis that aspiring entrepreneurs face financial constraints because of low entrepreneurial quality. We identify 304 constrained entrepreneurs who start a business after receiving windfall wealth and examine the performance of these marginal entrepreneurs. We find that constrained entrepreneurs have significantly lower survival rates and lower profits when compared with a matched sample of unconstrained entrepreneurs. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the marginal entrepreneur is of low quality.]

[This article offers a dynamic model of opaque over-the-counter markets. A seller searches for an attractive price by visiting multiple buyers, one at a time. The buyers do not observe contacts, quotes, or trades elsewhere in the market. A repeat contact with a buyer reveals the seller's reduced outside options and worsens the price offered by the revisited buyer. When the asset value is uncertain and common to all buyers, a visit by the seller suggests that other buyers could have quoted unattractive prices and thus worsens the visited buyer's inference regarding the asset value.]